

BERNARD BOSANQUET AND HIS FRIENDS

LETTERS ILLUSTRATING THE SOURCES
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS
PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS

Edited by

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“As iron sharpeneth iron, so a man
sharpeneth the countenance of his friend”

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To
HIS NEPHEW
R. C. B.

“From these clear coverts high and cool I see
How every time with every time is knit,
And each to all is mortised cunningly
And none is sole or whole, yet all are fit.”

SIDNEY LANIER

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ILLUSTRATIONS

BERNARD BOSANQUET

frontispiece

HELEN BOSANQUET

facing page 88

P R E F A C E

THE idea of making inquiries as to surviving letters of Bosanquet was suggested quite accidentally by a question addressed to me by Dr. Henry Barker, of Edinburgh University, in a correspondence some years ago on the relation of Bosanquet's philosophical opinions to those of his friend and contemporary, F. H. Bradley. "Is it possible," he asked in connection with what I had written of the two men in *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, "to fix the time when Bosanquet definitely accepted Bradley's metaphysical doctrines?" The question at the moment took me somewhat by surprise. Taking "metaphysical doctrines" in the sense of the idealistic tradition in philosophy in general, it seemed to involve the old textbook fallacy of questions. I had not thought that there ever was a time when Bosanquet had taken his lead in this from Bradley. I conceived of them both as having imbibed it from the teaching of some of the leading Oxford thinkers of their time—a view that was confirmed by the way in which Bosanquet so early as 1885 described what he took to be the situation as one in which "the plan of the great masters" (he had just named Kant, Fichte, and Hegel) "is being handed over to be carried out by the journeymen,"¹ among whom he reckoned both Bradley and himself. If Bradley had been before him in carrying it out in fresh ways in ethics and logic, any debt which Bosanquet owed him for this was set off by the friendly criticisms which Bosanquet was always ready to pass on what appeared to him departures from the spirit of their common inheritance. But the question might bear another interpretation. By "metaphysical doctrines" might be meant the bent that Bradley had succeeded in *Appearance and Reality* in giving to the argument of some of his predecessors for an idealistic interpretation of the universe by his doctrine of the Absolute. In this sense I knew from reiterated statements in

¹ *Knowledge and Reality*, p. vii. Cp. *The Distinction between Mind and its Objects* (1913), p. 55, where this description is repeated.

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Bosanquet's published works that he always generously recognized Bradley as his leader, and the question in that case reduced itself to that of the precise time at which he transferred his allegiance from the old argument, which was mainly derived from Kant's proof of the *a priori* element in knowledge, to the new one founded upon the nature of ultimate reality. I did not remember any decisive indication of the answer to the question in this form in his books; but it struck me that if access could be obtained to any correspondence he may have had with Bradley himself, or with others of his older contemporaries, we might have a clue to it, and I thought it would be worth while to make inquiries. In reply to a letter to his nephew and literary executor, Professor R. C. Bosanquet, and to another to the readers of *Mind* and of *Philosophy*, kindly published by the editors, I shortly found myself in possession of a large number dating from the early years of his residence as Fellow and Tutor in Oxford and including a continuous series to his colleague and most intimate friend in University College, F. H. Peters, from this time till Peters's death in 1900. Though they contained little or nothing directly bearing on Dr. Barker's question, they struck me as of the greatest interest in themselves, not only as containing indications of the sources and development of many of his well-known opinions, but as revealing new sides of the writer's character, and perhaps for these reasons justifying publication on their own account as a supplement to his wife's short life of him. Clutton Brock used to say that "we cannot believe any theory of the universe until it has expressed itself in terms of art; for only then are we sure that the theorist believes it." In these letters one seemed to see how Bosanquet had expressed his theory of the Absolute in terms of the art of life, and had thus given us new assurance of his belief in it. Two circumstances in the end decided me.

The first of these was that Professor R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, of Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg, who had been intimately associated with him for several years in the work of the Moral Philosophy Chair in St. Andrews, was found to have preserved a

Preface

second long series of letters from him which he was generous enough to be willing to place at my disposal for that purpose. These on closer acquaintance seemed to me to contain not only much that was of exceptional interest in connection with Bosanquet's opinions at that and the immediately following time, but to offer one of the most attractive pictures which philosophical literature supplies of the relations of an older writer with a younger, whose general adhesion to his main line of thought he was proud to own, but whom at the same time he regarded as far too independent a thinker to be tied down to the words of any master, and from whom as he broke into new fields, he was himself prepared to learn.

The second circumstance was that, upon further inquiry, I found that a considerable portion of the correspondence in which, as I knew from Mrs. Bosanquet's book, he had become involved in the last two or three years of his life with some of the younger Italian writers had been preserved on both sides, and that, taken along with the articles contributed to Gentile's *Giornale Critico* in 1922-3 (perhaps unfamiliar to English readers), this put the issue between his own form of Idealism and theirs in a fuller and clearer light than any of his books.

In addition to the letters to and from his philosophical friends, I have had the opportunity of seeing a large number of his letters to the younger members of his own immediate circle of relatives, which sometimes throw interesting sidelights on references in the others and contain characteristic *obiter scripta* on passing events, some of which I have been permitted to quote.

The questions of the order of arrangement and the permissible amount of introduction and annotation have caused me some difficulty. With regard to the former, the most natural order might seem to be the usual one of the dates. On the other hand, where the main interest is in the subject and the interplay between Bosanquet's thought upon it with that of his correspondent, the precise order of time is of less importance, and I have not been too particular in keeping to it.

With regard to introductions and annotations, if the appeal of

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this volume had been confined to professional students of philosophy, I might have felt free to print the letters with a minimum of note and comment, merely explaining personal references. But hoping as I do that on account of its human interest it may appeal to a larger circle, I have thought that professional readers may perhaps forgive me for taking up more space with both than would have otherwise been justifiable.

I trust also to readers' forgiveness for printing the letters themselves as they left the writer's own hands, without altering contractions or punctuation.

In the divisions of the Contents into Parts, I have followed the order of the development of his view as generally indicated in the Introduction. But owing to its intrinsic interest and the amount of the material connected with it, I have assigned a separate Part to the Italian episode instead of treating it as an Appendix, as the reader less interested in the controversy is free to do.

I have to acknowledge my indebtedness not only to the friends of Bosanquet, who have been so kind as to send me the letters from him which are in their possession and to permit me to print in some cases their own replies, but to those who, like Mrs. de Glehn, Lord Charnwood, and Mrs. Oliver W. Campbell, have permitted me to publish letters from others to him of which they own the copyright. But I cannot conclude this Preface without expressing my deep obligation to his nephew, Professor R. C. Bosanquet, not only for the trouble he has taken in separating out from his uncle's papers the material relevant to the object of this volume, but for the continual encouragement he has given me in the task of annotating them, and going through the whole of the manuscript. To my wife I am indebted for copying all the letters in type, for reading the whole in proof, and for assisting me with advice on many difficult points of editorship.

J. H. MUIRHEAD

October 1934

INTRODUCTION

WHEN Bernard Bosanquet died in February 1923 at the age of seventy-five he was described in *The Times* obituary notice as having been the central figure in British philosophy for a whole generation. Though not the originator of the particular view of the nature of ultimate reality and of man's relation to it with which he was identified, he may be said to have been for the last twenty-five years of his life its most valiant and chivalrous defender, carrying its standard into every field and bearing with unfailing equanimity the blows he encountered there. The external facts of his life have been recorded with such delicate completeness in his wife's "Short Account" and will be so often referred to in the letters which follow that the barest statement of them will here be sufficient.

He came of an old and distinguished Huguenot stock, being the youngest son by a second marriage of the Rev. R. W. Bosanquet, of Rock Hall, Northumberland. One of his elder brothers lived to become Admiral Sir Day H. Bosanquet. Another, Robert Holford, was F.R.S. and Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. Charles, the eldest brother, was one of the founders of the Charity Organisation Society and its first Secretary—a fact which, together with a lifelong friendship with Charles Loch, the well-known second Secretary, helps to explain Bernard's never-faltering loyalty to that institution through good and evil report.

Born in 1848, he was educated at Harrow under H. Montagu Butler. In 1867 he entered Balliol with a scholarship at a time when the influence of T. H. Green was beginning to dominate in the college and produce a deep impression on the life of the University of Oxford, "bewildering some of his hearers, opening to others a new world."¹ Before he left Balliol, R. L. Nettleship, of all others the man who entered most fully into Green's mind and his future biographer, had already been Fellow and Tutor for two years.

After graduating with first-class honours in Moderations and

¹ A. C. Bradley, in notice in *Proceedings of British Academy*, 1923.

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After graduating with first-class honours in Moderations and

¹ A. C. Bradley, in notice in *Proceedings of British Academy*, 1923.

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Greats, he was elected to a Fellowship, against so redoubtable a candidate as F. H. Bradley,¹ in University College, where for the next ten years he lectured on Greek History and the ordinary philosophical subjects for "Greats." It seemed indeed as though the former at this time were going to claim his life's work. We know from his letters to his colleague, F. H. Peters, and from the translation of Schömann's *Athenian Constitutional History*, which was his first published work, how heartily he threw himself into it. We also know how deep an admiration he had conceived for the achievements of Greek genius ("Hellenism," he wrote in an early essay,² "is perhaps the most splendid product of any single epoch in the world's history"), and how this admiration remained and even grew upon him to the end. But by the death of his father in 1880 he came into possession of an independent income, and the call of philosophy, strengthened by a growing dislike of the narrowness of university life and its failure to give scope to the interest in social problems with which Green, Arnold Toynbee, and Charles Loch had inspired him, gained the victory. In spite of his warm affection for Peters, C. J. Faulkner, and others in University College, he left Oxford in 1881 and settled in London, in or near which, except for the five years between 1903 and 1908, during which he occupied the Chair of Moral Philosophy in St. Andrews, he remained until his death.

The form of idealistic philosophy with which his name is identified has been before the world in singularly complete form

¹ R. G. Tatton, in conversation with Mrs. Bosanquet about this election, spoke of the reputation Bradley had already acquired as "an unruly man," and unacceptable on that account, but added that "Bosanquet probably got it on his own merits."

² *Essays and Addresses*, p. 52. Writing to his niece, Amy Bosanquet, in 1882, he advises her to keep in view the reading of the best parts of Grote and Mommsen: "Few novels are so fascinating as the history of Athens and the fall of the Roman Republic. . . . Not having read Greek, you want all the more to know how peoples so different from us and yet as great as we or greater, and in whose lives are the roots of our own, lived, acted and felt."

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for the last ten years in the long list of his books and articles. Is it possible by their aid to find evidence of the influences under which it first formed itself in his mind and of any particular crises in its development? Reviewing it for purposes of this volume and with the additional light thrown upon it by his letters, I believe that it is.

He was described by Green when he came under his tuition as "the best equipped man of his generation," and I had hoped that among his letters there might have been found some that dated from his undergraduate days and that might tell of the special reading that thus equipped him to follow into "the new world" which Green's lectures opened up to him. Unfortunately, none that throw any light upon this seem to have survived. The only clue is in an affectionate note from Montagu Butler before he went in for Moderations, referring to his own re-reading of the *Phaedrus* as a book equally familiar to his old pupil, and speaking of Plato's insistence on τὸ τὰ ἄνω φρονεῖν as an anticipation of the central teaching of Christianity. But perhaps this is sufficient. Bosanquet mentions indeed in the passage already quoted in the Preface, Kant and Hegel as the great masters who had "sketched the plan" which he conceived of himself as engaged in merely working out. But he always thought of Plato as the first and greatest of them, and there could have been no better equipment for entering into the spirit of the teaching of Green and Nettleship than familiarity with the plan as sketched in the *Phaedrus* and the other great dialogues. What he learned from them he has himself told us. Speaking in one of his last papers of the distrust he had early conceived of the phrase, "the other world," he there wrote: "Plato in particular came as a revelation, not as confirming the dualism of 'this' world and 'the other,' but because, against one's hazy expectations and in opposition to the current and more or less popular legends of his meaning, it was so plain and obvious that his true passion was for the unity of things, and, as guides to its nature, for science and goodness. . . . If his main passion was for the unity of the universe, it was no less a passion for analysing. . . . The two passions coin-

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cided in the vision of the universe as that which alone can satisfy the whole intelligence and the total desire. The law of value as he laid it down for all time, 'that which is filled with the more real, is more really filled,' together with his doctrine of the increasing concreteness and vital stability of the higher experiences, made an end of dualism in principle, though fragments of dualistic formulae might float in the ocean of his thought, undissolved for the moment."¹

One need not suppose that all this became clear to him at once, but there can be no doubt that it was this principle of the unity of the world as he found it in Plato that formed from the first the guiding principle of his own thought, and prepared him to recognize what he later found in Green and Hegel and Bradley as in essential continuity with it.

If there is any doubt as to what formed his special equipment for his work as an undergraduate student of philosophy, there can be none at all as to what formed his apprenticeship for his work as a philosophical writer. His first years in London were devoted to preparing, in co-operation with Green, Nettleship, Peters, A. C. Bradley, and others, the translations of Lotze's *Logic* and *Metaphysics*, which were published under his editorship, each in two volumes, in 1884. There could have been no better preparation for his own more original work as a "journeyman." While it deepened his conviction that a renovation of both these studies had long been overdue, it led him also to see that the renovation, though it had been begun, had been left unfinished by Lotze owing to his failure to go deep enough. Lotze, he held, had got as far as anyone could who had not the root of the matter in him²—the clear and unerring perception of the essential unity of thought and reality. Between these he had made a fatal division in that he seemed to conceive of the reality as a given material on which thought worked from the outside as a mason upon his blocks.

In an illuminating passage in the article already quoted, Bosanquet

¹ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, pp. 54 and 55.

² See below, Letter VI.

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mentions as another of the antitheses which had from the first awakening of his mind driven him into rebellion, that which was implied in the phrases, "pure thought" and "mere logic." If by pure thought were meant genuine thinking, as distinguished from irrelevant association, the phrase might stand. But "taken as an ideal of thinking which has learned nothing from the universe and in no way determines it by affirmation, it exhibits itself to my mind as the very type of impotence and self-contradiction. . . . If you ask what reality is, you can in the end say nothing but that it is the whole which thought is always endeavouring to affirm. And if you ask what thought is, you can in the end say nothing but that it is the central function of mind in affirming its partial world to belong to the real universe."

But again we need not suppose that this view of thought and of its relation to "the whole," implied by it, which is the object of metaphysical study, had become clear to him at this time. We have, in fact, his own express statement to the contrary. "When I wrote about logic," he tells us in a paper written some twenty years later,¹ "I am afraid that I really thought, though I did not loudly proclaim it, that logic was the whole of philosophy. I argued thus with myself: Philosophy is the connected system of the form or ultimate universal essence of all objects, including, of course, all systems of objects. Now about all objects or systems of objects, the pure truth, so far as ascertainable, is to be sought for in the sciences and not elsewhere. Therefore, if it were possible to analyse out of the sciences and exhibit in their connection the universal essence of all objects and their systems, one would have in the result at once a logic and a philosophy."

Holding this and seeing with his usual clarity what it involved with reference to the world of ordinary sense-perception, as only the starting-point for "the patient labour of the intellect and will" by which it was "sustained and transformed,"² no wonder that he was

¹ See "Science and Philosophy" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1914-15, and the volume with that title in which this paper was republished after his death, p. 19.

² See *Knowledge and Reality* (1885), p. 20.

filled with misgiving when he seemed to find in Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, published in 1883, five years before his own book, indications of another and opposite view of the intellectual world, more in harmony with the dualism between thought and reality which he detected in Lotze than with the teaching of the "great masters" to which he believed the forward movement in England initiated by Green and others was committed. It was these misgivings that were the occasion of the publication in 1885 of the small volume of logical studies under the title of *Knowledge and Reality*, now long out of print, in the Preface of which he explains in a few words his conception of the philosophical situation as it then presented itself to him and the object of the book as an attempt to show how "Mr. Bradley's essential and original conceptions might be disengaged from some peculiarities which he apparently shares with reactionary logic." I have discussed elsewhere at length¹ the extent to which Bosanquet seems to have failed to realize that the whole situation was in process of being altered in Bradley's own mind, and there will be occasion to return to this again in the course of the following pages in connection with the letters that refer to it. What it is here important to notice is that in the passage in which he recounts his adhesion to the view of the subject-matter of Philosophy as identical with Logic, he goes on to indicate the change that had since then taken place in that view. "I now seem to see that the common oversight of all such argumentation is just this: Philosophy no doubt is a theory and its interest is theoretical. But no presumption arises from this that its object-matter is in turn a theory, or objects or kinds of being as apprehended through theories. Its object *prima facie* is the universe with all its activities and values, among which the theories of exact science with their objects form only a certain proportion. . . . Besides the theory of what concerns the sciences, a philosophy which is to have any claim to deal with the universe is bound, *prima facie*, to undertake a theoretical consideration of beauty and goodness. There is no less and no more reason, to start with, for the former than for the

¹ See *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 248 ff.

two latter. Whether each can maintain itself as a fruitful investigation depends on the course of the investigation itself and cannot in any way be determined beforehand. All of them, as branches of philosophy, are alike theoretical, and the demand is rightly to be maintained that their interest should be the pure interest of knowledge. But to suggest that a pure theoretical interest can only apply itself to the investigation of pure theory and its objects is at best, it seems to me, a mere verbal confusion." We know also from the Gifford Lectures, which had just been published when he wrote these words, the remarkable fruitfulness of the investigations he had himself carried out upon the programme here indicated by the extension of philosophy to the consideration of the principle of value as it reveals itself in other than intellectual, purely logical form.

When and under what influences did he become convinced of the error of a view, which in his case, we may be sure, was not the result of a mere verbal confusion but at worst of loyalty to what he had conceived of as implied in the great tradition to which he had given in his adhesion? That he did not permit the narrow view of the subject-matter of philosophy criticized in the above passage to hamper him in his own literary projects, even at the time to which he refers, seems clear from the publication of his book on Hegel's *Philosophy of Fine Art* in 1886, of *Essays and Addresses*, mainly ethical and social, in 1889, and his *History of Aesthetic* in 1892. But it was possible to have made this advance in literary practice without any explicit recognition of the view of reality which justified it. Thought, if not in the narrow sense of a merely intellectual process, yet in a wider sense in which perception, emotion, will itself were included, might still be the essence of the reality which found expression in art, morality, and religion. It might still be possible to hold with orthodox Hegelians that "the real is the rational." Already in Italy in those days writers were preparing the way for a new idealism of which the central doctrine was just the identity of pure thought with the Absolute and, as a consequence, the claim of philosophy to constitute the highest

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form of experience, truer, because more concrete even than religion itself.

That this or something like this was still his view in the first two years of the 'nineties could, I believe, be shown both from his writings and from his correspondence at that time. What made it no longer possible to hold it thereafter was the publication in 1893 of the book which more than any other in the last quarter of the nineteenth century can be said to have been epoch-making in British philosophy, F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*.

This is not the place to recall in detail the advance on current forms of neo-Kantian or Hegelian doctrine that this book sought to effect.¹ Professor G. Watts Cunningham has described it as the advance from an Idealism based on an epistemological argument to one based on the argument *a contingentia mundi*.² In simpler language, it was the advance from reliance in the place that thought occupies in the construction of the world as known to us, whether in ordinary experience or in the systematic form given it by science, to reliance rather upon the essential relativity of all forms of experience (whether intellectual, aesthetic, or volitional), to the idea of an absolute reality, revealing itself with varying degrees of completeness in these, but transcending even the highest of them in the fullness and harmony of its contents. Readers who are old enough to remember the publication of this book will remember also the suspicion with which its central thesis was received by some of the leading exponents of the older idealism. To Bosanquet almost alone it seemed from the first to be only "telling him his own dream." He saw in it a restatement in modern and brilliant language at once of the Platonic doctrine expounded in the *Republic* and the *Symposium* of the different degrees of truth and reality that belong to our experience at its different levels and of the criterion which Plato himself had clearly enunciated of their relative values, namely, the degree to which they were "filled with

¹ See *The Platonic Tradition*, etc., Part II.

² See *The Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy* (1933).

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reality." So far was it from introducing any new principle into idealist philosophy that, as he tells us,¹ he was filled with amazement by the treatment it received from philosophical opinion. Here at last, he thought, was idealism in the form of "a plain tale" that "shall put you down"² as to the test of what was ultimately satisfying in human experience and therefore of what is ultimately real in the world. Henceforth all the old problems had to be restated in a new form, opponents met on new ground, would-be supporters warned of the danger to which too narrow an interpretation of the truth for which idealism stood exposed them, affinities perhaps found with forms of philosophy apparently the most remote from theirs, and the way thus prepared for a truly synoptic philosophy unhampered by sectarian tradition.³ For these tasks there was no one living better equipped than Bosanquet. At a time when Bradley's health showed signs of failing, he was still, in spite of minor troubles, at the height of his powers. Once he had finished off certain commitments and could be free from the engagements to which proximity to London exposed him,⁴ he might be free to devote the closing years of his life to carrying out some such programme. With what mastery of the situation, as, owing to the excursions and alarums of new schools of thought in the first quarter of the new century (to a large extent summoned into existence by Bradley's book), he carried out this task, we know from the series of books which stand to his credit in these years. It was in view of these that the writer of the notice quoted at the beginning of this Introduction felt justified in describing him as the central figure of British philosophy for a generation. This is not the place

¹ See *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. vi.

³ In his obituary notice of Bosanquet in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1923, Lord Haldane singles out, as the most important feature of the method he shared with Bradley, the way in which it "produced closer relations with schools that were not idealist than had the methods of their predecessors."

⁴ We know from his letters that the prospect of cutting these ties was one of the main attractions of the appointment which he accepted in St. Andrews in 1903.

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—perhaps the time has not yet come—for a critical estimate of the value of his own contribution. I ventured to indicate in a short article in *Mind*, written after his death in 1923, the point that has seemed to some even of those who follow the same great tradition most open to criticism, together with the line along which conciliation might be found. Other questions are raised by what has been said above as to the development of his opinions by contact with current movements of thought, particularly by the place he assigned latterly to Nature which has been thought by some incompatible with his prevailingly spiritual view of the universe.¹ If this were the place, it could, I believe, be shown that the abandonment, under Bradley's influence, of the epistemological argument as the basis of a true idealism never meant for him the displacement of mind from its paramount position as that in which the meaning, and therefore the reality of nature finds its completest expression.

It is more consonant with the aim of this volume merely to add that when those of us who had the privilege of knowing him try to recall what they felt and still feel in presence of his life-work, they have the sense of a great mode of philosophizing instinct with the spirit of a strong and striking personality. Hegelian idealism first expounded by Hutchison Stirling, Caird, and Green, then reinterpreted by Bradley, finally, and as so reinterpreted, establishing points of contact with other modes of thought through Bosanquet, comes perhaps nearer than any other to illustrating what he described as the "convergence of investigations towards some truly speculative attitude—free, concrete, penetrating, and widely appreciative—which contemporary philosophy on all sides seems very strikingly to reveal" and to which it was his own highest ambition to contribute.²

¹ See Part V below, p. 203 and article "Nature in the Philosophy of Bosanquet," *Mind*, July 1934.

² See *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. vii and viii.

PART I

PHILOSOPHY AS LOGIC

“When I wrote about logic”

i. OXFORD IN THE 'SEVENTIES

LETTER I

FRANK H. PETERS is best known as the author of the translation of Aristotle's *Ethics*, which since the date of its publication in 1881 has been a very present help to "Greats" students in time of trouble. The promise of an Introduction in the Preface of the first edition was never fulfilled owing to ill health, and was withdrawn in the Note to the fourth edition. He came to Balliol in 1868, the year after Bosanquet, and as Fellow and Tutor of University College was jointly responsible with him for the teaching of logic. One can see already in this letter the attraction which logic was beginning to exercise upon the writer, and the direction in which his mind was moving in the revision of the theory of the syllogism.¹ His home was still Rock Hall, adjoining the village of that name, some five miles north of Alnwick.

ROCK

ALNWICK

March 25 (1876)
Saturday Evening

MY DEAR PETERS,

I don't think you will find anything in my views with which you are not familiar in a better form. For instance, about all certain Inference being an Identical Prop.: I only *meant* to be applying the well known distinction between the "abstract understanding" and the "Reason". Take e.g. the causal relation, as the most intimate known to the "understanding". Even an inference through the true cause as middle term (e.g. from "all men being mortal" assuming that the physical characters of man are the cause of

¹ A remark to his logic students at this time recorded by the Rev. W. E. Plater, Rector of Yeovil, who was one of them: "The sentence, 'The fritillary grows in Christ Church Meadows' might with fuller knowledge become merely an identical proposition," points in the same direction.

mortality) is technically incomplete, until the cause and effect (Man and Mortality) are demonstrated to be inseparable. But when this, the highest, stage of certainty is attained, the distinction between cause and effect ceases to exist (as of course it does not exist for the "reason"), and the syllogistic form comes to be merely an articulate exposition of the 3 elements in the complete Thought. Such an exposition appears to me to be nothing but an Identical proposition, in which the Copula (as Hegel wld. say) is enlarged into the Middle Term. If you dislike my employing the phrase "Identical" of a proposition in which difference still exists $\pi\omega s$, I would substitute Analytic; protesting at the same time that Identical would be the technically correct phrase, though describing a state of knowledge to which we merely approximate.

It would follow, I thought, that "Certain Inference" would be a contradiction in terms, and that the complete forms of Syllogism could only express articulation, and not inference. For the thought of the Reason, though formally a whole, (and really one with itself) can never, as it seems to me, be regarded as an actual whole with reference to the context of experience; but must partake of the abstract character which belongs to the finite mind in its relations with an infinite possible structure of knowledge. i.e. to employ the thought as a weapon of inference (to make it *grow*) it must again be passed through the stage of growth, that is perception and the abstract understanding, wh. = the forms of inference. Otherwise it seemed to me that we should get into the Nominalist hobble, and rest truth on abstraction. E.g. All Carnivorous Organisms are animals

The lion is a C.O.

\therefore etc. etc.

That works all right in fig. 1. because the lion is an expected customer; though technically if the lion was not expected when the major was admitted, the Thought was relatively to him an abstraction, and has really been treated as such, and *stretched*, not merely articulated, in the argument. But as nothing wrong has

resulted, the extension, though formally invalidating the argument, passes unnoticed. Isn't that really the character of Mathematical arguments. But now try

All C.O.'s are A's
Sundew is a C.O.
∴ Sundew is an A.

The thought of Reason, though it may have been quite complete in itself, is here manifestly an abstraction from which a huge mass of knowledge has been omitted; and the perfect type of syllogism is consequently vehicle of an inference, and a bad one. Of course there are really 4 terms; but if the "Law of nature" is to be held to we must simply say with a Nominalist that "you may call it an Animal in that sense if you like": just as the sun and moon are still called planets, by a survival, in the theory of tides. This would save the universality of our thought, by insisting on its abstraction. I.e. wld. be an appeal to the "bad" universality; that of the term with the smaller content. Therefore when the thought requires stretching as in all cases of Inductive Inference I should certainly think that the right form was Aristotle's Inductive syllogism, in its incomplete state, i.e. before the Induction διὰ πάντων is perfected. I haven't a book and am probably wrong, but my notion of it is this;

Socr. and Caesar are mortal
Socr. and Caesar are men
∴ All men are mortal.

For the διὰ πάντων he requires a conversion, based on examining all the cases.

Socr. and C. are mortal
such as
All men are } Socr. Caesar etc
included in
∴ All men are mortal.

The former of these syllogisms (involving an illicit process, though strictly not in syll. form at all) always seemed to me a step in the right direction, and I thought that Ar(istotle) would have come out more right if he had looked to the quality instead of the number of his instances.

In proving an essence from attributes, instead of proving it from cases as Ar. would, it is more convenient to take a form which gives an undistributed middle, instead of an illicit process; I suppose all modern Induction can be reduced to the type All metals are lustrous.

This is lustrous

∴ This is a metal.

which of course has the formal fallacy of undistributed middle. The thought may be made complete in itself by using the first figure or perfect form

All lustrous things are metals

etc etc.

but ought then to be beyond the stage of inference, as the conclusion is certainly assumed in the major. I have purposely used a quite vulgar illustration; the differentia "lustrous" is upset by the first thing wh. "glitters and is not gold". (Though here again; if we like to say that lustre = metallic lustre, wh. it almost does by usage, we may preserve the truth of our differentia at the expense of its usefulness). I believe that the same rules apply even where, as in Mathematics, the analogies are so simple that the change of meaning in the syllogistic series is anticipated or unperceived. But of course I have admitted by implication that any Thought which is once put in its right place in the context of experience, is so far safe from further change; though no thought can be so really, till all are. No doubt Math. science looks like doing this in a sense now; but it may be deceiving itself; and the ultimate laws of nature may have to be gone over again.

Of course I think that all propp. are both Synthetic and Analytic;

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still the Synthetic par excellence are those of the Abstract Understanding, expanded into the Synthetic, Imperfect, Inductive or Analogical Syllogism; the Analytic par excellence those of the Reason, expressed by the Analytic, Perfect, Deductive, or Scientific Syllogism.

There; you brought it on yourself; don't blame me. You will see that it is nothing but a lot of truisms read as Paradoxes; but I can't help it. I have just been to church 17 people there besides; I read the lessons; I also read prayers in the house and altogether am preparing for heaven; but don't feel as if I was there yet. I ought to have said that even the Method of Difference can only test for known differentiae; unknown and unsuspected ones must escape it. In every experiment there are infinite varying circumstances; and who can say which are essential and which are not?

I really regret having written at such length; but you needn't answer; I can't condense it, it would take so long;

Goodbye; yours ever

S. BOSANQUET

LETTER II

Bradley's *Ethical Studies* was published in 1876. Though T. H. Green's *Introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature* had appeared in 1874 and he had been lecturing in Balliol on Moral Philosophy since 1860, Bradley's book was the first systematic statement of idealistic ethics in England. Bosanquet wrote of it in the year before his own death:¹ "For many of us the publication of Mr. F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies* in 1876—T. H. Green's conceptions being known at the time to his students through his lectures but not yet made public in a treatise—was an epoch-making event, not merely as restating and concluding the discussion of Hedonism, but because of a philosophical significance which far transcended that particular subject matter." He goes on to express

¹ See *Contemporary British Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 57.

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surprise at the comparatively small effect that the philosophical implications had in the interval produced, attributing it in part to the fact that it had never been reprinted, but in part also to the fact that "the book, though brilliantly written, suffered from the excess of thought and experience which it contained, being to most books on philosophy like Dickens or Meredith to most novels; a page of it would dilute into a hundred of any other." As a measure of the development of Bosanquet's own interests between the two dates we could not have a better than the difference between what he says in this letter on the ethical questions involved and what he goes on to say in the article just quoted where he fixes on Bradley's "Concluding Remarks" on the relation of the religion to morality as that which gives particular significance to the book. Though he is reported not to have thought so at the time and rather to have regretted the tone of this section, I believe that Bradley himself would have agreed in general with this later judgment.

What Bosanquet says in this letter about pleasure is of particular interest in connection with his later views as to the place of feeling. No one could accuse him of being a hedonist. He held that Bradley's book had said the last word on all that. But he held also that the psychologists are right when they tell us that pleasure is fundamental as indicating "both harmony and expansion of the self,"¹ and even that "every expansion *qua* expansion must be harmonious." Its value in the scale of human life depends upon what the self expands in presence of and accordingly what it expands into.²

¹ See *History of Aesthetic*, p. 437.

² This broadmindedness enables us to understand an incident recalled by Wildon Carr in a letter to Mrs. Bosanquet after her husband's death as an instance of his "gallantry," when, on the occasion of a paper by Miss Constance Jones, the well-known Mistress of Girton, on "Sidgwick's Hedonism" (given at the Aristotelian Society), which was violently attacked in discussion as justifying gladiatorial shows and other immoralities, "he came to her assistance in a way that made the opposers ashamed, not only defending her but supporting her theory."

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ROYAL HOTEL

NORTH BERWICK

Aug. 13, 1876

DEAR PETERS,

I threatened you with a letter, you know, and here it is. It may not find you, but that will be your good fortune. I suppose you are planted in Devonshire somewhere, and if you are not melted, are still alive. I saw Mrs Loch and Loch in town, and as I suppose he has a holiday, it is not impossible that they are with you now. If so pray remember me to them. I was ten days in town, then about a month at home, then made flying visits in S. of Scotland till last Tuesday, when I settled here for a fortnight, to read and meditate in solitude. I hate this life of a rolling stone to which the Long condemns me. I can neither work nor enjoy myself with real interest. Still I have got something done for my Grk. History lecture of next term; and find its claims so menacing that the book I was to write must wait; perhaps for ever. At first on reading Bradley's book I felt as if blown to the winds: I have been picking myself up since, but shall be much more cautious than I had meant to be in resolving to write. May I put my two chief difficulties with him on paper here? I have not done it before. First; I want to give Hedonism a scientific place; it is always hateful to me to put anything beyond the range of science; and I desire to class it as a theory, non-moral indeed (I agree with all that) but still workable and even useful as a first approximation. Therefore the part I have trouble with is all that about the "consistent hunt after pleasure";¹ it seems to me that no Hedonist need make his scientific abstraction into a moral abstraction; but the distinction is so elementary that I must be wrong, and I do not profess to know the literature of the subject. In a word, my idea of Hedonism is to define the will as "the last appetite before acting". His apparently is to define the end of moral action as pleasure in the abstract, which I do not well understand. But no doubt it must be an account given by Hedonists; the fact is, I have read very

¹ See *Ethical Studies*, first edition, p. 92, l. 4.

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few. I can understand saying in the abstract, as all science is abstract, that pleasure is the end of action; just as we may say in the abstract that self-realization is the end of action; but the question of the degree in which the end of action must be envisaged in the abstract as such by the moral consciousness, is horribly difficult, and I don't think I clearly see through it. But the strong points of Hedonism, its recognition of reason in appetite, and of the selfeducating tendency of desire, he seems to me to omit. I mean, the possibility of an objective demonstration of the "greater pleasure".

Second; in the same way about Utilism.; I want to make a definite stage, both in morality and in moral science, at the point where appetite becomes so far trained as to turn into human affection; in other words when some comprehensive thought, such as the idea of pleasure of all sentient, attracts the affections into an "enthusiasm of humanity". When my "System" comes out, it will be in three books, headed "Appetite", "Affection", "Will"; and they will be treated as stages of self-assertion of reason. To avoid appearing rash, I may add that I hardly think it ever will come out.

But this is enough; my Greek History is my present labour, and I am going down to the sea directly to smoke and read the "Odyssey". How jolly the new rooms of the National Gallery will be; when I was in town I was mad about the Blake exhibition; Mrs Loch intended to go, I hope she did go finally. Really you needn't answer; I write from the necessity of conversation at the moment; but no doubt I should like to hear if you have time;

Very truly yours

BERNARD BOSANQUET

P.S. I shall be here till Tuesday week, then at Rock, Alnwick.

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LETTER III

UNIV. COLL.

Xmas Eve (1876)

DEAR PETERS,

A merry Xmas to you, though I should lay more stress on the happy New Year; seeing that my letter will not reach you till the day after Xmas. I hope you are well and happy; all my friends noticed that you were doing too much last term; and I am uneasy about it. Do remember that good men are scarce! I went and called on Abbot (t?)¹ of Balliol yesterday; he was more affable than I had been led to expect, and I thought him a delightful fellow. You will be amused to hear that I came back from town last Tuesday expressly to write on Bradley, and found a letter from young Bradley² begging me if I did to try and get it into *Mind*, the *Westminster*, or the *British Quarterly*. I replied that I would do anything that anybody told me; but I suppose I am late for the January "*Mind*", and it will be rather ancient history by April; I promised Bradley to try the others if I didn't get into *Mind* but it is all rather a bore; and I am inclined to think for the book's sake the fewer people see my paper the better; for I am sure it is awfully dull. I have written 22 pages MS = about 15 of *Mind* I should guess, and I have to finish by Tuesday night; probably about 30 MS and 20 of *Mind*, I should think, will be the length. I go down to Ouseley (Rooper's) on Wednesday for three nights, and then come up to get lectures ready, and must have absolutely none of this thing left to do then or in term time. I am very much inclined to put it in Thornton's³ hands at once, or I know I shall want to

¹ Evelyn Abbott (1843-1901) was elected Fellow and Tutor of Balliol in 1874 and thenceforth, in spite of the paralysis of his lower limbs, was "the mainstay of the administration and teaching of the College." He was editor of the volume of essays published as *Hellenica* in 1880 and joint editor with Lewis Campbell of the biography of Benjamin Jowett. His chief work, *The History of Greece*, in three volumes, was published 1888-1900.

² Andrew C. Bradley, F. H. Bradley's younger brother, at this time Fellow and Tutor of Balliol.

³ The well-known Oxford bookseller and publisher. I have not been able to discover whether this article was ever published.

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rewrite it. I saw Ernest Myers¹ in town the other day; Abbott couldn't tell me what he was doing, except as secretary to something or other. By the way, how and where is Loch (a rhetorical question)? don't tell him I was a week in town without going to see him. I went with Mrs McCallum² and Stirling to the vaults of the National Gallery where is a room with not only the old Kensington Turners on the walls, but with full 50 cases of his studies, including the Rivers of France and the harbours of England. We were 3½ hours at a table hard at work at them; saw almost none in proportion out of the lot. Stirling, with that tendency to systematize pleasures that marks him for a pupil of mine, improved on the existing system by going to Wornum himself and getting an order for 6 months (once a week) an indulgence which nearly drove the attendant out of his mind. That was after I was there. But probably you know all about these things; I have always observed you to be omniscient.

Goodbye Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

The Porter should always marry a cook; Wheeler did so, and I, generously allowing the college kitchen to be shut up, am enjoying improved food in consequence. I really didn't know it would be so; but I hope the college will see that it always is so in future.

LETTER IV

ROCK

ALNWICK

Sept. 16, 1877

DEAR PETERS,

. . . . I am glad the Mods Logic question is settled; I was in no hurry, but like to know my work for the academical

¹ Fellow of Wadham College and author of the essay on *Æschylus in Hellenica*.

² A cousin of Bosanquet's closely associated with him in some of his most characteristic London activities.

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year beforehand. You must give me the hints you were going to make use of, when we meet. I heard from the Master the other day; he and Fyffe have been concocting a paper for the scientific men; I wish we had had an Essay; I suggested that they should be asked to define an organism, but perhaps that will be thought too rude. I have not done as much as I wanted, finished Hdt. and have read Böckh Staatsh. der Athener; that is all. There are hundreds more books on Greek antiquities I have to read; it is an infinite subject. I almost think another Long I shall stay up at Oxford and study hard for some part, and go away without books for the rest of the time. I can't do more than 5 or 6 hrs a day here. You must have enjoyed being with Andrew Bradley; he is almost too good to spend in teaching, but I suppose he won't err on that side. I suspect Andrew Lang has erred on the other; Mrs Creighton told me the other day that his mind is perceptibly lowering to the level of the newspaper-writer. He has made a profession of it, and it is a damned bad one. Steel wrote me a long letter about the undergraduates' intellectual life, which he thinks very badly of. He declares there is neither religion nor good infidelity among them, and thinks we ought to do something to give them healthy occupation on Sundays! I was staggered, as I look back with the greatest possible delight on my own undergraduate Sundays, and I am sure we had dialectic enough. . . I suppose what he says must be true at least about Univ. Coll. . . I wonder if we shall ever have any intercourse with the men which is at once social and "intellectual"? Their opinions stand fearfully in the way just now. Don't you sometimes wish you were Professor Beesley with a lot of disciples; I always feel Mephistopheles' taunt to Faust, that after all he daren't teach the best he knows. . . I hope Bright¹ may have taken a holiday again; what he did with us was insufficient to set him up. I have read Edward Dowden's Shakespeare Essays through, and it is excellent; not that his assertions "Shakespeare meant" or "taught" this or that can possibly be true,

¹ J. F. Bright, afterwards Master of the College in succession to George Granville Bradley, who was Master at this time.

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but they have a sort of illustrative value. I should like our men to read the book. Darwin's *Forms of Flowers* looks delightful but I have only looked at the introduction; it goes to show that even in common flowers of the same species there is often an adaptation of form which tends to cross fertilisation. You aren't to answer this; it is merely written in need of conversation; there is no one here who can talk except my brother,¹ and he is but a physicist, poor fellow. Au revoir.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER V

P.S. I have been led into bad metaphysics by evil communications; they needn't be read, *they* will exist in the absence of your consciousness, I fear.

CASTLEMEAD

MANORBIER

S. WALES, R.S.O.

Aug. 25 (1878)

MY DEAR PETERS,

. . . . This is a most celestial place, and our house very comfortable; the presence of two ladies undoubtedly makes a difference.

It is a very fine coast; we are on a ridge of Old Red Sandstone, which joins Silurian on one side of us and common limestone on the other; but the colours and shapes are most wonderful, and as Mrs Mc. Callum is always sketching one's attention is drawn to them a good deal. . . . I began the vac. by reading H. Spencer's psychology; and it has partly driven me back towards Green, and away from the tendency which I think was yours when we last spoke together. It forced on me a new *form* of an old argument for the non-existence of bodies apart from consciousness of them. Waiving the old puzzle about existence without consciousness, is

¹ Holford, see p. 19 above.

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there not a more obvious difficulty in existence of things as we know them or can in any way conceive them in the absence of our *bodies*? Unless I misapprehend, it is demonstrable that without the eye or ear the *external mechanical equivalents* of sounds or colours do not exist; and so for all sensation. Of course this is only pushing the old question into detail; but it seems to me at present quite unanswerable. It is not the metaphysical difficulty, as if consciousness was independent of an organism and being wiped out might imaginably leave the vibrations etc. as before; it is the practical consequence of consciousness being bound up in an organism, viz. that without the organism the mechanical motions necessary to the production of sensation as we have it, and different from the motions which communicate it to our bodily frame, are demonstrably absent. It is not e.g. the etherial vibrations that constitute a colour; it is other and quite differently timed vibrations set up in a nervous medium by the former. To say then that the colour exists apart from that particular organism seems to me like saying that a piano plays if you take away all but the keyboard. No one would say that the rudimentary eye or ear or limb can cause a consciousness of colour sound or figure at all like ours; and when there is no eye etc. how can we possibly think that the things exist? Of course you may go for primary qualities; (do you? I forget) or for H. Sp's unknowable; but do you care for that? I mean wouldn't you as soon do without altogether? Of course this is no new puzzle; we have always known that things got into consciousness through a medium which modified them; and we ought to have been prepared for the consequences of supposing this medium away. But I confess it never occurred to me how irresistible the inference is, when you can definitely say "without this subdivision of the retina there is no consciousness of colour; and below such and such a point in the animal scale there is no subdivision?" The *mechanical condition* being taken away it seems to me the quality must go, if science is to mean anything at all, as much as if the thing wh. causes the colour were itself taken away.

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Have I a conclusion? No, I have none; I am prepared for primary qualities if the same argument does not apply to them; or for a Pythagorean number world; or, I confess, for a God; or an unknowable. Of course you may say that we don't demonstrate away the conditions of the thing's *existence*, but only those of our consciousness of it; but then, it is such a complete annihilation of all *imaginable* conditions of its *existence*; in short, except to a similar organism, it is *demonstrably not* what it seems to us; not merely *not demonstrably*. There, this is all stale and included in the old puzzle; but I have only just realised it.¹ I shall put a warning at the beginning of the letter so that you need not read it all.

I hope you are well; we have jolly lawn tennis² and bathing here, don't bother to write, and certainly not to answer my metaphysics, but I shall be glad to hear if you are prosperous.

I am doomed and must return for a moment; what has fixed me so is the *amount* of modification which the organism contributes; if any sensitive surface would understand light equally well, I could more easily imagine that we know something of colour-in-itself. But the modification of colour seems so much a *πάρεργον* of nature, and done by our eye for our own amusement, that I can't imagine any sort of relation between it and the outer mechanical fact wh. forms part of the condition.

"Circumstances over wh. we have no control, bless you and keep you".

Yours affectionately

B. BOSANQUET

¹ Cp. what he says on primary and secondary qualities, Letter CII below.

² A fairly early notice of the game. It had been brought to Rock by his sailor brother Day in 1874 in its rudimentary form as Sphairistiké (the name under which its inventor, Major Wingfield, had patented it in that year). In 1877 the rules had been remodelled by the All England Club after the pattern of the older tennis. Bosanquet doubtless would be up to date in this as in other things.

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LETTER VI

ROCK

ALNWICK

Jan. 5, 1879

MY DEAR PETERS,

I am going to relieve my indolence by writing to you; you need neither read nor answer. We have had deep snow here till the beginning of the week, now hard frost, and skating on some flood ice near, for those who skate. I suppose you are zealous at that. You would be pleased at the Lord Mayor's refusing to have a fund;¹ I am sorely in straits what to subscribe to; it seems rather rough to do nothing out of sheer wisdom. But it certainly is pleasant to see the great towns saying they want no outside help. Did you see the French Govmt. sent 500 francs to Newcastle? a very funny present for a government to make. I have just read tonight (in Cockburn's Memorials) that "on March 4 1795 about eleven thousand persons, being probably about an eighth of the population, were fed by charity in Edinburgh". I wonder if they were all really in want. But that was a dearth of corn, not likely now.

Is the book progressing? I have finished, or rather come to the end of, Lotze. I had to leave out a lot of the mathematics; it only wanted a little time, but that I had not to give. I shall be anxious to hear what you think of him; he seems to me as good as any one can be, *without having* the root of the matter in him.² But I would forgive him anything for his defence of Plato's ideas.³ Only omitting the reference to Plato's doctrine, surely it is a wild notion of his that a "Begriff" can't express a Law of Nature, because it has no change in it, while a judgment has. It seems to me quite ridiculous; depends on his view about some notions being prior to judgments I suppose. But I oughtn't to plague you with all this; you shall explain it all when we meet. (A pleasant look out!) Yesterday I began my lectures for next term; I am going to strive

¹ For the unemployed in this bad winter.

² See Introduction, p. 22 above.

³ E.g. *Logic*, sec. 314 ff.

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to make them clear; but they will not be. My head is not naturally clear. I am expecting Stirling here with his mother on Tuesday to stay a night on their way to town, and I shall arrange with him about a day at the Brit. Mus. in the last week. Wednesday 22nd I should think. I suppose nothing has happened to the Hall for Ladies since the Master's accession. Was it true that the Newnham ladies jumped over the Lawn tennis net? . . . Could we get a symbol in Lotze's manner for "circumstances over wh. we have no control"; say for instance like this "Cm-Wn. bless you"! it would be shorter,

Ever yr affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

ii. LONDON IN THE 'EIGHTIES

THE 'eighties will always be known as a time of rising interest in social reform. For a generation Ruskin and Morris had been exercising a powerful influence on their time. These were both Oxford men, and it was only natural that through them it should have begun to be felt in their old university. One of the present editor's earliest recollections of Oxford was of seeing undergraduates hastening with picks and shovels in hansoms to take part in Ruskin's scheme of road-making at Hinksey in 1874. Through the teaching and example of T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee a more practical direction was being given to social effort in the later 'seventies. One who had entered so fully as Bosanquet into that peculiar union of the practical and theoretic represented by these men, and was free to follow his own bent, was not likely to be long content with the "cloistered virtue" of college life. "To find in life new material for philosophy," wrote his wife, "and to take back to life the wider views gained by philosophical insight—this I think may be said to have been his vocation."¹ London

¹ *Bernard Bosanquet*, p. 55.

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in the 'eighties offered a unique field for its exercise. Here the new interest in social reform had begun to concentrate and organize itself in various societies led by the younger men. Already these were dividing themselves into those which like the Democratic Federation, founded for direct action by Morris and Hyndman in 1880, shortly to be followed by the Fabian Society with its subtler method of "permeation," were pledged to State or municipal Socialism, and those which like the Charity Organisation Society stood for co-operation in the humbler work of detailed action on the character of individual and family life. Both by the ties of family and of friendship¹ Bosanquet was drawn to the latter. But there were deeper sources of sympathy with such work. He has himself told us of the impression which the existence in and around his old Northumbrian home of a "real social will," as "the completer fact in which the private will finds form" and as containing the whole secret of "the art of living together," had made upon him.² This, uniting with what he had learned from Plato, Rousseau, and Hegel of the concrete reality of the General Will, had inspired him with a profound belief that "our growing experience of all social 'classes' proves the essentials of happiness and character to be the same throughout the social whole,"³ and a corresponding distrust of doctrines and methods which seemed to him to dim this "time-honoured belief." "Those," he held, "who cannot be enthusiastic in the study of society as it is, would not be so in the study of a better society if they had it. 'Here or nowhere is your America.'"⁴

The danger that such views should be misunderstood and taken by more impatient reformers to be "individualistic" and reactionary is obvious, and Bosanquet did not escape their open hostility on this ground. Perhaps he tended to forget the difference in the problem as it presented itself in a northern village and in the enormously complicated circumstances of modern industrial life,

¹ See p. 19 above.

² See *Contemporary British Philosophy*, i, p. 52 and p. 312 (19) below.

³ *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. ix.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

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and failed sufficiently to realize the depth of the wound inflicted on the life of the working-class populations by the *laissez-faire* doctrine and practice of the preceding half-century. But it has to be remembered that the distinction between a doctrinaire Socialism and the social control through legislation of unsocial profiteering had not yet become clear. Bosanquet was prepared, as he said at the time, for any amount of collectivism. What he insisted on was that it should be guided by sound doctrine as to what he called in the passage quoted above "the essentials of happiness and character." On this there can be no doubt whatever of the quite fundamental truth of the doctrine he had inherited from Green of the existence of a true general will or social conscience in all classes of the community, on the liberation of which from obstructions, whether the natural one of ignorance or the artificial one of industrial exploitation, all social progress in the end depends.

Fortunately, during these early years in London there were forming themselves other groups of student reformers which were less committed than the C.O.S. to anti-socialist controversy and which appealed to his interest, as combining theory with practice.

One of these was the London Ethical Society founded in 1886 by a small group of university men who had heard of the American Ethical Culture Movement and sought to adapt its methods to the opportunities offered by Toynbee Hall for Sunday evening addresses. Bosanquet became a member of its first committee with Mr. E. Peters, the father of his friend, F. H. Peters, as chairman, and Professor Edward Caird, of Glasgow, as President of the Society. He saw the possibilities of such a society, but he saw also the danger of assimilating it too much to the American model, with its semi-ecclesiastic organization, its leader and hortatory weekly address, and at the beginning of the second session he circulated a characteristic open letter to its members for the express purpose of warning them against it. "The object of the Society ought to be not moral suasion," which he compared to medicine, but "new resources in life, intellect, and feeling," which he compared to wholesome food—"not so much to help our hearers as to

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put them in a position to help themselves." So far as its work was reformatory, it "ought to aim at transforming, by organizing the material of a noble life, so as to bring it within the reach of all." "Teach moral philosophy (among other things) by all means; but for Heaven's sake do not mix up your teaching with your preaching." That he was on the whole satisfied that his advice was being followed was shown by his continuing after Mr. Peters's death to be the Chairman of Committee for the next ten years. He once said to me that he thought that Professor William Wallace, who sometimes lectured for the Society, had found a certain inspiration in the discovery that he could hold the attention of a London audience. I believe that the same could be said of himself. When the Society, after removing to Essex Hall, The Strand, added to its work the formation of a centre for University Extension and he was persuaded with much difficulty himself to undertake courses on Logic, Psychology, and Ethics, there was no more effective lecturer in the whole U.E. movement.¹

LETTER VII

In the first years of his residence in London his main occupation was with his book on *Logic*. But here, as in the case of his projected book on ethics, Bradley had again unwittingly anticipated him by the publication of his *Principles of Logic* in 1883. While recognizing the significance of the book as a contribution to the forward movement in British philosophy, he was disconcerted by what he took to be signs in the writer of having been unduly influenced by Lotze and writers of what he called "the German reaction." The particular danger point was the recurrence of the dualism between the constructive work of thought and a real world, supposed to be given in perception, which it

¹ A number of his syllabuses have survived. They are a model of clear condensed statement of the subjects of the several lectures with lists of books and testing questions. On the London Ethical Society, see *The Ethical Movement in Great Britain*, by G. Spiller (1934).

had been the work of the great German idealists, in their endeavour after a world which, in Fichte's words, should be "all of one piece," to undermine and explode. So disturbed did Bosanquet feel by this note in Bradley's book, especially as it occurs in the now famous passage where, in contrast to the concrete world of perception, thought is referred to as "a spectral woof of impalpable abstractions or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," that he laid aside his own work to put together the logical studies contained in the little book, published in 1885 under the title *Knowledge and Reality*, with the view of counteracting it.¹

The spirit in which Bradley received the criticisms it contained may be seen from the Preface to the second edition of the *Principles of Logic* (1922), where he acknowledges his gratitude to Bosanquet "for all that, since 1883, he had owed him," and from the frequent references to them in the "Additional Notes" he there appended to the chapters of the original.² If we ask what Bosanquet received from Bradley in return, we have to wait for the answer until, after the publication eight years later of *Appearance and Reality*, it became clear to him that Bradley had no intention of severing the world of thought as an artificial product of an intellectual process from that given in immediate perception as something more solidly real, but aimed on the contrary at welding them more solidly together as inseparable aspects or appearances of reality as given in actual experience.

The critical notice of *Knowledge and Reality* in the January number of *Mind*, 1886, which was the occasion of the two letters which follow, was not, as Bosanquet supposed, by Andrew Seth, but by his younger, less known brother James, afterwards Professor of Moral Philosophy in the same University. The reviewer rightly saw the main thesis to be the necessity of carrying out the reconstruction at which Bradley had aimed with greater thoroughness. Bosanquet was given credit for his defence of the place of the copula

¹ As the book has long been out of print the reader may be referred to the quotations from it on the point at issue given in *The Platonic Tradition*, etc., p. 250.

² In further illustration, see Letters LXXIX ff. below.

Philosophy as Logic

and of subsumption in judgment and for his attempt to remedy Bradley's failure to provide any substitute for the syllogism, which he had ousted from its central place in logic. For the rest the critic complains of the obscurity of much of the book and particularly of the author's neglect to reply to the accusation that Idealism as a doctrine had failed to yield reality. Instead of facing this task he had contented himself with proclaiming that the Real is simply "the system of relations, the ideal completion of that process of judgment which is its progressive definition." In the course of his review Seth showed his own sympathy with what was taken by him to be a sign of grace in Bradley—his denunciation of the abstractness of thought, quoting in support Hutchison Stirling's declaration that "neither gods nor men were in very truth logical categories."

131 EBURY ST.

S.W.

Jan. 4/86

DEAR SETH,

I was gratified to see your notice of "Knowledge and R." in *Mind*. The book *was* too patchy, little more than notes; it was intended for a mere pamphlet, but I was tempted at the last moment to try and put it in shape for a book. I had hardly expected a notice in *Mind* at all.

I want to set myself straight in your eyes, so far as I can, on a particular point. I have no doubt the book is obscure, and it is also quite probable that I am wrong, and that your notice credited me with a more reasonable position than I really held. But I want just to tell you what I *wished* to maintain on one particular point.

I thought there were *two* views in Bradley about reality. One was a question of the analysis to be applied to the world as we know it, whether this world existed in or through thought only, or whether it needed to be welded together with the actual presentations of perception as our only contact with reality. This is a reasonable question to ask; Bradley's answer was, in the form

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

wh. he gave it at least, new to me; and I intended to assent to it. In saying the whole affair fell within the intellectual world I meant to use intellectual in a wide sense, alluding to the well known relativity of "object" and "subject" to each other, but in no way to exclude sense perception or feeling. I only meant that *prima facie* the whole thing—the whole knowable universe—is a vision of consciousness, and its analysis a fair matter of dispute.

But his other view which horrified me so, I took to be quite different. I thought that (like Plato) he frequently confused the actual world of organised things and definite relations with the presentation of sense *qua* presented. (E.g. if you so much as emphasise or distinguish within the sensuous datum, you *ipso facto*, he says, "mutilate" the fact). And therefore, I fancied, the entirety of actual existence as distinct from the sensuous datum ceased to appear to him to be actual (it is *all* hypothetical on this view, for the slightest abstraction divorces you from fact, and there is nothing definite without abstraction) while the reality which he in this mood admitted to be real of course was not satisfactory, having neither past nor future, nor articulate existence. And in presence of this unsatisfactoriness, as it seemed to me, having lost hold of the actual world of human beings and moral institutions by confusing it with the presentation of sense, he cries out for a "fuller splendour", or "more glorious reality". I, *bona fide*, do not know what he meant; but thought he meant a heavenly paradise, or anyhow some counterpart world of which our whole sphere of experience gives no hint. It was against this *extra* world, not against *any* interpretation, which keeps fairly to interpretation, of the content of our universe, that I meant to raise my voice.

I fully agree with what he and Stirling say about "bloodless categories". But I am opposed to it as a criticism of the actual world, because it rests on the old notion that you must by hook or by crook have two worlds, not continuous but one the repeat of the other, in one of which, the remoter of the two, the interest of the other is centred. I should not like to say it in public, but

I am convinced that Stirling never understood Hegel. I remember something of his attitude towards the Logic wh. makes me feel sure of this, though I do not know his (Stirling's) writings as well as I ought. Apart from this old superstition of the "other world" I can see no earthly reason for placing the *raison d'être* of our life in some of the organs by which it is known.

I do not, therefore, quite admit that I *meant* to reject Bradley's interference with commonplace idealism. I meant to accept, and to quote Lotze in support of, the doctrine that only that is real for me which is identified with my own perceptive history, directly or indirectly. This is to admit that a content is not real because it is thought, but must also be welded together with presentation. I made my concession obscure, I daresay, by an attempt to find room for degrees of assertiveness over and above the attachment to presentation. But I decidedly intended to break away in company with Br., from mere abstract intellectualism. It was at the further point, where, as I fancied, a question of logical and psychological analysis of a whole is converted into a fanciful depreciation of that whole and suggestion of another and imaginary one, that I meant to break from Bradley's company. His excellent article on spiritualism in the December *Fortnightly*¹ (did you see it?) has rather reassured me on this head, though even in it I had rather regard all the suggestions about other worlds of matter, material contact with matter normally imperceptible and the like, as reduc-

¹ The article which appeared in the December number under the title, "Evidences of Spiritualism," had for its text the "three great gaps" that divide the spiritualist from his Land of Promise and that have to be crossed by three separate labours, viz. to prove: first that the "phenomena" are real; secondly, that they are not the abnormal work of human spirits; thirdly, that they are any evidence of immateriality and immortal life. How far Bosanquet shared this view of the vanity of the attempt to bring immortality to light through spiritualistic phenomena may be gathered from Letter CI. His little book of thirty years later, *What Religion Is*, was written in a white heat of indignation against war-time exploitation of them. He was correspondingly delighted with *The Road to Endor* (H. Jones) as an exposure of "the spirit and temper of people who have once been persuaded to 'believe'" (letter to R. C. B. of February 10, 1920).

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

tions to absurdity of the other people than as serious. But I judge, so far as I know his very queer style, that they are far more serious than I consider compatible with logical sanity. But how original and how "treffend" he is in the smallest matters; I think even the little note on Comparison in Mind¹ throws a new light.

I ought to apologise for this long letter, I see you have brought out the first set of your Edinburgh lectures.² The subjects sound most attractive, and especially the promise for your next course.

So Haldane³ is a successful man. I heard that he managed his canvass with great skill. But I suppose he will drop philosophy; the bar *and* the House of Commons must be enough even for his activity.

Yours truly

B. BOSANQUET

¹ Continuing a discussion started by Professor James Sully in *Mind* of October 1885, and criticizing Sully's account of comparison as involving a *voluntary* act of attention, and as leaving the question of the *kind* of comparison unanswered. Bradley's own view is that in comparison proper we have two things, A and B, an idea of their identity and diversity which interests us, and an ensuing process of subsumption of one under the other, as in the infant's differentiation of sugar and salt. Bosanquet kept the ball rolling in the July number of 1886 with a short article (illustrating in miniature his general attitude to Bradley at this time as one of discriminating admiration). While agreeing that the essence of comparison is subsumption, he insists that the aim is to make the identity and difference explicit by subsuming the things compared, not under each other, but under some *standard*, qualitative or other—as we might now say in some "frame of reference."

² Under the title of *Scottish Philosophy, A Comparison of the Scottish with the German Answer to Hume*.

³ R. B. (afterwards Lord) Haldane unseated Lord Elcho (Conservative) in East Lothian at the elections which had just taken place by a large majority. He retained the seat through eight contests for the next quarter of a century. Needless to say, he did not "drop philosophy." Bosanquet watched his political career with increasing interest and admiration. It was characteristic of him to see in it a proof of the connection between philosophical thought and the best kind of public action. In a letter to him of June 11, 1912, congratulating him on attaining the Lord Chancellorship, he wrote: "It will be an incidental advantage of your career that it will make English people esteem thinkers more highly; and not only thinkers, but the whole method of conciliation and co-operation in public life, which thinking involves, and of which you have given such splendid examples."

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LETTER VIII

131 EBURY ST.

S.W.

Jan. 19/86

DEAR SETH,

Thanks for your note. It was too hard to be made responsible for your brother's review, though there was nothing objectionable in the responsibility for he writes very well. I am sorry I attacked you about it.

I have heard from Bradley with some notes on my book. He seems to think we are pretty much agreed; probably he is rather clearer in his views than I have succeeded in becoming. He does not think we need ultimately differ about the "more glorious reality" passage. He does not wish to go outside the "intellectual world" as a whole; but wishes for a reality or totality in which the *discursive* intellectual world "should be suppressed *as such*". I do not quite know what he means, indeed he professes to be only seeking; but he clearly does not mean the ordinary Paradise, wh. on my honour for a moment I thought he did.

He also points out that "he could not say that reality is an ideal construction *only*" i.e. I suppose he means to insist on the other terms of his definition "*ideal constr. attached to reality presented in perception*". I thought this might interest you as you are looking at his book from time to time. Don't answer; you are a much occupied man I know.

Bradley has been working at psychology for the last 6 months, and has sent an article on "attention" to mind.¹ But he doesn't mean to go on with Psych. at present; evidently fears it would absorb him altogether. I thought it v. good in "Principles of Logic". . . .

Yours v. truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ Under the title, "Is there any special activity in Attention?" His fear that "Psychology would absorb him altogether" did not prevent him from returning eight years later to the subject and sending articles pretty continuously between 1894 and 1914 to *Mind* upon it. These are fortunately now being republished.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER IX

131 EBURY ST.

S.W.

Sunday, Nov. 6 (1887)

MY DEAR PETERS,

I have been anxious at the reports about your health for some time, but as I assume that you are not up to writing I am content with the news your people give me. Someone told me that it is thought when you get through this you will be better than for some time before; but I fear it is a painful business in the meantime, though I do not exactly know what is the tribulation. It is awfully hard to write to a friend who is in pain. If one writes lightly, it is unfeeling; if gloomily, it is dull. But you won't think I am careless about your trouble. I am awfully afraid of anything painful myself, and if it is not a great virtue, at least it makes one think much of any friend who is liable to suffering. You are very brave, I know, and you have a good wife, two great helps. Don't think me silly for sending you down a copy of an address I gave at Toynbee.¹ I don't imagine it to be amusing; but if you were up to anything it might take your fancy,—or might not; you needn't tell me which! . . . I come to Oxford on Saturday for a few hours to lecture for the Home Arts business under patronage of Herbert Morrell and Mrs Liddell! but I shan't be able to get so far as to you I fear; nor perhaps will you be fit to see me. I hope you will soon be round again.

Yours affectionately

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER X

There was none of his contemporaries for whose philosophical insight Bosanquet had more respect or of whose future as a writer

¹ Probably "How to read the New Testament," given April 3, 1887, afterwards printed in *Essays and Addresses*.

Philosophy as Logic

he had more confident hope than Nettleship.¹ Like himself a pupil of Green, in the Memoir that he published at the beginning of the third volume of Green's works he gave what will always remain the most authoritative exposition of the form of idealism, of which Green was the first and most powerful representative in Oxford. But again, like Bosanquet, he was no slavish follower, and had he lived we might have expected from him fresh developments on lines similar to those that we have come to associate with Bosanquet's name. More particularly he had a rooted suspicion of some of Green's statements, which seemed to imply a break of continuity between nature and mind, the physical and the spiritual. "I think," he wrote, "I shall end my days as something like a Spinozist. At least I get more and more to feel that there is absolutely no difference in principle between what is called physical and what is called spiritual, and that if one can understand a triangle one can understand oneself."² A hint of this kind was not likely to be lost on Bosanquet, whose whole philosophical development was in the direction of what in one of his last papers he speaks of as "the continuity which I love."

BALLIOL COLLEGE
OXFORD

March 16 (1887)

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

The Press asked me a little time ago to read some of the ms of your *Logic*, which I did with much interest, and told them that I hoped they would publish it. At the same time I could not help feeling that possibly, if you waited for a little time and then looked at it again, you might make the main points stand out more clearly. I don't know whether you find what I do, that while one is actually at work thinking or writing it is almost impossible to get the perspective of one's work; and that if one puts it aside for a little and then looks at it, one is sometimes able to proportion

¹ On the disappointment of this hope by Nettleship's early death in 1892, see p. 78 below.

² *Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, p. xlvii.

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it better. Your book will of course be stiff reading in any case, and is none the worse for that: but in so elaborate and minute a piece of work it seems the more important to make the salient points really salient. It is perhaps impertinent of me to suggest this, when I have only read a small part, and that not as carefully as is necessary for a proper understanding: but Tatton, to whom I was talking about it, said he thought you wouldn't mind my telling you my impression. If you cared to talk about it (which is always better than writing) I shall probably be coming through town at the end of this month, and would gladly come and see you.

Have you much more written than what you sent to the Press? I suppose there must be a good deal to come, if you are treating it all on the same scale.

I should have very much liked to see some of the part on induction.

We have just finished Collections, and I am having to look over Newdigates, and then I hope to get a start with Green's 3rd volume, which I shall be thankful to get off my hands. I find college work more and more absorbing, and though I am pretty constantly thinking about things which interest me, I don't find myself ripe for writing. The worst of teaching under these conditions is that one is always in danger of perplexing the men with half worked-out ideas. It sometimes seems as if teaching ought to be done by people who have written books and come out clear on the other side of their subject.

Yours ever

R. L. NETTLESHIP

LETTER XI

7 BANBURY ROAD

March 28 (1887)

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

I hope you will on no account hesitate to close with the Press. I said (and shall say) nothing to them of what I have said

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to you. I honestly think it would be a great pity if the book was not published, altered or unaltered.

I will tell you when I am coming to town. Meantime would it be much trouble to send me a few sheets—say of the early part on Judgment? If I read it again I could tell you more definitely when we meet what (if any) impressions of improveability I have. I know how useless and annoying it is to have merely vague suggestions made to one.

If the Press still has the ms perhaps I may ask them for it?

Yours ever

R. L. NETTLESHIP

LETTER XII

MRS. GLOVER'S,
HINDHEAD, HASLEMERE

April 2 (1887)

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

I think I quite understand your point about the qualitative judgment.¹ It seems to me that the question ultimately raised by it is whether it is a *judgment* at all. The impossibility of applying a demonstration in the absence of a "demonstrandum" seems to mean that the "minimum reale" or "intelligibile" is "something" *τόδε τι*. The apprehension or experience of this would then be expressed (in Aristotle's words) by such phrases as *θιγγέν*, *φάναι* etc. not by *καταφάναι*. And of course truth and falsehood could not apply to the application, because strictly speaking there would be no "application," the "applied" and "that to which it is applied" being one and the same thing. I suppose this unanalysable element might indifferently be called the "self" or the "real."

If this is right, the "this" which is the background of all judgment, the ultimate subject, would have to be characterised in some more elementary way than by e.g. spatiality; for as far as I see a spatial "this" is already a "this-not-that," "here-not-there," and

¹ According to Bosanquet, "the qualitative judgment proper affirms a nearly simple content directly of present Reality," e.g. "how hot!"

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

it was of "this" in this sense that I was thinking when I read what you said about the qual. judgt.

It seems as if the beginning and end of experience was in some sense unity—or rather individuality. Judgment and reasoning seem to be neither beginning nor end, but the individual becoming "dividual;" and it has to become "dividual" because not being a real unity ourselves we can never realise its unity, though on the other hand whatever we do realise of it *is* its unity.

Please don't think I am spoiling my holiday by this. It is a real pleasure to talk sometimes to other than undergraduates about philosophy.

Yours ever

R. L. NETTLESHIP

LETTER XIII

BALLIOL COLLEGE

OXFORD

December 12 (1887)

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

I would rather not lecture for the Ethical Society in April; thank you all the same for giving me the chance. I cannot get over my dislike of speaking to people with whom I am in no sort of living relation. It is bad enough here spouting to men of other colleges whom one knows nothing of, but I don't want to feel more of a sophist than I do already.

I was much interested by your lecture on the New Testament which Peters lent me.¹ I do hope you will be able to form a class for regularly reading the New Testament. That seems to me the proper sequel of such a lecture.

Is your Logic being printed?

Yours ever

R. L. NETTLESHIP

¹ See Letter IX above. In a note of January 14 (1888) he writes: "Have you been able to keep up a class in the New Testament? If so, I should like to hear how it has worked sometime."

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LETTER XIV

BALLIOL COLLEGE

OXFORD

December 16 (1887)

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

Many thanks for your proof. I have read it twice—some of it more and like it very much. I confess that the distinction you allow to remain (though I understood you to practically deny its existence) between “objective reference” and “truth” seems to me untenable and liable to mislead. But I daresay it will appear in its right light as the book goes on.

I have not seen Seth,¹ but shall try to look at it sometime. What bothers me is the notion that there *can* be any real antithesis between a noble ideal and the doing what wants to be done here and now. To all men who have *really* had the one and *really* done the other they must have been absolutely inseparable.

And all one's personal troubles seem to me to come from falling away from their inseparableness.

Yours ever

R. L. NETTLESHIP

LETTER XV

131 EBURY ST., S.W.

June 30/88

MY DEAR PETERS,

Yours is perhaps properly an answer to my “Sending” of the book;² but it is so long since we have communicated that I must send you a line.

I knew quite well that you could not find time to read the book;

¹ Presumably *Hegelianism and Personality*, by Andrew Seth (afterwards A. S. Pringle-Pattison), which was published in 1887. On the flutter it created in the Hegelian dovecot, see *The Platonic Tradition*, etc., p. 202. If we had Bosanquet's letter to which Nettleship's is a reply, we should be in a better position to see the precise point of the characteristic remark as to the unity of the ideal and the real.

² Bosanquet's *Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge* (two vols.) was published this year.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

I sent it because of a sort of superstition that I should like so substantial a remembrance of me to have its place on your shelves. It is a great blessing to have done with it, and this feeling at present dominates any anxiety about its fate. I can see however that it is too digressive and loaded with excursus' and qualifications. An enemy might say that I qualify and digress my point right away, before I even state it at all, or even fail to state it altogether! I must try to remember that the point is the point, and the qualifications are not the chief thing; *if* I ever get another book ready.

I enjoyed Italy immensely, but not wholly without drawbacks. The sense of being a foreigner is extremely annoying to me; I have a sort of feeling all the time as if I had no right to be there—oddly I never felt this in Germany—I am so much more “at home” in German language and ideas. I took lessons in Italian before starting, but cannot *converse* in it, though I can *speak* a little.

Then the “problem”—the connection of our time and even of the modern Italians with the great time—presses on one so awfully; the ugly restorations, the convent of San Marco turned into a mere exhibition-room, the Americans at the pension where I stayed, the hideous furniture and loathsome modern Italian pictures at the Art Exhibition at Bologna. It seems wrong to say all this first; but in spite of the immense substantial gain in knowledge and power of enjoyment, the background of the whole *was* rather a sense of “Is it all vanished? What is there in the future”? I came back with an immensely raised opinion of our National Gallery and of our modern art-movement—there is not a soul in France Germany or Italy who could make a Morris design I do believe, and e.g. the Tribuna of the Uffizi contains works mostly of little interest from a genuine point of view. The real discovery to me was the Tuscan Gothic, and its independence of marble inlaying etc; the great sombre tile domes and brick churches; these things I never tired of; and the Giotto chapels in Sta. Croce and the Memmi chapel (Spanish chapel) in Sta Maria Novella,¹ and the

¹ The identification by Ruskin of Logic's leafy spray, in the work of the early painter here, with the syllogism was used by him more than once in

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Giottos by the Marchesa Ridolfo's tomb, and especially the Galileo tomb slab (nt. the astronomer's, the other, Ruskin talks about) in Sta Croce. But I must go out; I am hungering for a rush up to the Brit. Museum—I haven't been since coming back. . . .

Your affect.

B. BOSANQUET

Love to your wife. I *didn't* disparage Robt. Elsmere did I? The cheap edition is to be out in July I hear.

LETTER XVI

ROCK HALL

ALNWICK

Sept. 21/88

MY DEAR PETERS,

Many thanks for your most kind letter. I hear from first hand authority that Fowler¹ has nt. resigned, but has only said that he will resign at close of year; this gives more time. My personal feeling coincides w. what you say; Oxford does not suit me, and has but little congenial society, excepting yourself and one or two like you. If I heard that I was elected, it would be a dolorous moment. My feeling was this—I thought, what I know now from F. H. Bradley himself as well as from you, that *he* would not stand. I was told that Case² and Courtney³ were the two people illustration of inference as the growing-point of thought, "the leaping and vital flame by which a whole system exhibits its concentrated life within a single focus, creating a something which is at once the old in the new and the new in the old" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, i. p. 62-3). It was characteristic of his desire to share his pleasures that in the following spring he revisited Florence, taking with him two nieces and a cousin.

¹ Thomas Fowler, Professor of Logic, author of *Elements of Deductive and Inductive Logic* (1869), *Progressive Morality* (1886), and (with J. M. Wilson) *The Principles of Morals* (1887).

² Thomas H. Case, author of *Physical Realism* (1888) and of articles on Logic and on Metaphysics in vol. 30 of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, ninth edition.

³ W. L. Courtney, author of *Metaphysics of J. S. Mill* (1879), *Studies in Philosophy* (1882), *Constructive Ethics*, second edition, 1895, subsequently editor of the *Fortnightly Review*.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

whose names suggested themselves at once as probable candidates; and I thought it would be my duty to enter the unequal fight against Courtney's frock coat and Case's cricket bat in order that the banner of scientific logic might at least be carried on to the field. *Now* I hear, that R. L. N. and J. Cook Wilson, are talked of, and to my surprise, A. Bradley. This does not decide me at once, but puts another face on the matter. If I could secure Wilson's election by raising my finger, I think I would, not that he is necessarily abler than R. L. N., but that the gain to science of setting free such a man to pursue it would be so great. So perh. I may please myself, and if I am to please myself I shan't stand, you may be sure of that.

I am glad you are better. I had a gorgeous time in Orkney, but the indolence is too strenuous, and does me less good even physically than if it were more tempered with mere leisure. Your headache must have been bad indeed, if it was worse than you have had before. I am sorry you have to suffer so. I did not know Heberden¹ was up.

I was pleased at the chance wh. made Mrs Mc.C. friends with Mrs Green. But I fear Mrs Green gives her a too theological impression of Oxford views, and will a little set her against our ideas. Of course she cannot but assume, what I think was never quite the case, that Mrs Green was wholly in sympathy w. Green on speculative matters. However the friendship of good people is a good in itself. Love to your wife; ever your affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XVII

131 EBURY ST., S.W.

Oct. 10, 1888

MY DEAR PETERS,

A thousand thanks for your kind note, wh. is a great encouragement to me. I value your judgment about as highly as

¹ C. B. Heberden, a Harrow and Balliol friend, at this time Vice-Principal, afterwards Principal of Brasenose College.

Philosophy as Logic

anyone's, and I should not have *thought* you would be led away much by friendship, although in this particular case I am almost bound to suppose you are. Frankly, I have always thought the books we write on a different level from the books (of) men who are not in our sense students at all. With them, it is a question whether there is anything in their books at all; with us, I feel sure there is something in the books, and the merit or demerit consists largely in making or not making it possible for anyone to read them.

I have had one gratifying result, and only one, before your letter,—an invitation in glowing terms from the Sec. of the Edinburgh Univ. Philosophical Society to read an opening paper on their first meeting night this session. But this may be the work of some one fussy undergraduate.

I don't think I shall touch the Profship business. I am warming into the history of Aesthetic¹ and shld have either to give that up or scamp it. A. Bradley writes a most kind letter; I think he assumes he is not standing. Surely Cook Wilson is the right man; or are his lectures v. hard? As a private coach, he produced the greatest effect, I thought.

I can hardly spare a day to come down, I fear. I have got a variety of small engagements to give unimportant "addresses" and I always prepare these things v. carefully. And yet I feel v. much inclined to rush down just to see you. Is there any day in the week when you are specially free so that I might stroll with you in afternoon, dine or tea, and come back to town by last train? Sleeping in Oxford practically loses the next morning, wh. is why I dislike it.

I hope you keep fairly well. Love to Mrs Frank. I haven't seen your people yet; I hear the house is so nice.

Your affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ *The History of Aesthetic* was undertaken as a volume to appear in the Library of Philosophy. It was published in 1892.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER XVIII

131 EBURY ST., S.W.

Nov. 6/88

MY DEAR PETERS,

Many congratulations. I am glad the business is so well over; it must be a horrible anxiety. Pray tell Mrs Peters how glad I am that she and the new creature are well.

Oh yes! it will be very pleasant to me to have my name preserved in your family, and I shall be delighted to be godfather. But you must get me a proxy for the "simminery" I think. I don't see how I am to say "all this I stedfastly believe". . . . Beside I go to Edinburgh on Tuesday, and am full of business. I don't know how soon these things are done, but anyway I should like to keep out of the church business. I do not think I could get through it with decency.

I wonder what the infant will see before his career closes. Our generation will move off at a v. interesting crisis in the great novel!

Ever your affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XIX

131 EBURY ST., S.W.

Nov. 23/88

DEAR ALEXANDER,

Thanks for your note. I think the need for reparation was rather the other way—of course I should have fought for your general idea, had I not supposed the President¹ would stop the discussion in good time and let you have an uninterrupted 20 minutes at them. But he is so eager that he himself can never resist interrupting the speaker, and rather spoilt your effect, though of course the point was perfectly clear as you put it.

¹ Shadworth H. Hodgson, the first President of the Aristotelian Society, whose chief work, *The Metaphysic of Experience*, was published in four volumes in 1898. Alexander gave a paper on November 19th of this year on "The Growth and Progress of Moral Ideas." His book, *Moral Order and Progress*, was published in the following year.

Philosophy as Logic

I daresay when I see your book I shall find all I want quite well represented there, I think so from your letter; besides I really attach very little importance to my own views on ethics just now; I have hardly looked at an ethical book for five years. I thought one must distinguish between the non-moral and the immoral, somehow, but I feel sure you will have met this need, if not in this language, then in some other.

I am much more troubled just now about the beautiful and the ugly. I am sure the ugly is a species of the beautiful.¹

I look forward to your book with great interest.

Yours sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XX

In 1889 Bosanquet moved from the rooms he had occupied since he came to London in Ebury Street to a house which he had bought in Cheyne Gardens, Chelsea, where he hoped to be able not only to see more of his growing circle of friends in London but to have those at a distance to stay with him. Those were the days of Morris papers, hangings and tiles, and of parquet floors with which he took great pleasure in furnishing it.

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

July 20 (1889)

MY DEAR FRANK,²

I had meant to come and see you on the day of the Balliol dinner, but did not go down. I have been less careful to communicate with you while I was arranging this change of abode, because one of my ideas in doing it was that if you and your wife

¹ He treats the whole subject at great length in the *History of Aesthetic* (see *sub verbo*). For his own view see p. 435. Alexander explains in his recent book, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, p. 163, the sense in which he is prepared to regard the beautiful and the ugly as both "departments of the beautiful."

² A mark of his growing intimacy and affection for Peters.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

could sometimes leave the children for a few days you might come and stay with me here, where goodwill should not be wanting to make you comfortable, though my experience as a housekeeper has yet to come. I haven't all my chairs and tables yet; but I hope in the autumn or at Christmas to be able to give you an effective invitation. . . .

If we could get up a habit that you and Mrs Peters should come and stay here once or twice in the year, at seasons that might suit you, we should keep up our intercourse, and it would be a real boon to me, for I hardly know enough people to utilize my house properly.

I am glad you like the little book;¹ there is no one whose judgment I value more highly; but I fear that you are influenced by friendship—a consideration not in itself entirely disagreeable. Is it true that they've elected Aubrey Moore² to the Chair of Morals instead of Nettleship or Alexander? Surely, if so, the party or order ought to guillotine some parsons. Tatton suggested the horrible idea to me—I mean, he had heard some rumour to the effect I mention.

Yes; I often think how anything said or done is the work of a generation or group rather than of any one; I often feel myself a sort of spokesman for my friends, and am only crushed at doing it so imperfectly. I once made a list, for my own edification, of sayings that I remembered as intellectual turning-points—some of the most important were yours;

Your affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ Presumably *Essays and Addresses*, which was published this year.

² At this time Tutor of Keble, author *inter alia* of *Science and the Faith*. The chair was the Waynflete Professorship of Metaphysics and Morals. In the event Case was elected. Lord Salisbury, who was then Chancellor, is reported to have said at the meeting of electors: "Well, gentlemen, I believe that Mr. Case has written a book on the subject, and I shall vote for him"—his view apparently being that one man was as good as another except for appearance in print.

Philosophy as Logic

LETTER XXI

The paper referred to in the letter which follows seems to have been a criticism of some points in his recently published *Logic*. Alexander thinks it may have been read at the Aristotelian Society, but, if it was, it was not printed. The notes which Bosanquet mentions as made upon Alexander's paper have survived. I have printed those of them which do not depend on the particular (lost) context, and would call attention to those on the scope of Metaphysic and the idea of Totality as particularly significant for the views he held at that time. (See Introduction.) What he says about Conception and the Universal goes to the root of his difference (then and afterwards) with Alexander. It anticipates what he was to say in 1913 in *The Distinction between Mind and its Object* (pp. 34 ff.), and again in 1920 in his copy of Alexander's *Space Time and Deity* (marginal note on I, pp. 222 ff.), where he insists that "the universal must be several particulars held together as elucidating each other" and asks "can this be understood except in c(onsciousness)?" and again that "a universal must be several things at once, alternatives in connection" and that "nothing but a thought can be this." What he says about the universal as standing merely for a "common feature of many states" goes to the root of the fallacy of conceiving thought as a process of climbing up the tree of Porphyry from abstraction to abstraction. The note on Mill's Method of Difference gives in a nutshell the whole scope of the advance which Bradley and he were in the act of effecting on the traditional view of inductive logic.

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

October 2 (1889)

DEAR ALEXANDER,

I don't know if you have more than one typed copy of the paper, so I send it back to you w. my notes. If you can spare it altogether, I should like it back again. I hope you don't mind pencil very much. It saves me a heap of time. If you return the

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

paper, may I send it to Bradley, or have you perhaps communicated w. him already. I agree of course w. much that you say about his psychological tendency. I never meant to deny that Mill started the whole business, and really, like the man who finds a new country first, did the bulk of the prospecting (besides that he was a man of genius). I used sometimes to say that the real question betw. him and Green and Co. was whether it was worth while to state things accurately in logic. I think one has to pull him a long way round, often right round, to get him really straight.

It was a great compliment that you should think it worth while to criticize my book. I hope you like Manchester.¹

Yours v. truly

B. BOSANQUET

NOTES

"Metaphysic."—I agree with the reservation that as yet the separate content of metaphysic has always appeared to me so small, that it was more vitally treated in the special analysis of different departments of experience than in special treatises. It always seems to me related as a sort of summary to the special philosophical disciplines.

"Conception and the Universal."—This is a big affair. I should have said that the "what" alone could be active in thought. I am not sure whether you do not assign it existence as a psychical event; this would account for supposing it inert. The distinction between the logical and psychological point of view seems to me to be pressed in your criticism into a difference of the elements considered. Is it that you make the logical universal one case within psychological concept? But then it would become a particular.

"Totality."—I seem to distinguish "whole" from "total," and even the former I only apply as a point of view. Logic i, 96.² I don't see how to escape from this. I can't conceive, e.g. whiteness except as A an

¹ Where Alexander had been recently appointed to the chair of Philosophy in Victoria University.

² "It is only when the differences or parts assume the maximum of homogeneity (as in numerical judgments) and conceal, so far as is possible, the individuality of their relations to the whole, that the parts become *units*, and the whole a *total* or *sum*," *ibid.*, 97.

Philosophy as Logic

extension including differences of shade and B as a general quality including special qualities.

"Common feature of many states."—That objection naturally occurs to one and I mention it in treating of the subject. But I cannot think it conclusive. The question there treated is whether the common element *necessarily* gets more abstract as more different examples are compared. If, in comparing greater numbers you become aware of relations which qualify the individuals compared, and wh. examination of a few did not disclose, I can't see how you can rule these out. It is a little important, or at least interesting, for the history of science. Has not every extension of area in science practically deepened, and not shallowed, its views of what was known before? e.g. animal psychology?

My own point of view about "Method of Difference" I will state so as to give you as little trouble as possible, although perhaps giving myself away. The M. of D. struck me as isolated and as not reconcilable with my general prejudice that ultimately we always affirm because the connected system of fact would be shattered if we denied. I went about, therefore, to bring these ideas into connection by explaining the value of the M. of Diff. to rest not on the mere observation of this *trait* present and that absent, but on the whole framing on wh. we depend for our notion that relevants are excluded or allowed for. No one has remarked (this is a joke!) the really strong point of my Logic, wh. is the identification of the confirmatory negative instance with the contrapositive converse¹ (acc. to Bradley on Negation). So that while not denying Mill's difference to be a rough account of the matter I tried to exhibit it always as the delimitation of a frontier between two organized systems of fact, such that the adjustment of the not-a (wh. is b) to the a was a matter of positive content and its arrangement. Classification (and here you will think I give myself away) is really the type from wh. I started. The observation that here we have a and here not-a seemed to me only justified when you possess the meeting-point of system a and b and with both before you trace the boundary between them in the light of the continuous nature of each. I do not admit that my laborious examples of analysis² are *mere* applications of the M. of D. What I *try*

¹ The Method of Difference gives "not-a is not-c" (i.e. its contrapositive converse) as the confirmatory negative instance of c is a. See his *Logic*, first edition, vol. ii, p. 117, and n.

² E.g. the adaptation of the Bee Ophrys for self-fertilization in vol. ii, p. 125 ff.

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to show throughout is how one positive content shows another into its right place and the two as negatives confirm each other. This I hope explains the point about hypothesis. The organisation of fact seems to me the really central process, and the delimitation by difference, though formally absolute, to depend for its real security upon the former. You can't tell where not- begins, till you have organised b and v. v. (vice versa). It helps to explain the above if I say that I think much more about the old analysis of perception than most recent people seem to.¹ I have expressed this strongly at end of *Knowledge and R.* In a careful experiment with instruments we are really, it seems to me, arriving at a conclusion by an enormous system of petrified reasoning any bank (?) of which may at any moment, but for our special knowledge, melt away and let in a fallacy. The observation that "a is absent" fades into insignificance before the huge system of ideal barriers, erected to keep out the undiscounted relevant. And they all depend on our previous knowledge of the object-matter. For all that Mill says, in the *M. of D.* you might be dealing with bare negation. I don't think he makes any attempt to explain how the general system of knowledge is brought to bear on the determination of a and not-a.

LETTER XXII

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

Nov. 7/89

MY DEAR FRANK,

. . . . I have been reading Weismann's essays; but find him long and somewhat technical. Still, as you say, one lives into the point of view. I understand it better now; but still I hardly see why race remains true, in other words the causal connection between the germ-plasm and the soma. If there is one, it must be modifiable; if not, why—. I understand him to say it is not unmodifiable, but practically enormously hard to modify, and only affected mechanically by modification, so that an alteration of the germ-plasm may not propagate the same somatic change that caused it, but some other as the shaking it receives may chance to cause. . . .

Yours affectionately

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ See *Logic* (1st ed.), II, p. 143 ff.

Philosophy as Logic

LETTER XXIII

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

July 18 (1890)

MY DEAR FRANK,

Yours finds me just preparing to start, for Harrogate to Rooper¹ in the first instance, then to Rock, then to Glenlyon where I am to sojourn with the old Master² and Dendy³ and their ladies. The "tolles Wesen" of shooting begins to weigh on me. And the cost is really "unverantwortlich" (a favourite word in German novels—I wonder if my use of it is idiomatic!) I think it would be much nicer to go somewhere nice (tautology!) and get nice people of kindred sympathies round one; and loaf and botanise. What say you, another year: a house in Wales, or in Scotland, or in the Black Forest (can your wife speak the jargon) with a Loch or two, a selection of choice Peters', perhaps a succession of them; expenses perhaps a little unequally divided, on the ground of my not providing a wife or other social attraction; so I should have to furnish, say the house, and entertain the party at boarding rates your wife being housekeeper—perhaps a McCallum or two if the party would admit them in their turn. This would not cost me more than my moor, and would be infinitely nicer, except for the desertion of Dendy. Oh yes, you might fish; a perfectly justifiable practice, if, like me you never catch anything, and only meditate whether suicide is justifiable, a question which fishing always brings to my mind. You *would* go catching something; but if it were good to eat I shouldn't mind. Holiday making on the moor is like resting by going fast asleep; it is so extreme that one isn't conscious of it. But I think I must stick to Dendy unless he can make up a v. good party without me.

¹ T. G. Rooper, a Harrow and Balliol contemporary, afterwards H.M. Inspector of Schools, author *inter alia* of *School and Home Life* (1896) and a pioneer in hand and eye training in elementary schools.

² Dr. G. G. Bradley. See Letter IV above.

³ Arthur Dendy, a Fellow of University, with whom and another he usually shared shooting in those days. •

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

Yes, I wish we could have met. I have written a lot of Aesthetic, have broken the neck of the introductory Greek part, in some 50 (printed) pages I should think, (over 200 MS.); have got to end of Plato; not done Aristotle. I find a facility in it wh. is not quite wholesome as if one's ideal had lowered. It cannot be done exhaustively in the time at my command and knowing that, I am trying to take a line and say *something* clear and not untrue; not to say all there is, wh. I simply do not know.

Socialism—I have said less in answer to you about this; because my Fabian paper¹ is in type for the C.O.S. review, and I *suppose* will appear there, either next month or month after. My view is that something good may come of it, but has not come yet—that its origin was Individualistic-materialistic, and that the present people (Fabian) still show strong marks of it, although they are gradually becoming more or less influenced by the ideas which they have long professed to hold—the German ideas. In the concrete they are frightfully anti-C.O.S. still, and I could never work with them or w. any of them in any practical effort; we should be at daggers-drawn on every detail. . . .

Ever yours affectionately

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XXIV

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

June 3 (1892)

MY DEAR FRANK,

. . . . I have accepted the chance thrown open by Wallace's illness and am starting in 3 weeks' time for the "summer school" of Ethics at Plymouth near Boston U.S.A. to take the place Wallace

¹ On "The Antithesis between Individualism and Socialism Philosophically Considered," printed in the *Charity Organisation Review* of September of this year. It had previously been read, with characteristic courage, before a meeting of the Fabian Society. Founded on the distinction, on the one hand, between Economic Individualism as a competitive system based on private property, and Moral Individualism as an atomic view of society and, on the other hand between Economic Socialism, as the collective organization of the productive and distributive functions of society, and Moral Socialism, as "a name for a human tendency or aspiration that is operative throughout

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was to have had. If I can make the lectures good enough, I shall be prepared to enjoy myself, and on the strength of the fee I am to have I shall take a trip west and see the Yellowstone Park. I am working hard at getting lectures ready. . . . I shall hardly see you or your wife before I go, but I do hope you have got through the term well and will have a good time.

I have just seen probably the last for some time of my favourite niece Amy,¹ the tall bright girl who was a mistress at Highfield school—I'm not sure if you have met her. She has offered to the Church Missionary Society for foreign service, and they will jump at it I should think; will probably send her to Japan to teach in a ladies' school there where a friend of hers is already working. My feelings are more mixed than you would think; granting her views, I am rather proud that she will not be content to remain inactive, and school work in England is clearly too much for her strength. The doctors commend the plan; they think the adventure and the climate just the thing for her. It is a blow to Mary McCallum, who is v. fond of her. Love to Mrs F. P.

Your affectionate,

BERNARD BOSANQUET

Don't worry to write about the book.² It will tax your patience by many blunders and shameful misprints. The revision was done at express speed.

LETTER XXV

KNUTSFORD HOTEL

SALT LAKE CITY

Thursday, Sept. 1/92

MY DEAR FRANK,

I have been travelling fast, and writing little; but I think I owe you at least one letter from this New World. It is no use history in opposition to Unsocialism"—it carried war into the Fabian camp on the ground that economic socialism might be only a name which concealed a rooted moral individualism.

¹ Amy C. Bosanquet, a sister of R. C. Bosanquet, who went as a missionary to Japan.

² *The History of Aesthetic*, see Letter XVII above.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

answering, unless to the familiar Cheyne Gardens as I sail from New York the 24th of this month. I hope your summer plan came off, and that you had a happy time, and were all well, esp. the children, for if they were well, this wld. be a great factor in the "wellness" of all the rest. It would have been a great pleasure to me to be w. you, as you so kindly asked me. But already I feel that meeting again will have a special piquancy and freshness—for me at least. It does not take me long to be homesick, though I have had a v. fortunate and happy time here. You know my first month, roughly speaking, was devoted to lecturing at Plymouth, New England. There were 15 lectures on and accessory to Plato's Republic, and two "conferences" (classes) and an extra lecture on C.O.S. matters to fill a gap in their programme. The lectures were treated as a success, written up in the papers etc. I could not but be gratified at the warmth and brightness of the people's minds, although I felt that much of what was said was quite ridiculous, and sometimes they displayed horrible misappreciation in the very attempt to commend. Still, the members of my class bought 30 copies of Davies and Vaughan's Republic (why is there no pocket Jowett?) and I hope they gained something. They were mostly women; a few of these, and a few men were seriously interested students; the rest v. sympathetic and agreeable—lecture hunters. Plymouth is a queer little place; all the folk are cousins; and all descended fr. Pilgrim Fathers. The "first Church" of Plymouth—the actual church wh. gives Scrooby,¹ England, as its place of origin, is progressive Unitarian, as the Courts held that the endowment and building went w. the "Congregation" and not w. the "Society." This is v. interesting, and throws light on disestablishment questions I think. I preached in it—in the church of the Pilgrim Fathers! Truth to tell, it was not a v. large congregation. "The Unitarians are not meeting-goers" some one said. The other courses of lectures outside the Ethics proper—though the whole thing is called, God knows why, a school of "applied Ethics"

¹ Notts, the birthplace of William Brewster, the Pilgrim Father, who was keeper of the post office there.

Philosophy as Logic

were v. model courses, I thought, for a popular summer school, if there is to be such a thing at all. Four good economists fr. different American universities gave successive courses of 5 lectures each on special points such as social progress cooperation etc. and 4 or 5 good Semitic scholars in the same way treated the history of the O.T. ideas ending up w. Job and the Wisdom books. Toy of Harvard took this last subject himself. He and his wife—a charming person—were there the whole time, and acted as host and hostess at our table at the hotel, to wh. all the lecturers came. So I saw all those fellows, all of them good fellows and v. able men I thought. With one of them, a Mr Moore of the Andover Congregationalist Seminary, and his wife, I made great friends, and afterwards went to stay w. them at Andover. They are most delightful people, much Germanised, and always speak German together and to their little boy. Moore is editor of the American “Journal of Biblical” studies—I forget the exact name. The oddest thing was that all these people (the Semitic people nt. the economists) are parsons, wh. I hardly found out till I had made some mistakes. You may say anything to them except atheism; it is hard to say whether their state is happier than ours in this. *Everyone*, in these circles, is thoroughly Germanised as to Biblical criticism etc.; but they all are moving together and therefore no one seems to be atheistic. Some Unitarians have determined to be non-Christian!

Then I went to Andover, seeing Cambridge and Harvard en route, then to Chicago, where Mrs. McC’s brothers entertained me—then to Manitou where I just failed (by 500 yds) to walk up Pike’s Peak. Your sister Caroline who never forgets our walk up Brae Riach when I was so done will laugh at me for this. I wasn’t conscious of any mountain sickness, but I daresay the rarity of the air had its effects. Then, by slow stages, seeing the scenery, on here—rather a one-horse town I think, though said to be rich. I went down and bathed in the Salt Lake—so buoyant that I couldn’t swim—my legs would rise out of the water! The Temple looks to me v. ornery, though built of fine granite—the

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

Tabernacle a great turtlebacked thing, seating 10,000 people, and I daresay v. good acoustically. The gutters are *not* running w. clear water; one, on the main st. is dry, and the others are v. muddy. All the "silver states" are low in the world just now, because silver is so cheap. It seems to me, though a foreigner may readily be mistaken, that protection is eating the heart out of this people. Silver is the real issue in the present campaign, and I can detect no argument on behalf of its monetisation exc. that the "silver states" can't mine at a profit unless it is monetised. This is the argument that moves them—I am sure of that. There may be better argts however. Tomorrow I start for Yellowstone, reach Chicago again about the 16th, New York about 20th. . . . The election seems a bad business;¹ but I can't judge of the English news here. All good be with you.

Your affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ The 1892 election which left Gladstone dependent on the Irish vote for a majority and secured the defeat in 1894 of his Home Rule policy. He had not yet heard of Nettleship's death on the Dôme du Gouter on August 25th. On October 5th he wrote to Peters: "Yes, Nettleship's death was an awful loss. I had always looked forward to his doing something considerable."

PART II

THE NEW HORIZON

“You will have to make up your mind whether to take
Metaphysics seriously or not.”

i. CLEARING OFF

REFERENCE has already been made in the Introduction to the effect on Bosanquet's thought of the publication of *Appearance and Reality* in 1892 and to the circumstances which prevented him from giving concentrated attention to its metaphysical and religious implications. He had on his hands the accumulated material of his teaching experience in London and a plan for the application of what he had learned from Green to the new developments both of political practice and psychological theory in a book on the philosophy of the State.¹ The appointment in St. Andrews in 1903 first gave him the opportunity of detaching himself from the growing burden of London engagements at the same time as it plunged him into a theological atmosphere in a high degree favourable to the development of the new interest in metaphysics and its religious implications with which Bradley's book had inspired him. Lord Haldane, who was delivering Gifford Lectures in St. Andrews in the first year of his residence there, wrote after his death to Mrs Bosanquet his impressions of the work he was doing. "Although he was well understood in the University to be quite independent of orthodox Christianity in his religious attitude, the value of his services to religion itself came to be deeply appreciated, and not least by some of the Divinity professors. He was considered when he left to have raised the level of religious thinking, among professors and students alike in a high degree."² But all this was in the future. Meantime we have to return to 1893.

¹ See *Philosophical Theory of the State*, pp. viii ff.

² It was on the occasion of one of his own Gifford Lectures in St. Andrews that, observing Bosanquet in the audience, Haldane stopped to explain apologetically that he felt like a bishop's chaplain speaking in the presence of his lordship.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER XXVI

50 QUEEN ST.

EDINBURGH

Aug. 14 (1893)

MY DEAR FRANK,

I leave for Norway on Friday 18th. There was an idea, I think, of my coming to see you in Oxford before term begins—I am first going to my sailor brother¹ at Devonport Sept 18 or thereabout, and it must be either before or after that, i.e. Sept 14, or, say 24, (or later if you like). Will you let me know at Cheyne Gardens by Sept. 1; it is no use to shoot flying at me in Norway. I have been passing time here (besides correcting proofs of a new lot of Addresses² wh. are nearly ready) in hearing Prof. Geddes lecture at the “summer school”. He is Prof. of botany at Dundee, but lives in Edinburgh, and has a sort of aesthetic-socialist following. He is a good fellow, and I begin to see some daylight in his views e.g. of “thrift”. He is building here on a large scale, as agent for his friends I think. He loves to get a sound building built, and is boldly erecting students’ lodgings and the like at one end of the Castle parade, and therefore as a factor in the finest city view in the world! rather cool, but they are not so bad. He has a French ethical prophet (Desjardins) over here lecturing, whom I partly came to hear. He is a good fellow, but v. French.

Speaking of the enslaving effect of national debt, as a lien upon the production of the future, Geddes said “in fact, the Egyptians are now in bondage to the Hebrews, which is dramatically just.” It is v. witty, is it not—his lectures are full of such things. But I suspect one must be careful not to believe more than half; then, which half?

With best love

Your affectionate friend

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ Admiral Day H. Bosanquet.

² Presumably *The Civilisation of Christendom*, published this year.

The New Horizon

LETTER XXVII

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

Feb. 23 (1894)

MY DEAR FRANK,

Alas No! I wish I could come down. I have a d—d Ethical Ctee here on Monday night, and have to interview a young lady on Tuesday. No, I am not going to be married, it isn't so bad as that; it is only a question of finding a lady secretary. . . .

I am glad you like my new book.¹ It is all pretty obvious to us (except what is wrong) but I daresay it has its uses. It has been less noticed I think than the old book.² Whittuck's projected book³ sounds very interesting. I wrote to him about C.O.S. ideas in connection with his late book. . . . Loch is ill, cold, since last Monday, not expected to be back till next Monday. He got a chill, Price said he was going on right Wedn. evening. We have had a storm in a teacup—Woolwich secretary been dismissed. It was rather an anxious business as we had to take it to Council.

It wouldn't be bad to join you in summer, if one could get lodgings near you. I must go into retirement somewhere, and work. It will be jolly to see you when you come up to town. Love to Maud. Is Bernard old enough to "hear sermons"? You know it is my duty to take him to them! Love to him and the others, if they remember me. . . .

Ever your affectionate friend

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ See previous letter.

² *Essays and Addresses* (1889)?

³ Charles Whittuck, Rector of Bearwood and formerly Fellow of Brasenose, published *Learning and Working, Sermons on Practical Subjects* (1899). His "late book" was presumably *The Church of England and Present Religious Thought* (1893).

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER XXVIII

FLEET

HANTS

Aug. 23/95

MY DEAR FRANK,

You may have heard from Loch, but must hear from me, that I am engaged to be married to Miss Dendy. She leaves the C.O. service and becomes a volunteer. We suit exactly, and I am in blessedness.¹ C.O.S. wants 3 mos. notice, so we are tied in December; get a fortnight off, and then turn to again at C.O. lecturing etc. etc. and *receiving our friends!* Love to all esp. Maud.

Your affect.

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XXIX

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

Nov. 9 (1895)

DEAR ALEXANDER,

Very many thanks for your kind letter; yes, I am confident that I am highly to be congratulated; the certainty is almost immediate,² I think, though I forget at the moment whether I allow that there is any immediate certainty.

It's all very well for you and Stout, who are too big swells to bring out your respective books, to chaff me for publishing my wretched little ideas,³ but what can I do? I want to get on with Aesthetic,⁴ and in order to do that I want to understand Psychology,

¹ In reply to a note of congratulation he wrote to a friend that they had every prospect of being happy: "We play the same games."

² His marriage took place on December 13th of that year.

³ He brought out in this year his *Companion to Plato's "Republic"* and *Essentials of Logic*, besides editing and largely contributing to *Aspects of the Social Problem*.

⁴ His *Psychology of the Moral Self* was published in 1897, but he did not publish anything more on Aesthetics till the *Three Lectures on Aesthetics* in 1915.

The New Horizon

and I can't understand anyone's but yours and Stout's, and you won't publish anything. So I must fill up the time as I can. I wonder if I shall ever know what a psychologist means by "feeling." I am going to be quiet for some time now, I hope, and look about me and read.

Yes, the more experience one has, the more that feeling of the mind going on of itself comes over one. I often feel when I go down to lecture as if there was no earthly certainty of the things coming into my mind when I want them. Suppose they didn't, I couldn't do anything to make them. The hope that they will, seems to rest on a most precarious Induction by Simple Enumeration!

I wish you could have come up to the Ethical.¹ I hope we shall see you now and again in town.

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XXX

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

Jan. 1/97

MY DEAR FRANK,

It was delightful to get your letter. I meditated running after you in town, but our brief holidays melted like smoke, and I wasn't quite sure where you were, though I believe you had told me before. I hope you are feeling pretty well and hopeful in face of the new year. Certainly one values one's friends and friendship more as the years go on. I think one begins to understand philosophy for the first time, when one experiences how the great things, love friendship and the higher interests, stand by one and become more real as life itself gets a little tiring—physically and in externals, I mean.

¹ The London Ethical Society, of which he was still the Chairman. Alexander, I suppose, had been asked to lecture, as he had done several times in its early days.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

I have just sent Macmillan a set of lectures on the Psychology of the Moral Self;¹ I don't know if he'll take them. I am working up Sociology and Social Philosophy for the lectures at Manchester College²—reading Kant and Fichte and about the post-Rousseau 18th cent. people, to get the line of transition to 19th cent. ideas. Then I have to repeat a course on Ar's Ethics (w. your translation) in London. I want to get back to Aesthetic; I have as a germ a set of notes for lectures given a year or two back; but I can do nothing at it till after summer. If possible, I shall take an easy year from lecturing in 97-8, but I don't know how that may be.

I am glad you are reading Helen's book:³ it is v. unpretending but I think there is a good deal in it. Sherwell's book⁴ abt. West End wh. many papers couple w. it, is rather striking and perplexing; I think it shows how the whole type of idle pleasure life needs changing or dispersing. No housebuilding e.g. will cure overcrowding in such a district; it is the type of life that makes people submit to it. At least I suggest that.

With love to all

Always your affectionate friend

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ *The Psychology of the Moral Self* was the outcome of a University Extension Course in connection with the London Ethical Society, at the conclusion of which he was amused to be asked by one of the students whether he would not give one on "real psychology."

² Oxford, where under the Dunkin Trust he gave three eight lecture courses in 1896-7, which formed the basis of his book, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899).

³ Mrs. Bosanquet's book, *Rich and Poor*, came out in 1896. Before her marriage she had for many years acted as Secretary to one of the East End branches of the Charity Organisation Society and spoke with authority on this subject. A second edition was called for in 1898, the year in which her book, *The Standard of Life and Other Studies*, also appeared.

⁴ Sherwell's book, *West London, a Study and a Contrast*, was published in the "Social Questions of To-day Series" in 1897, quickly going into a second edition.

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LETTER XXXI

2 BEAUFORT

WESTON S. MARE

March 12/97

DEAR BOSANQUET,

Many thanks for your letter and its good wishes. I am very glad to hear that you will be able to give more time to philosophy, as, though I would not undervalue your other work, I can't help thinking it is philosophy to which you have a call. Yes, I should feel that you had not accomplished your destiny if you did not write a book on first principles. And I am sure for the sake of others you ought if you can. *I* think you undervalue yourself as much as you over-estimate what I have done. We can't argue about it, but I must say what I feel. So I shall look forward to seeing something.

Yrs truly

F. H. BRADLEY

LETTER XXXII

7 CHEYNE GARDENS

CHELSEA

March 19/97

DEAR MR. PETERS,

Your parcel was full of delights, and I don't quite know where to begin my thanks. The Agamemnon will be our next reading aloud book; just now we are engaged in Ruskin's Seven Lamps. The catalogues are fascinating; the difficulty will be to moderate one's expenditure, and I am glad to have some clue as to what will be good to start with. I had got Sutton's catalogue, but it is not half so interesting; fortunately I had not yet sent my order.

We shall have a fair amount of ground, both shady and sunny; and though the garden has been greatly neglected I see large possibilities in it. We hope you will come and advise us, as soon as

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

you can spare the time, in the disposition of it. We are both inexperienced though ambitious gardeners.

I am so glad that you thought Bernard looking well. The prospect of the country life, with quiet and leisure, makes us very light-hearted. We have just returned from a journey of inspection, and find that we shall probably be able to begin our move¹ on April the 5th. If you can really spare them without despoiling yourself some plants any time after that would be most welcome. I aim at a garden of perennials, no bedding out, though annuals will probably be allowed for the first year or two until we get well stocked.

I am venturing to keep the catalogues a little while, but would return them at once on receipt of a post card.

Bernard sends his love. Please remember me very kindly to Mrs Peters, and believe me with many thanks.

Yours sincerely

HELEN BOSANQUET

LETTER XXXIII

THE BIRCHES

CATERHAM-ON-THE-HILL

Oct. 6 (1897)

MY DEAR FRANK,

The plants have just arrived—too late to put them in tonight; and Helen, most unluckily has a cold. I have laid them out on the grass and covered them up to protect them from possible frost; there was one degree last night and will I think be more tonight; thermometer at 37° at 6-o P.M. I will put them in tomorrow, Helen directing me from the window. They are a lovely lot, and beautifully packed; I almost think they will be all right; they don't look at all ill. . . .

I see the Nettle ship book is announced in Chronicle. I look forward to it much. . . .²

¹ To The Birches, Caterham-on-the-Hill.

² Nettle ship's *Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, with a biographical sketch by A. C. Bradley and G. R. Benson, appeared this year.

The New Horizon

I hope you are feeling well. It is beautiful autumn here; my wife's kind regards and thanks to both of you.

Your ever affectionate

B. B.

LETTER XXXIV

THE BIRCHES

CATERHAM-ON-THE-HILL

DEAR MR PETERS,

Oct. 8/97

We feel like the worst kind of fraud, only fit to be exposed by the C.O.S. For now we have two boxes full of plants, one at least of which is clearly obtained under false pretences. I do hope your garden won't suffer much for its generosity to ours. I have had a lovely time planting the first lot; (she went out, and it cured her cold. B.B.) I do not think they are harmed at all, some indeed had misunderstood the conditions and begun to grow rather strongly, especially *papaver pilosum* and *alstroemeria*; but I have planted them very carefully, and hope they will find out their mistake before it is too late. The fig-tree is delightful.

Some new birds have appeared which quite puzzle me. Small, with a rather large glossy black and white head, and a flat bill like a duck's, only smaller. (Ducklings, surely. B.B.) (This is nonsense, they were smaller than sparrows, and flying in the trees. H.B.) Bernard sends greetings and joins me in many thanks.

Yours sincerely

HELEN BOSANQUET

LETTER XXXV

THE BIRCHES,

CATERHAM-ON-THE-HILL

MY DEAR FRANK, . . .

Dec. 28 (1897)

I am glad to hear you have been fairly well. I am deep in Nettlehip, for "Mind".¹ The Republic lectures are really splendid.

¹ His notice of the two volumes, *Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, appeared in the April number of *Mind*, 1898. He describes them as "good

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

There is a curious directness about them wh. makes one (as Bradley says¹) almost think them elementary, until one reflects that the things have hardly been said before with anything approaching to such clearness. I daresay you have the books—Bradley would surely send them you. The extracts from papers letters etc. are very fine I think, and no doubt more freely characteristic than the lectures. The admiration for Spinoza² must have been very natural to him. I wonder if it will prove as one might be tempted to think, that he effected little outside his educational work. These two volumes seem to me good all through, and likely to help a great many minds. I don't feel sure whether elaboration in large books would have done very much for the thought.

Yours ever affectionately

B. B.

LETTER XXXVI

THE BIRCHES

CATERHAM-ON-THE-HILL

Feb. 22/98

MY DEAR FRANK, . . .

Then your 20 years service is complete at the end of next term, and that secures your fellowship for life, as I understand? I am very glad of that. Then you will be able always to take a holiday without feeling that you are deferring the security of your fellowship. . . .

I still hope you may get your books done. You have done so much, that it seems likely you will do more. In any case, my own books certainly have been affected through and through by what I have learned from you. I once made a list of aphorisms which

from beginning to end," and singles out the treatment of feeling and the worthlessness of it, as commonly understood, to be a standard of value as specially significant. In speaking of the lectures on the *Republic*, Bosanquet develops what he says in the letter of their directness and apparent elementariness, and suggests that as "the best extant introduction to that book" they should be published at a price which would give students a chance of buying it.

¹ See vol. i, p. 51.

² On this see p. 57 above.

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were epoch-making *for me*, and a lot of them were your sayings. I believe it exists somewhere; I will show it you if I ever find it. Don't you suppose you could write if you had not the teaching to do? I am not recommending you to give it up while you feel it possible to go on; but I should think that there will be a time when you might fairly give it up, and yet do a good lot more work under the condition of having your time and seasons in your own hand. I find that makes all the difference, even though I am as strong as most of my years. I am going to recast some lectures to make a book on Political Philosophy;¹ this is to take not more than a year; then a handbook on Aesthetic; then a work on Meta-Physic; and then or before, the end! . . . With kind regards to Maud from both of us.

Ever yours affectionately

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XXXVII

In October 1897 it was decided to carry on the work hitherto done by the London Ethical Society by a new body to be called the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. This change was an outward and visible sign of the growing dislike of its leaders, Bosanquet in particular, to identify themselves with a movement which seemed to be drifting more and more in the direction of Positivism and its religion of humanity. But it also offered the advantage of giving them a freer hand in the organisation of courses of lectures than had been found possible in working under the University Extension Society. Their experience during the last ten years had proved that there was a considerable demand in London for philosophical lectures available to men and women who were unable to take advantage of those given in the daytime to University students. When therefore the

¹ His book on *The Philosophical Theory of the State* was published the next year. The handbook on Aesthetic was never written. For the work on Metaphysic we had to wait till 1911.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

London University Commission in 1899 was receiving applications for admission to the University in its reorganised form, Bosanquet and his friends were anxious that this demand should receive recognition. There still survive among his papers several documents of some historical interest in connection with this application. Among them there is a short memorandum signed by Leslie Stephen, Henry Sidgwick, and James Bryce pointing out the inadequacy of existing arrangements to meet "the interest felt by an increasing number of the general public in philosophy and kindred subjects" as these are "more and more brought into connection with questions of life and education." There are also a memorandum on the Work of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy and an Address signed by Bosanquet as Chairman and Mary Gilliland Husband as Secretary asking for the recognition of its teachers under Part II par. 2 of the University of London Act of 1898. The application was refused and the School with its Director E. J. Urwick was in the end taken over by the London School of Economics. But this left the wider question thus raised as to the need of further opportunities for philosophical study and research unsolved. Much has since been done by the London County Council and the Workers' Educational Association, more recently by the foundation of the British Institute of Philosophy, with its headquarters at University Hall, Gordon Square, and a small library to which a hundred of Bosanquet's most valued philosophical books with many marginal notes has recently been presented by his literary executor. But much remains still to be done in the cause Bosanquet and his friends had at heart.

THE BIRCHES
CATERHAM-ON-THE-HILL

June 11/99

MY DEAR FRANK, . . .

I suppose term is drawing to a close, and your work is over or nearly so. No doubt you will begin by one of your cycling trips. I am riding rather better this year, though still contemptibly

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by your standard. But on a quiet road, when I can see $\frac{1}{4}$ mile ahead, and expect no serious hill, I *quite* enjoy myself now. Do you think it lawful to pasture cows in the middle of a high road? what they find to eat there I can't understand; but there they are.

We are interested in applying for the London School of Ethics and Soc. Phil. to have its teachers recognised as teachers in the new London University. It won't be done, because we haven't enough money to assure continuance etc.; but I shall get in a memo. embodying our experience of London Philosophical teaching, wh. may be a help to the Commissioners. It is awfully funny and English. They will recognise any decent "school" wh. can support itself but they have no money to give anyone; so if one can't find one's millionaire—a beastly business too—one simply drops through. There is beer money, but that must go for "technical" education.

Love to all

Yours affectionately

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XXXVIII

THE BIRCHES

UPPER CATERHAM

July 14/99

MY DEAR FRANK,

This is great news; I had not heard it from Loch; and I am heartily glad of it. I always admired you for sticking on at the college grind for so many years; but I always hoped and trusted that you would bring that period to an end while there was still time for you to add some good books to our literature. I never heard anything on Goethe that stimulated me like your lecture upon him, and all through the philosophic field my work has constantly been a working out of suggestions I have got from you in conversation. You *will* have cold fits, no doubt. The removal of the absolute daily compulsion to a routine makes one more sensitive even to the weather—more attentive to changes

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

and influences in the surroundings. But all that doesn't matter to people who have been trained to work and think as we have. I am quite sure you will be both happy and efficient; your books will be a great gain. I wish Andrew Bradley¹ wld. follow your example. . . .

Ever your affectionate

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XXXIX

Aug. 23/1899

MY DEAR FRANK,

. . . . We move² either the week of Sept 11 or of Sept 18 probably. I do hope we may all of us have some solid space of years in which to do some work, and fit ourselves into a simple and wholesome way of living and see something of our friends.

You refer to my letter of the other day. Here is a simple case of what I and others owe to you. You know the point of view about concept, judgment, and syllogism being really inseparable stages of one activity etc etc. I have just looked over 80 Indian Civil Service logic papers, and all the *good* men had this wonderfully clear and thorough. Now to some extent they have got it from me and teachers who have read my book, and I, quite unquestionably, got it from you. You said it to me one day in sharp definite terms which I cannot recall in detail; but wh. gave it me for the first time quite explicitly. Of course I know that all the big men from Plato to Bradley have said or meant the same thing; but I stick to it that that particular point, put in that sharp way, I got from you and many others from me. There are more cases like it, I think; but I am sure of this one. . . .

Your affectionate

BERNARD B.

¹ Who was still Professor of English Language and Literature at Glasgow.

² To The Heath Cottage, Queen's Drive, Oxshott, which they had had built for themselves.

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LETTER XL

THE HEATH COTTAGE
QUEEN'S DRIVE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

Dec. 24/99

MY DEAR FRANK,

. . . . I am afraid the Lochs and we don't see eye to eye on the Transvaal question.¹ But it is true (as the Manchester Guardian admitted the other day) that we must drop the argument about beating a small boy, for the present! It seems now from the figures that everyone who cared to know must have known that they were arming hard from /95 on. And quite right too, I think.

I am more hopeful about the end than many. I suppose hatred *is* developed, chiefly I think by the non-combatants, esp. the Press. But on the whole, is it not like a fight between two boys? Shall we not learn to respect each other, and understand that we must have more consideration for each other in future? Whatever happens now, the Boers have covered themselves with military glory (putting aside the allegations of bad faith about flags of truce etc. wh. are the most serious point) and ought I think, to be able to accept any fairly constitutional settlement without rancour. . . .

Ever yours affectionately

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XLI

THE HEATH COTTAGE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

April 8, 1900

MY DEAR FRANK,

. . . . We got home on Friday last, and saw Loch and Mrs Loch yesterday. So we know pretty much how you are. I gather

¹ Bosanquet, like Edward Caird, the Master of Balliol, and other leading idealist philosophers, was strongly "pro-Boer."

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

that you are in the best possible hands, and I do hope that some crisis may come which may leave you permanently better. It is very hard to be laid aside just when you were getting some leisure, and when it seemed likely that you would write that book about Goethe wh. I have longed for ever since I heard you lecture on Faust. But I do trust it is only deferred. It is a splendid thing, you know, to be so brave and strong in heart as you are. I think that all your friends are better men because of you, or certainly they ought to be. . . .

Ever yours affectionately

B. BOSANQUET¹

LETTER XLII

Dr. Johnson used to advise his acquaintances to "keep their friendship in repair." Bosanquet knew better than most the wisdom of the advice. In the last twenty years of his life he was constantly forming new connections with younger writers. The letter which follows was a reply to one from Miss Hilda D. Oakeley telling of her work in the Philosophical Department of McGill University, Montreal, where at this time she was Warden of the Women's College, and asking for advice as to study at an American or a German University during her vacation. The reference in it to the gospel according to Bradley and its criticism of "Personalism" are not likely to escape the reader's notice.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Dec. 28, 1902

DEAR MISS OAKELEY,

It was very pleasant to catch a glimpse of you at Barmoor last summer, and now to hear that you have not abandoned philosophy.

¹ Peters died on April 23rd this year without having the opportunity of realizing his friend's hopes of future literary work.

The New Horizon

I suppose that English and American Universities except Chicago, are mostly closed at the time when you will be free; and I don't *know* of anything special at Chicago. Nor do I know of anything specially original in Germany; but that is quite likely to be my ignorance. Their output of work is tremendous; but they don't seem to me to be advancing in principle. I know too little, however, of what they are doing.

I am half inclined to suggest that, with all their faults, the Harvard people are doing as well as anyone. William James is certainly a spiritualist crank; but all he writes is suggestive; and Royce's two series of the World and the Individual are full of the ideas about Will and Personality which you wish for. McTaggart's review of the 2nd series in the October "Mind" will give you a hint how to take it. McTaggart's own book "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology" is much more attractive than the title sounds, and takes a very interesting line, though perhaps open to criticism. You don't mention Bradley's Appearance and Reality, which is still to me the gospel among all modern philosophical books. You know Nettleship's Philosophical Remains and Lectures?

"Epistemology" has many meanings; but I don't much like it if it mean study of Cognition apart from Reality. Perhaps—I don't know—you will have to make up your mind whether to take Metaphysics seriously or not. I incline to think that if you play the game at all you must be driven on to that—"Idealism" implies a metaphysical view. I mean that one can't really stop in criticism or in ways of approaching knowledge. One must be brought up to the question what or what sort of thing seems to be true, and why?

I wondered if Harvard is in session when your college is not, and if you could hear Royce, by any chance. But his books tell you all he has to say, and I daresay you want rest combined with quiet reading. I do not think that he or McTaggart are as sound as Bradley; but, taken critically in Bradley's spirit, they might help you to push further into more interesting fields. I agree about Personality and Will, that they demand attention; but there I think Bradley's point of view most important; not to suppose any one,

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

or any two or three, of these experiences can as such be the key to reality. They can only be clues, subject to criticism, and defective in their own ways. You need to approach them all freely, as facts to be analysed, and make the best of them together; not to try to reduce one to another. Have you seen Adam's *Republic of Plato*¹ (with commentary); it is a workmanlike book. Perhaps you will let me hear what you do next summer, and how your philosophy at the College gets on.

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

ii. ST. ANDREWS

LETTER XLIII

S. H. BUTCHER was at this time Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. G. F. Stout had just been appointed to the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at St. Andrews. Their letters were a heartening welcome to Bosanquet on his consenting to accept the Moral Philosophy Chair in St. Andrews.

27 PALMERSTON PLACE

EDINBURGH

March 22, 1903

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

It gave me a thrill of genuine pleasure to hear that you had consented to teach philosophy in Scotland. It will give a new stimulus not only to the Professors of philosophy but to others in different departments of learning to feel that they have got such a Colleague. At least that is my own intimate conviction. And all whom I have heard speak of your election are prepared to welcome you with unusual warmth.

¹ The *Republic of Plato*, edited with Critical Notes, Commentary, and Appendices by James Adam, was published by the Cambridge Press this year.

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I hope that before long we may meet again. In recent years we have seen one another too little and I have often regretted it.

Yours ever

S. H. BUTCHER

LETTER XLIV

137 WOODSTOCK ROAD

OXFORD

19 April, 1903

DEAR BOSANQUET,

I was delighted to receive your very kind though all too flattering letter. It is certainly one of my main grounds for congratulating myself on the St. Andrews appointment that I shall have you for a colleague. I trust that we shall find it possible to have more real and intimate cooperation in the work of teaching than is often found between the 2 philosophical Professors in a Scotch University. I feel that I should like some time this summer to talk over future plans with you.

I am very glad that you have taken up the work of academical teaching. My Aberdeen experience leads me to expect very good material in a Scotch University. The Honours men at least are really interested in their work. In revising the syllabus for next year I have named your "Essentials of Logic" among the books to be read by students. I fancy I shall end by using it as chief text book.

My wife has suddenly decided to go up to St. Andrews to see about a house this week. She will be there on Wednesday and hopes she may see you and Mrs Bosanquet, but if she can finish her business she will go back to Edinburgh at night, and she fears she may just miss you.

With kind regards to Mrs Bosanquet and yourself in which my wife joins.

I am

Yours ever

G. F. STOUT

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER XLV

The State provision of school meals was strongly opposed at this time by the C.O.S. as an undermining of family responsibility. But it was already a rearguard battle for the reason Sir Edward (afterwards Lord) Grey mentions. The defection of this old family friend and neighbour was likely to be keenly felt. It was a sign of the change in Liberal opinion and general social policy in the coming years which saw the open adoption of collectivist methods, including industrial insurance and the provision of old age pensions on a large scale by the Asquith administration.

By the reference to the Tower Street School hangs a tale which if it could have been foreknown to Bosanquet and his friends would to some degree have compensated for any disappointment they may have felt in the course of events at the time. This was one of the "Special Difficulty Schools" of those days, being situated in a court off St. Martin's Lane and attended by the children of some of the lowest class in the district. In 1889 Miss Margaret Frere became a Manager and for many years "worked away," to use her own words,¹ "as a Lady Bountiful and quite satisfied with my open-handed efforts. Then a book called *Poverty and Riches*² by a Mrs Helen Bosanquet fell into my hands and opened my eyes to the utter futility of the work I was doing." Miss Frere was thus led to start constructive work with the aid of a Relief Committee, annual reports of which were sent by her to Sir John Gorst and shown by him to Sir Edward Grey. It was this obscure effort that greatly through her efforts as coopted member of the L.C.C. Education Committee became in the course of the next twenty years the model of the Children's Care Committees, now firmly established all over London—a fine instance of the union of what was best in the principles of Collectivism and of Charity Organization respectively.

¹ In letter to the editor.

² Really *Rich and Poor* (1896).

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FALLODON

CHRISTON BANK

NORTHUMBERLAND

Jan. 23, 1905

DEAR MR. BOSANQUET,

I think I spoke of it being possible to do something as regards better feeding through the Education *Department* and Local authorities and I spoke of insufficient and *unsuitable* feeding. What was in my mind was 1. whether something could not be done through our Education system to bring up future generations to know what children should be fed on, and how food should be cooked. 2. As to *insufficient* feeding I should like to see local education authorities empowered to provide meals and have a food fee collected from the parents as an Education fee used to be collected. In cases of destitution the fee would be remitted; I think it was so in the case of the Education ("school") fees.

If voluntary work will cover the ground there is no need for more; but I am rather impressed by the statements of Gorst and others that some organized powers are necessary. I like the idea of the Tower Street School Committee: it seems to me to be the proper way to work; but is it now the exception or the rule in big cities? and if the former will it ever become the rule, if left to itself?

Yours sincerely

E. GREY

LETTER XLVI

R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, son of Rudolf Hoernlé, C.I.E., of Oxford, after an education in Germany, had come to Balliol in 1899, where he had had a distinguished career, winning the Jenkyns Exhibition and the John Locke Scholarship. The letter that follows was written to him on the eve of his taking up work at St. Andrews as Bosanquet's assistant.

The off-print referred to was one of the first of the two articles on "Pragmatism versus Absolutism" that appeared in *Mind*

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

N.S. Nos. 55 and 56. Towards the end of his article which consists of a trenchant criticism of Bradley's Absolute as a principle of explanation, founded upon his failure to bring it into any clear relation to the actual, Hoernlé tries to illustrate this defect from the doctrine of the unreality of time. Bradley *more suo* shows that the idea of time is inconsistent with itself and that therefore time must be unreal, but that nevertheless it must exist "somehow" transformed in the Absolute. But he does not even attempt to show either why there should be an appearance of the character of time or what its character as "transmuted" in the Absolute is. Other Absolutists e.g. Royce and A. E. Taylor had attacked these problems but had failed to solve them. Hoernlé is willing to admit that we see "through" time, in a sense, and grasp the deeper meaning which manifests itself *in*—even we might say *by means of*—it. But "the fullest possible understanding would not transcend the temporal character of experience in the sense of doing away with it. There is nothing to show that we can have the meaning without the process. Rather one might argue that the process is essential to the expression of the meaning." The old Aristotelian paper that Bosanquet refers to is doubtless the one that was given by him as the Presidential Address in 1895 on "Time and the Absolute." It reads like an answer by anticipation to this argument and is of great interest as an illustration of his relation to Bradley. He tells us in the course of it that he considers himself to a great extent to be "merely expanding" Bradley's argument. But he approaches the subject, also *more suo*, in an entirely different way. In place of Bradley's high *a priori* and somewhat scholastic treatment of it he appeals to "the actual position of time in our experience," and instead of dwelling upon the unreality of time as we know it starts from "the necessary admission that Time is in the Absolute," and has a positive contribution to make to our knowledge of the deeper reality that manifests itself in it. "For this," he writes in words that seem to anticipate Hoernlé's, "we require, not the annihilation of temporal experience, but the power of seeing *through* it." What constitutes the "slightly different point

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of view" is the emphasis he lays on what he calls "the *evanescence* of Time in all the higher intellectual processes," till, when we come to Art, Philosophy, and Religion, "we find that the Time-spirit has practically lost his power, or rather, has become the spirit which conquers time. He presents us with the quintessence of the ages, but the process of distillation is lost and only the spirit remains."

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Sept. 22/05

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I was very glad to get your letter and the off-print. I read the article with the greatest interest when it came out; but an off-print is always nice and handy to refer to. ἔχω λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν but I won't write more now as we shall meet so soon. I am bringing down an old Aristotelian paper of mine on "Time" which takes a slightly different view from yours on one or two of the same points. I shall be most eager to see the second half of your paper in Mind.

I should think Pilmuir Links is a capital situation; it is near the Links and near us! We came home from the Italian lakes on the 20th, having had a capital time, and seen a heap of interesting things. I should think our first week's work will be pretty well cut up by the Rector's reception and address etc, and your first introduction won't make you think highly of the industry of a Scottish University. We reach St. A. on the 4th.

Merton must have a precious strong field if you are not to get the fellowship: I hope you will be in good form, and be successful.

With kind regards from myself and my wife.

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

We shall be at 4 Howard Place, easily found.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER XLVII

THE UNIVERSITY

ST. ANDREWS, N.B.

New Year's Day 1906

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

It has given me great pleasure to get your letter, and my wife and I heartily return your good wishes for the coming year. We are both very glad that you have found yourself at home in St. Andrews, and it is only natural, as we hear nothing but golden opinions of you on all hands.

Your work with the students has been particularly successful and valuable, so far as I can form a judgment. The plan of seeing them privately with their essays is not I fancy a very old one here, and it is an excellent thing that you should have worked it so effectively. It is a thing that we can do, and the larger Scotch universities cannot, and we ought to make it a specialty. I am sure no one could do it better than you have done.

I am glad you find the class work interesting; it is much best that you should have a perfectly free hand. Webb is an authority on the Middle Age, I think; I remember being much interested in some of his papers. It was the Master,¹ surely, (not J. A. Smith to whom "the latter" in your sentence seemed to refer) whom you found run down, and who is suspected of a conversion to Realism. He quoted that sentence of mine in his Academy paper ("Idealism and Theory of Knowledge"). I don't think I meant any harm by it; I was more set on attacking ideas independent of judgment, than intending to maintain a metaphysical doctrine. I have a letter from Nettleship which criticises me for not going far enough in

¹ Edward Caird, who had suffered from a paralytic stroke the previous year. The Academy paper referred to was published in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1903-4. Bosanquet is not mentioned by name but is clearly referred to in the sentence: "When an idealist speaks of 'the judgment by which we sustain the world,' however adequate may be his explanation of such language, it is apt to excite the suspicion that his theories, if they were completely carried out, would lead to the individual being regarded as his own universe and his own God."

The New Horizon

the former direction, and for allowing the conception that ideas could be "entertained" unjudged to appear in the book at all.¹ But no doubt I should have said and should say that Reality would be lessened if I and my judgment were not forthcoming.

But I must not write more now.

Renewing our best wishes

I am

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XLVIII

Professor James Ward's Gifford Lectures, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* had appeared in 1899 and already gone through several editions. The paper referred to at the beginning of the following letter was the one that Bosanquet read before the British Academy on April 30, 1906. It was a criticism of what he regarded as the false direction that was being given to idealistic doctrine in its conflict with mechanistic views by Ward and others, who seemed to him to be resting the case for a teleological conception of the universe on the capacity of finite consciousness for selection and guidance. If this was the right reading of their work, he thought that it might be necessary "to recall the mechanist, along with Spinoza, in the interests of the philosophy of history and the theory of religion." Whatever can be said of the distribution of mentality through creation (a mere question of fact) "no appeal to it can

¹ Nettleship's view was that: "We talk of ideas or conceptions as if they were isolated things, occasionally brought into action and relation; but if we attend to any conception in our minds we are at once aware that it is no such quiescent and self-contained thing. It is no more so than a word in a book. On the contrary, every one of my ideas is in a context which it colours and by which it is coloured" (Op. cit., 148). With what Bosanquet here says, cp. *Logic*, i. p. 77 (first edition) and *Essentials of Logic*, pp. 32 ff., where he speaks of judgment as "the continuous mental construction of reality"; and contrast what he says below p. 277 of thought as "the control" of mental processes by reality. The difference is a measure of the development of his own thought on the subject in the interval.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

release us from the necessity of assuming a determinate outward side, which characterizes the mind or will of separate beings, or can account for definite characteristics of the world from a subjective aspect alone. . . . Reality must ultimately be of the nature of mind or experience. But to pass from this to the idea that finite minds are the sole vehicles and determinants of teleology apart from a nature—a relatively external and mechanical system by which their content is defined and their individuality moulded—seems to me as serious an error as that of the mechanistic view itself.” He traces the error to the unfortunate suggestion which the word “teleology” itself contains of something which is last in a temporal succession. “End” in this sense “is not necessarily the main constituent in teleological value.” What is important is the reference to the ideal of wholeness or perfection (in his phrase individuality), which is the operative principle throughout. “The notion that the ideal belongs to the future is the enemy of all sane idealism; the ideal is what we can see of the whole. It is vain to look in conscious purpose for the essence or significance of teleology. . . . Purpose only means that someone wants something. Does this something lose its value when he gets it? Does everything derive its value from want? Is nothing good in itself or as a fulfilled purpose? Surely we must take account of fruition and the character of perfection.” He ends by claiming in support of this view the deepest conclusion of religious philosophy “that on the whole the finite intelligent being has the duty and position rather of coming to himself and awakening to his own nature and his unity with what we call by an imperfect analogy a greater mind and will, than of controlling the course of the universe or moulding it as an independent cause.” The paper is of importance as a succinct statement of the view he was afterwards to develop in the more accessible pages of the Gifford Lectures.¹

In the article on “Socialism and Natural Selection” in the volume *Aspects of the Social Problem* (1895) now long out of print, referred

¹ On the suspicions that this development aroused, see Introduction, p. 28 above.

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to on page 108, Bosanquet in a characteristic passage had argued that: "The abolition of the struggle for existence, in the sense in which alone that term applies to human societies, as proposed by some forms of Socialism, means the divorce of existence from human qualities; and to favour the existence of human beings without human qualities is the ultimate inferno to which any society can descend." He quotes in support of what he there calls "the fuller meaning of the struggle for existence" Darwin's definition of it in the passage referred to in the letter (see Chapter III of the *Origin of Species*): "I should premise that I use the term in a large metaphorical sense, including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny."

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

June 11, 1906

MY DEAR PROFESSOR WARD,

It was very kind of you to find time to recognise my paper by writing to me about it. I see, in its printed form, that it is even more crude in expression than I had supposed. And I daresay, when I get the ideas put as well as I can put them in a more connected form, they will still be crude. The subject is awfully difficult.

My philosophical basis is, I believe, practically Caird's; and, as I think, orthodox Idealism. The point of it, *ad hoc*, is that I believe in "externality"; and I choose Caird as my type, because none of the others, I think, press this point quite so boldly as he does. And I believe salvation can only come by pressing it more boldly still. Of course, ultimately, I do not think the external can be real *per se*. But I do not think it can be resolved into the psychical or inward, no, not in the Absolute; although the "whole" will be of a psychical nature, and nowhere *merely* external. The two cannot be dissociated; that is the root-notion. I am not sure how far the admission of Nature as a *Vorstufe* satisfies this view. I do not think it is merely a *Vorstufe*, if that means that in complete experience it would reveal itself as psychical without any "external"

factor or object. I believe any such notion to be self contradictory. And I think from what you said at the meeting that you agree so far. You do not think that spirituality means holding all things to be spirits, as e.g. Taylor and McTaggart do. I shall be most interested to learn how your views stand when you next deliver yourself at length, I hope at St. Andrews. I may say, I don't expect you to continue this correspondence, in the Leibnizian fashion. The call on time and strength of such enormous correspondence, beyond an occasional interchange of suggestions, rather tends to impair the published work, which would cover and satisfy your correspondent's reasonable demands. I expect you agree with me about this.

Well then, about Mechanism. I thought you yourself tended to use it in a wider as well as a narrower sense. Narrower, as the dynamical theory which you criticise, as I suppose, successfully; wider, as that view of evolution which would make no difference of principle between the inorganic and the organic world; and which might, as I gather that you imply, treat successfully of the inorganic world, if that stood alone as the fact to be explained. I have in mind the contrast as drawn on G.L.i. 204-5, and the whole of Vol. i. lect. x. The tremendously sharp contrast which you draw between the inorganic and organic tendencies, evolution without guidance, and with guidance, and the whole preference of Lamarckism to ultra Darwinianism, strikes at the root of the continuity which I love. I don't mean to say that matters to the truth of your views; but it may illustrate the sort of position I should like to get. Take e.g. your treatment of *Origin of Species* ed. 6 p. 50 (G.L.i. 275 top). You make Darwin's (Wallace's Ward has corrected) "metaphorical" an admission, as if it meant that "Struggle for Existence" was simply a figure of speech. Cp., if you think it worth while, my treatment of the passage (*Aspects of Social Problem* p. 290-1) in which it seemed to me to reveal that "Str. for Ex." meant so much *more* than the words at first convey. The place is to me the meeting point of Nat. Sel. and social morality.

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Then, taking "mechanism" to mean, what I thought you let it mean in the sense accepted as applying to the inorganic world, the reign of "natural" or "physical" law; I wished to show, to suggest, a continuity without breach from this appearance to the world of human action, religion etc. The phrase "guidance", as if of a man steering a ship, was disagreeable to me, as indicating the relation of something (the external world) which would go on in one way, unless something else, the principle of consciousness, were to come and twist it to do something different. Now what I wanted was, having admitted or maintained that "mechanical" combination involves qualitative novelty from the beginning, to show the "guidance" as the result of a "whole" taking in the elements more and more completely, but at no point eliciting from any element a response which is not teleologically its due response in the whole as at the moment constituted. You would see how typical the case of Nat. Selection is for this point of view. The plan, I wanted to suggest, is in the whole, *not* in the conscious mind, which is only an awakening, more or less complete, but never in the finite mind really complete, to what this "externality" imposes and suggests. All preference for Lamarckism is therefore highly "suspect" to me. And I rest the case on history, which is just the field where Eucken and his fellows, I am told, are denying it.

I shall weary you if I go on; so I will just put a limiting suggestion, not caring how I give myself away, if I can in any degree make myself clear. How about body and mind? you naturally ask. I reply thus, in principle. *If*, what I do *not* think to be true, pure epiphenomenalism had to be accepted, I could not for myself pronounce it a hopeless or worthless position. It would be the very extreme counter attitude to moralistic individualism, and would mean that man was here, not to impose his ideas, but to learn, and see, and submit. And as against views which say e.g. that man may criticise the universe solely because it makes him, "wie er geht und steht" uncomfortable, it would even be welcome to me. And though I do not think this is true; yet I do think it

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fundamentally false to seek for the secret of plan and movement and good in what comes out of the finite mind in the highest possible isolation "from the whole".

And here as to "aspects". Of course I feel the difficulty and the inadequacy. But what to do? I am convinced that here lies the entire crux. In a sense, we *must* admit, that we have *nothing* of our own; though in a sense, we can make all our own. Our "circumstances" are not outside us, but include us wholly. It is by being them as a whole, that we are ourselves. Mechanism here shows as Logic, passing into the law, or fact, of sufficient reason.

Now we must not, I feel absolutely sure, oppose our consciousness to its content, except as whole to part. We must accept the content, and be it in its logical fulness. The "circumstance" of external things, or the bodily fact, *is* modified by entering into consciousness, but only as consciousness stands for the wider whole: consciousness *per se* brings no new plan or content out of the void.

This kind of truth, which seems to me absolutely fundamental, I express by speaking about "aspects". I, as a mind, am an interpretation of what I am as a body in a bodily world. There can be nothing in this interpretation which is not in my bodily machinery, except the interpretation itself. We must accept it *all*.

I call it, then, an aspect of what we have in externality. I wish I could express it better, but I see others, who repudiate such expressions, falling into what I hold to be fatal fallacies; opposing character and circumstance as different contents; discussing whether history makes individuals or individuals history; and all the troubles about freedom. You *cannot* make man *αὐτάρκης* that for me is the long and short of it. . . .

Well, this is a long story; but I end by saying again it was most kind of you to write; and if you get so far you will find that I also think it most kind of you to have read!

My wife sends kind regards.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

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LETTER XLIX

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

(*Summer of 1906*)

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

. . . . I am very glad you have had so good a time. Your Tyrolese experiences sound delightful; I sometimes think that those, and not the books, are the true sources of one's philosophy—or ought to be. I am glad to know about the Rembrandt in Amsterdam—we have long had an eye on Amsterdam; we must make a plunge there sometime soon.

I am most interested in what you say of your work. I noticed for Menzies' review¹ a book by one Mack, wh. is all about Anders-können—I wonder if he is known in Germany. I shall be most eager to see what you have said on the subject. His doctrine of sichmühen-können puts all the difficulties in a nutshell—I thought. But you will see what I have written if you care to. It isn't out yet. I feel with you about the working hypothesis people though the fact is, that the "Appearance" principle rather plays into their hands; Taylor says that there is one "mind" as the object of science, and a wholly different one, quite unconnected, which you carry on mental operations with! I have been reading up Caird's *Theol. in Greek Phil.*²—surely his best book; if our Honours men knew the 1st vol. of that, they would at least have something to think of. And I have to review a . . . person Marshall on *Ar's Ethics*.³ Kind regards from my wife; it will be v. pleasant to meet again.

Yours v. sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

¹ The *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, edited by Allan Menzies between 1905 and 1915, in which year it was killed by the war.

² Caird's book, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, had appeared in 1904.

³ See *The International Journal of Ethics*, January 1907.

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Bosanquet's review of Joseph Mack's *Kritik der Freiheits Theorien, eine Abhandlung ueber das Problem der Willensfreiheit* appeared in the September number of Menzies' *Review* this year. It is interesting as the most direct criticism we have from him of indeterminism in its up-to-date form, and as itself an up-to-date application of Green's view as developed in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Bk. II, c. 1. The importance which Mack attaches to the controversy, the watchwords of which are "Determinism and Indeterminism," he attributes to his sharing with determinists the error of treating the mind as "an object among other objects." Mack seems on the way to transcend the opposition in rejecting the determinists' assumption that the self that wills can be made an object of knowledge and in maintaining that it exists only in "being lived" in cognition and action, and to be ready to proceed to "an account of reason as in principle *the* initiative." He goes a further step in this direction in his acceptance of the view that the subject values (*wertet*) and thus brings norms to his experience. But he leaves the norms empty of all content and cuts them off from all standards of fulfilment, whereas in Green's view they draw content and fulfilment from the outer world: "Man is the object world feeling and realising its unity in a finite but spiritual centre." Mack will have none of this: "It is almost as if he recognized with Kant no positive theory but the explanatory theory of natural science." The subject must remain according to him "uncognized, blindly lived out self-being." In other words, freedom is one with *Anderskönnen*—something which is simply experienced, and which excludes all prediction. Try this view, he suggests with Bradley, on your friends! It is vain to define freedom as the "power to take more or less pains with our moral life," "exert more or less effort" so long as you still insist on identifying it with the exclusion of all leaning one way or the other and as it becomes in your hands something merely quantitative. Hoernlé had written a review of the same book for the October number of *Mind* of the same year. He was also engaged on an article for the *International Journal of Ethics* of the following year upon the

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same subject. It may have been to what he told him of this that Bosanquet refers, as he does not seem to have known at the time of his review of Mack.

LETTER I

Pringle-Pattison's book, *The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays*, was published in 1907. Among the other essays was the reprint of a review of John Dewey's *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903), defending Bosanquet's view against the assumption there made that it was typical of the old representational theory. On the contrary, "Bosanquet has taught more persuasively than any living writer the unity of experience and the fallacy of all dualistic conceptions." Similarly it was mere misunderstanding to take his view that "reality is ultimately given for each individual in present sensuous perception and the immediate feeling of our own sentient existence that goes along with it" as equivalent to the assurance that somewhere behind the curtain of sensuous experience reality exists. To do Dewey justice, except as editor of the volume, he was not responsible for the vagaries of the article in it by another writer upon "Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment" referred to in the review.

THE HEATH COTTAGE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

DEAR PROFESSOR PRINGLE PATTISON,

Jan. 23/07

Blackwood have just sent me your book "The Philosophical Radicals". I had not previously seen the review of Dewey and his friends. It was very good of you to defend me so far as you felt able to do so, and I should have thanked you before if I had known of it.

The initial misapprehension, which you found out, seemed to me so gross, that being occupied with other subjects I never made any rejoinder, and in fact did not think it worth while to track out all the details bound up on (with) such a view. I do not at all mean that Dewey himself and his point of view are negligible

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quantities; I am far from thinking that. And I quite think it likely that some of my expressions are ill chosen.

The whole book, (your book) is interesting and pleasant. It seems quite a short time since our joint undertaking which you recall.¹ And what a path Haldane has travelled since!

There is a little point, not philosophical, which struck me in the first essay. I am too weak in political history to criticise your main point about the breakdown of the Utilitarians' influence after /32. But I have always supposed, and, I fear, said, that there was one remarkable thread of continuity between the Philos. Radicals and the later development of the social spirit. Was not the Poor Law Report of /34 and also the Factory legislation and Sanitary Reform connected with Bentham through the person of Mr. Chadwick? The New Poor Law, and the general board of health always seemed to me to be practically Benthamite institutions, and to represent a very remarkable legacy from the old Radicalism to the new "Socialism" or what we like to call it. I am not at all one of them, if any, who think the New Poor Law the last word of wisdom; but it and sanitary legislation together, (combined, as I recall while writing, with the fact that Bentham first definitely popularised the idea that the function of Parliament was to improve social conditions by legislation) make a tremendous send off to the new era. Bentham's own P.L. scheme "anticipated many features of the P.L. of /34".

This was a mere detail of interest wh. occurred to me; I suppose really there is always continuity, and it is always, I think, fascinating. I have just glanced at Sir E. Chadwick's life in the Dict. of Polit. Economy, and I see it bears out my point.

Don't trouble to write—this not a serious criticism, just a little matter of supplementation. Of course I don't admit the policy of the New Poor Law to be negative.

Yours v. truly

B. BOSANQUET

¹ The *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, published in 1883, edited by Seth and Haldane, to which Bosanquet had contributed that on "Logic as the Science of Knowledge."

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LETTER LI

The notice mentioned at the beginning of the letter was in reality a long article on Baillie's book, *The Idealistic Construction of Experience* (1906), which appeared in *Mind* of October 1907, and in which, taking the author as "in many respects the most 'orthodox' of present day Hegelians," Hoernlé complains that the criticisms that have been passed on Hegel's philosophy since his time had been ignored and the main positions restated without reference to them. Going into more detail, he criticises the definition of reality, as a single all-inclusive experience, in view of the difficulties it raises as to the relation of our experience, particularly our moral and religious experience, to that of the Absolute and the sense in which the lower forms of these can be said to be included in the higher. Religion, e.g., is said both to be the highest level of experience and to be a "cross division" containing different levels in itself. In moral and social experience there is the further difficulty of conceiving of this as literally the activity of a social self-consciousness, over and above that of the constituent individuals. In the course of his review Hoernlé refers to Bosanquet's article on "Contradiction and Reality" which appeared in *Mind* of January 1906, where he criticises the theory that the Absolute is a society of selves on the ground that we cannot get the whole content of life out of a universe composed merely of persons: "It is things which set the problems of life for persons; and if you turn things into persons, the differences which make life interesting are gone, except in so far as for practical purposes you turn the persons back again into things." Baillie replied to his critic in the following number of *Mind*, and Hoernlé added a note of counter-reply. Bosanquet's letter, on the whole supporting Baillie, is of great interest as a statement of his attitude at this time to Hegel and to some of the characteristically Hegelian doctrines which Hoernlé had criticised.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

RUSACK'S MARINE HOTEL

ST. ANDREWS, N.B.

April 4/07

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I find the atmosphere of this hotel, along with the presence of talkative though interesting acquaintances, unfavourable to consecutive thinking. I like your notice very much; it is very moderate, and delightfully clear. Where you refer to me, I think you express the point of what I was trying to say, exactly. I can only make one or two quite general remarks, besides.

I am interested to begin with (as I was when you said the same things at our meeting) in the way that, I gather, Hegel strikes a younger generation. To me he has not, and never had from the first, that foreignness or essential difficulty. Not that I can "explain" him any more than others can, but that when I do seem to understand he speaks to me as the only writer I can understand. What he says seems to come straight out of one's own heart and experience; every one else seems distant and artificial beside it.

I think that, as I gather that you mean on the whole to maintain, Baillie does not make so good an explanation and defence of Hegel as he might have made. I do not feel sure that he would have been much helped by going into what later people have written, e.g. Bradley; unless that had led him to meet them by going back into Hegel himself in a more thorough and fundamental way. It is possible I think that Baillie did not do this so much as he might have done, owing to a feeling wh. I often am paralysed by in dealing with these matters. Certain fundamental things appear to me obvious, and I cannot suppose other students to be unaware of them. I am therefore led to presume that being aware of them, they think them trivial or false; and I have not the courage to seem to remind people of what I take them to have consciously set aside. One would have to talk at length (as Nettleship sometimes does) of very elementary things; and one tends to feel, when that is necessary, it is hopeless.

I take as an instance the whole subject of the Individuality of the absolute, as including "our" experiences. Does it not all turn

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on the importance we attach to the separateness of our experiences—I mean of the experience of one “subject” as distinct from that of another? Of course one knows that my toothache is not your toothache. But that seems to me a trivial point of view, applying strictly only to the animal elements of feeling, and in a certain sense perhaps not to that. Really, the “human” predicates are not, as it seems to me, applicable to the separate man “wie er geht und steht”—from the beginning e.g. you cannot *strictly* say that I am self-conscious, but only that something greater is self-conscious in me. Or if you do say “I”, you must either take it to be v. imperfectly self-conscious; or you must understand it in a sense in wh. the unreflective person does not understand it—viz. as an “organ of the absolute”. “My” consciousness is no doubt separated from others by the veil wh. my limitations put between me and them; but then so far surely it is not fully mine. Shakespeare’s consciousness is a step in the direction of what would be necessary to give me “my” full consciousness. “My” self-consciousness, then, lies really outside “me”. I only get any of it at all by living in parts of some great unities, of which, if the system could be rendered visible, I should appear to be a member, but, as I stand, a member only half-alive and half-attached.

Well then, the moral of all this is, for me, that to attach human predicates to me, you must take me as I live the life of my family, or Shakespeare, or the state. And I don’t think it makes much difference of principle how far you go. “The State” is at the disadvantage of having no “separate consciousness” attached to a private body, but unless one is going to say that the absolute must have a private body I don’t much see that that matters. “I” am only human and self-conscious in virtue of a consciousness wh. I have not, but which, in one respect, say, a great statesman has. My little special consciousness no doubt completes and fills out his; to a mind independent of difference of bodies, the two would coalesce into a systematic consciousness and communicating feeling. As it is there is for us a membrane between; but I don’t think that matters in principle.*

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I don't see why the absolute should not be related to our minds in a way which would present some analogy to the way in which Shakespeare or Gladstone's consciousness is related to our minds. Our separateness seems a good device for giving every element of the diverse others its emphasis and full specialty in the total experiences just as space and time do the same thing for portions of our particular lives.

However

"You see the trick on't now, and can go on
Through the succeeding 80,000 lines."

(Calverley's parody of the Ring and the Book)

About the cross division between Religion, Science etc. and diff. phases of religion. Doesn't H's treatment of art throw light on this? I defined his cross-division in the classification of arts.¹ Is it not true that (A) the aspects of the absolute tend to be, all of them wherever any of it is, and retain in general their relative characters (B) certain aspects are predominant in particular conditions and it is only when the highest aspect is also the predominant aspect that you get its full nature. One would have to talk v. fully about religion. All religion is religion—but there is a religion which is also the perfection of science. Well, I must stop. Many thanks for letting me see the article. I think it will probably provoke excellent discussion.

Yours v. truly

B. BOSANQUET

¹ See *History of Aesthetic*, pp. 349 ff., where he defends Hegel's "Double Basis of Classification" in analysis and history on the ground that we have to take account both of the inherent difference of the arts and of their historical development. Architecture, e.g., is specifically symbolic art, but it appears historically in classical and romantic as well as in symbolic form.

The New Horizon

LETTER LII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

June 18, 1907

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I have not yet heard about any candidate for the Cape-town professorship.¹ I have no doubt that you are wise to try for it; it would be an experience just suited to your age and power of getting on with people. You will be a sad loss to me and to the University; but I shall have a certain pleasure in feeling that you are fairly under way—we couldn't expect to keep you for many years in any case.

I see I have written rather as if your going out there was certainty; I was just contemplating it; of course we don't know who may stand. My brother-in-law² says things are depressed, and money will go further there than it used.

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LIII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Sept. 27/07

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I only just had time for a brief note yesterday, and indeed it hardly seems necessary to congratulate you more now than before; for we all knew that you must inevitably be chosen. Wilson has I think expressed to you his doubt whether you are doing the best thing for yourself in going out; and we all felt strongly that

¹ At the South African College, Capetown, for which Bosanquet was one of the electors and to which Hoernlé was appointed.

² Arthur Dendy, F.R.S., Professor of Zoology in the South African College 1903-5, afterwards at King's College, London.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

the College is very lucky to get you. But of course it was for you and not for us to judge whether to go out was your best policy, and I think you are right. If you go on writing, and with the experience which you will acquire of men and cities, you will be able to come home to a British professorship in a few years' time and have a clear career as a philosopher before you. Dendy says there are very nice and influential Dutch people in Capetown; I should think your knowledge of continental ways would enable you to get on with the mixed social elements there better than many men would.

The loss to St. Andrews is quite irreparable; but of course we knew you would not be with us very long in the position of an assistant. To me personally the loss is also very great, though my retirement would not have allowed me to enjoy the pleasure of your co-operation much longer, even if you had stayed at St. Andrews. I should say that you have given a distinct lift to the standard of philosophical assistant's work, by the excellence of your teaching, and the energy and influence of your dealings with the students. I hope we may not fall back from it.

Can you help me in finding an assistant to take your place after Christmas? Some one as like yourself as possible, at least in essentials. Alexander mentions a man Handiside,¹ a Scotch Balliol man, as I gather. Do you know anything of him? I should not mind writing to a good man, as the plan was so successful with you. I think the Oxford people thought it rather cheek on our part. But it really has not been, I hope, a useless or unpleasant experience to you, and you would make a favourable report of it, I hope, to any other young Oxonian we might endeavour to attract.

¹ John Handyside, who graduated with a First Class in this year. He was appointed by Professor Pringle-Pattison to be one of his assistants in Edinburgh the same autumn and to an independent Lectureship in Philosophy in Liverpool in 1911. He went out to the War with a commission in the 18th King's Liverpool Regiment in June 1916, and was killed on October 18th of that year "while gallantly rallying his men in a particularly awkward and desperate situation." His promise in philosophy may be judged by the small volume on *The Historical Method in Ethics and Other Essays* posthumously published, with a Biographical Note by Pringle-Pattison, in 1919.

The New Horizon

My wife sends her kindest regards to Mr and Mrs Hoernlé. They will not mind parting with you for an enterprise like this, which is really likely to be serviceable to the educational system of the Empire, and I trust to yourself. I wonder if you are anything of a field botanist; I believe the flowers on Table Mountain are a perfect glory. I know I should like to see them.

With kindest regards from both of us.

I am

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

I ought to say that Stout being referred to sent a most outspoken and unequivocal judgment in your favour. As I said yesterday, I don't know how soon you will hear from the Agent-General or the Council of the College. He said, when I asked him, that he must look into the papers before he knew whether the appointment was formally left to him, or to be made by the Council on his report.

LETTER LIV

4 HOWARD PLACE

ST. ANDREWS

FIFE

Jan. 2, 1908

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

It was very goodnatured of you to take the trouble to write me that letter, and I shall always value it very highly. I have always felt an absolute trust in your kindness and loyalty, but I knew of course that you were of the younger generation and a man of original mind, and I never supposed for a moment that my views could have any special weight or influence for you, beyond those of dozens of other scholars of the day. If you have found anything in them to be helpful and suggestive to you, I am only too thankful; it is plain, of course, that you are going to be one of the teachers of the rising generation, and I hope I may live to see what results in the main you come to.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

What you say about the men is a great help and comfort to me; I will try to believe, as you tell me, that the five years I have been here have not been useless to my students. Probably one does not quite remember enough to judge what one's own efforts as a student may have looked like in the eyes of Jowett or Green—and one is not quite Jowett or Green oneself.

And now it is a real fare well for you are starting off quite shortly; and while we are grieved to the heart to lose you, I think our minds go with you with a certain exultation. My wife was charmed with the flowers; Goodbye, with all possible thanks and good wishes; and don't forget the photo!

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LV

THE UNIVERSITY

ST. ANDREWS, N.B.

March 21/08

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

At last I draw breath, and find time to write to you. Partly to thank you in our joint name for your very excellent photo which will be a most pleasant memorial to us of old times together, to look back on in our country retirement. Yours is a good likeness I think. I enclose 2 of us. I hope you like my wife's. It was good of you to send us a p.c. on your arrival; I am very glad you had a good voyage; but that is all ancient history to you now. When you have a moment, write and tell us your news. We go to Oxshott this day week—ah! I shall be back here before you can write—on April 21. I am returning to this house (4 H.Pl.) as a lodger for the summer session. I do hope your work is satisfactory and your health good. You will be anxious to know about Bréhaut.¹ He is a charming fellow and I am sure he is all right in

¹ Louis Bréhaut, who went to University College, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar from Prince Edward's Island in 1905. After taking his degree, he acted as assistant first to Bosanquet, then to A. E. Taylor, in St. Andrews.

The New Horizon

his work and the men must like him. But he is diffident, and I suspect has worried himself needlessly as to whether he was getting on well. I have not liked to ask the men and therefore can only speak by inference. I gather from the Stouts that he doubted whether I was satisfied with him; I think it arose from a walk in which I was trying to indicate that I wished we could have done more to make him comfortable! College Echoes made a stupid joke wh. annoyed him; some girl student had said "we went in (to have essays corrected) like lambs, but came out roaring like lions". He thought they meant laughing at him; of course it only meant he doesn't sit on them. But he is a man of sense and character and I am sure he will be all right. I shall write to him at Oxford. I enclose an Honours list; Bréhaut was most helpful and punctual in making up the lists. . . . Everyone is very nice to us, and they seem to say we have exercised a good influence. I'm sure I hope so!

Does your health hold out? And have you a decent class?

With kindest remembrances from both of us,

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

My wife has beaten both Mrs Lindsay and Miss Rotherham at golf-singles. There will be return matches. I was given — 25 in the handicap, and might perhaps have won, but I picked up at the 17th hole because my ball was unplayable, forgetting the rule that I might pick out and lose 2! I nearly *cried*!!! My caddie ought to have known. I went out in 53.

Thence he returned to Canada to occupy the Chair of Philosophy at Saskatoon University. On the outbreak of the War he enlisted as a private and came to England with a draft for final training. The strain was too great, and he was sent back to Canada incurably disabled, and died in 1933, as a *Times* notice says, "a War victim though inscribed on no Roll of Honour for the fallen." It adds, "there can rarely have been a man more naturally and wholeheartedly a metaphysician; he lacked not even the absent-mindedness popularly associated with philosophers."

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER LVI

4 HOWARD PLACE

ST. ANDREWS

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

June 7/08

Many thanks for your long and very kind letter. I can see what difficulties you have to meet out there, but I am sure you will deal with them well and successfully. I am much pleased by what you say of my work here; I hope (as I think I said before) that some of it may be true!

So you have cabled an application;¹ you will hear from your father how he wrote me (I received the letter on May 29) and what I wired in reply. I think, as he indeed presupposed, that Taylor is the favourite; if he were to break down or retire, my voice would be for you. Of course it had often occurred to me whether you might not become my successor; and I thought inwardly it might pay the University well enough, to secure you now—later on, it might not get you. For yourself, I was less sure; I thought a “Wanderjahr” might pay you better in the end than to settle down at once. And you certainly are in a “Wanderjahr” now! I think it is a work worthy of your strength and buoyancy, and I hope you will continue to find the place attractive and the people pleasant.

My own conclusion here is a little clouded. My wife came back overtired from her Commission work in Ireland,² and on taking advice proved to have heart symptoms. I fear there is no doubt that organic mischief exists; we have been nursing her, partly in bed, for a month, and are now moving to Oxshott. She will be all right again for ordinary life, but never so strong as she has been. Golf, except putting, will be forbidden! The work of the

¹ Refers to Hoernlé's application for Bosanquet's chair in St. Andrews, to which A. E. Taylor was appointed.

² Mrs. Bosanquet was a member of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law, whose Report was issued in 1909. The work involved much travelling as well as prolonged sessions, the strain of which was not lessened by the acute difference of opinion between the two groups who were responsible for the Majority and still more famous Minority Report respectively.

The New Horizon

Commission is the anxious part; she can write well enough, and I hope will be able to take a fair share in the drafting of the Report; with kindest regards from both of us.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LVII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Jan. 30/09

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

Your two letters have crossed one of mine, wh. will have told you what I felt about your standing, and also about my wife's illness. I have just written to congratulate Taylor.

I hold very strongly that no sentimental objection ought to be raised against any one standing for any chair. If the electors like to chance it and take a young man, it is their look out, and often I daresay they would be wise. Age is a commoner defect than youth in Professors, and perhaps more serious! It is kind of you to speak so highly of my "record"; but still I always feel that the important record for a Professor is the one he is going to make, not the one he has made. I've no doubt you'll come home to something better some day.

We know that my wife is suffering from heart overstrain, but we don't know much more. She is recovering her strength, and doing a certain amount of writing for the Commission, though personal interviews are a little trying to her. The best opinion is that the defect will not be permanent, but all agree that she will have to take a good deal of care for a considerable time.

I am sorry to hear that you have been a little seedy: teeth are an infernal nuisance, and don't fit in with the theory of a Providence.

I hope you will be all right soon.

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

Kind regards from my wife.

PART III

“THEN A WORK ON METAPHYSIC”

LETTER LVIII

AFTER leaving St. Andrews Bosanquet found himself free to give undivided attention to the task of carrying out the last part of the programme he had sketched out for himself in 1898.¹ We see from the letter which follows what good use of his time he had already made in it.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Dec. 12/09

MY DEAR PRINGLE-PATTISON,

I should be greatly honoured by the mere fact of your proposing me for the position of Gifford Lecturer before the University of Edinburgh; and still more honoured if I should be appointed. I quite understand the attitude of those who desire a man of science or a historian of religion, and should not be at all surprised or disconcerted if either of those wishes were to be assented to by the Senatus. But if the choice should fall on me, I should readily accept it. I note that the period in question consists of the two sessions 1911-2, and 1912-3.

In fact, the work I had projected has made a good deal of progress, and so far as I can calculate I might have been ready to print rather earlier than autumn 1911. But for the sake of the better introduction to philosophical readers which I should obtain by producing my work under the auspices of the University of Edinburgh, it would be well worth my while to wait a few weeks, and perhaps print concurrently with the delivery of the lectures. And of course my calculations may very probably prove wrong, and in attempting to make the work worthy of the occasion I may feel that all the time is needed which the date of delivery allows me.

I fear I cannot be present at the meeting of the philosophical

¹ See Letter XXXVI, p. 51 above.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

club; though I should much have liked to hear Taylor on the subject of Evil.¹ My wife is fairly comfortable, and does a good deal of writing, but is not up to much active work.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LIX

Bosanquet was appointed Gifford Lecturer in the University of Edinburgh for the years 1911 and 1912. The two courses which he gave were published in his two best known books, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

January 9, 1910

DEAR PRINGLE PATTISON,

Many thanks for telegraphing. The appointment is a great honour, and a great responsibility. I will do my best to justify it.

I suppose I shall hear officially from the Secretary, and answer officially to him.

I ought hardly to thank you personally for your initiative seeing that these things are a matter of public duty. But perhaps I may say that it is an initiative which not everyone in your place would have taken, as there is a certain amount of divergence between our views. I am glad to have plenty of time, and will think over things as largely and solidly as I am capable of doing, before launching them to the world under the auspices of your famous University.

I remain with kind regards

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

¹ Taylor writes that his paper, if ever delivered, was not published.

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

LETTER LX

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Jan. 16, 1910

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I waited to answer your letter till I could tell you something definite about my book and about the Philos. Theory of the State. Of the latter, I hope you haven't yet got a copy of the 1st edition, for the second is just out with a new introduction, dealing with questions of the last few years. I might have warned you it was coming, only that I didn't in the least know how soon it would be out. About the metaphysical book, I have just been asked to take the Gifford Lectureship at Edinburgh in October 1911-1913. The position is a little comic, for the book would naturally be ready before then; but not so soon that I could get it out and also prepare Gifford Lectures in time for 1911. So I shall probably begin printing some time before, and read the lectures from the proofs if I am in existence so long hence. The reason I allowed myself so long, when I talked with you about my book in leaving St. Andrews, was the same queer position. I had reason to think something of this kind would happen, though not at Edinburgh. The book is half done, and I could finish it this year. But it will be none the worse for revision. I usually rush my books, I get so tired of them.

I am glad you are feeling drawn to metaphysic. With regard to what you say about reality and realisation, I think that what one might call the "dissociation of the absolute" is a most suggestive problem.—I am going to try to deal with it not of course that one can seriously deduce the different forms of being; but I think one can see how they must fall apart as one goes down the scale of finiteness. My wife is much occupied with the 2nd edition of the English Sigwart¹—there is a life of Sigwart and a lot of notes to be added from the 3rd German edition.

¹ Sigwart's *Logic*, of which she had published an English translation in 1895.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

When you get this, you will know the results of our general election,¹ I have been presiding at meetings and speaking; I am most excited against the Lords. I have just seen the first day's results (in 83 seats) and I prophesy a joint Liberal Labour and Irish majority of 174. So you can estimate my forecast.

It is very inspiring to hear of all your work and travel. I am so very glad your people are well. With kind regards from my wife.

I am

Yours v. truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXI

The year 1910 was a disturbed one in British politics. The controversies of the House of Lords with the Liberal Government of the day had reached a climax in the rejection by it of Lloyd George's 1909 Budget, necessitating two elections, one under Edward VII and the other under the new King. The disturbance spread even to philosophers, as the beginning of the letter shows, though none of us can recollect the occasion of Bosanquet's "P.C. address"² which had to be postponed, and though, as we see from the reference in the middle of the letter, the exhibition of Post-Impressionist art organized by Roger Fry brought consolation to some of them. It did not, however, prevent the meetings of the Aristotelian Society in the autumn, at which both he and Alexander read papers. His own was "On a Defect in the Customary Logical Formulation of Inductive Reasoning," and consisted of a two-edged criticism both of Bergson's view, as stated in his recently published *Évolution Créatrice* that "l'intelligence

¹ On the issue between the Asquith Ministry and the House of Lords. The actual majority was 126, which was adequate to satisfy the King's standard of "sufficiency."

² Probably in preparation of the Philosophical Congress of 1915, of which he had been elected *Président*. See p. 136, below.

“Then a Work on Metaphysic”

a pour fonction essentiel de lier le même au même,” and of the apparent acceptance of this limitation in the customary statement of the basis of Induction in the formula “Same Cause, same Effect.” As against both it is a powerful up-to-date restatement of the essentially “creative and constructive function of intelligence in its normal and natural working towards the concrete and continuity within difference,” as expounded in his *Logic*. It is probably this paper that is alluded to in the middle of the letter as “not disapproved of” by Alexander. Alexander’s paper was his Presidential Address on “Self as Subject and as Person.” It contained the first intimation to his friends of his view as to the essentially (and exclusively?) conational nature of mind which was to be further developed in his “Sketch of a Conational Psychology” (published in the *British Journal of Psychology* the following year), and was to form the basis of the chapter on “Mind and its Acts” in the book, *Space, Time and Deity*. To Bosanquet this “new view” was particularly interesting as carrying the process of the evacuation of mind by realist thinkers, and the consequent transference of its content to the “thing,” so far as to defeat their own ends, and make the object, as he here says, “come alive” in their hands. This criticism he further developed in his Adamson Lecture two years later *On the Distinction between Mind and its Object*. He lived to see a further step in the process of spiritualizing the physical “thing” from the side of Realism in Whitehead’s view of it as “nothing else than the systematically adjusted set of modifications of the (physical) field,”¹ and thus something that has to be grasped, not like a brickbat, but like a theory. He would have welcomed Sir James Jeans’s suggestion that to Science “the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine” as only a further step still in the same direction. He would only have added that a great machine is itself nothing else than a great thought embodied in space-time conditions.

¹ *Concept of Nature*, p. 190. See *The Meeting of Extremes*, etc., pp. 18, 19.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Dec. 7, 1910

DEAR ALEXANDER,

I only got home last night. I am practically well, and more comfortable than I have been for a long time.¹ I don't know whether the P.C. address is to be given after the election; it was put off (for the second time) because of it. I daresay people's minds are too much turned to other issues. I think things look well today; but if the Lords sit tight it will be very hard to know what to do. I am assuming that you are still a Radical. But in these days one never knows. My wife is fairly well, thanks, as long as she keeps within her strength; and she is stronger of late. We were at the Post-Impressionists yesterday and we both rather like them. I thought the row in the papers indicated something good.

I am very glad you don't disapprove of my paper. They didn't take the point *at all* at first; but Dr. Nunn spoke up for it, and the discussion went fairly well; with, I fear, too much assistance from me. I always like to answer each speaker at once. I never can remember them apart if I don't.

I will wait about your new view till I see it at length. I often feel closer to you than to anybody; but then I know you would repudiate me. I think you throw so much work on things at the expense of mind that they must "come alive". I like the idea of a theoretical will. And I think part of what you say (the new view in your letter) is obvious; but I hasten to add that I am quite sure that isn't how you mean it.

Yours sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

¹ On the state of his health at this time, see p. 139 below.

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

LETTER LXII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

May 13, 1911

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

Your letter of Jan 31 has lain among letters to be answered since it came—it is frightful how time flies. I am delighted to hear your news; I can read between the lines that you are making a great success of things, and if it did cost you a bit of a breakdown, I don't suppose the effects will be permanent. I am sure you enjoyed yourself in Switzerland—a little breakdown earned by very interesting work, is rather agreeable, I think. I do hope you have not really over-taxed your strength. Psychical Research? I wonder if you have seen an English book "The Adventure"¹ the oddest thing I ever read. Two sober, and quite well known, school mistresses visit Versailles. They see things and speak to people which seem rather odd to them, and write down their experiences in separate accounts 3 months after. In *subsequent* long-continued researches they ascertain that the things they saw and heard—a kiosk, a bridge, a wood, certain persons, did not at the time of their visit exist, but are verifiable in very unfamiliar documents and plans hidden away in museums etc, as belonging to the time of Marie Antoinette. After *ten years* research, having got their case complete they feel obliged to publish, as the story has got about in false forms. They strongly disclaim all occult interests and spiritualistic tendencies. Their own view is that they had "got into an act of memory of M. Antoinette"—odd, for persons claiming to be naive. Assuming bona fides, I have no theory of the case, i.e. if there was, as they say, no antecedent knowledge to serve as suggestion. It is not unlike De Morgan's story in Alice for Short, which might have been suggested by it. The detail is in appearance extraordinarily solid and complete.

I am much pleased by what you say of the Union on the whole.

¹ *An Adventure*, by Elizabeth Morison and Frances Lamont (pseudonyms), 1911.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

The native question sounds alarming, but I can't help thinking that it will work out right. I don't think you can do very wild things when Europeans are present in force, though in outlying districts you may. You really have a great position and great opportunities there. I expect, too, it is all good experience for your philosophy, though it sounds as if you were having rather much "business". I am much interested in Angell's "The Great Illusion", have you seen it?

Since the New Year I have worked mainly at the 2nd edition of my Logic, adding several chapters to the 2nd vol., and dealing with some of Keynes' remarks in the first. I have sent one of the chapters to the St. Andrews Centenary Publication which I daresay you will see. There is to be a great function there in September *entre nous*, rather a nuisance. I do hate functions. The Logic Ed 2 won't be out for some time; I daresay hardly this year—the proofs haven't begun to come yet. I am just writing the Introductory lecture to the Giffords, which are to be in Oct. Nov. this year. All the rest is ready.

The Congress of Philosophy, which met in Bologna last April, is coming to London in 1915 and I have to be working President.¹ I hope you will come. We are both well, though living quietly. With kind regards from both of us.

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXIII

From the publication of his *Handbook of Psychology* in 1890, John Mark Baldwin, Professor in Johns Hopkins University, had been the leader of the "genetic" treatment of psychology and logic in America. His best known book was at this time his *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*, first published in 1898, in which Imitation was given what seemed to many of us an exaggerated importance as the unifying principle in mental and

¹ "The quality," he wrote on this, "which causes one to be President of a Philosophical Congress is the inability to say 'No!'"

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

social life. Bosanquet, as usual, was early in the field to correct what appeared to him a fundamental misunderstanding of the whole situation, and wrote a criticism of Baldwin's theory in the July Number of the *Psychological Review* of 1902. Baldwin replied, and Bosanquet continued the discussion in the same journal in the following year. "Imitation," he wrote, "is a fact and plays an important part in furnishing the self with material. . . . But surely response and reaction, indices of communication through a common nature, are much wider and more primary facts, extending over the whole world physical and psychical. . . . What you want to account for intelligent reacting, instead of trial and error, is not imitation but the power of consciousness to combine perceptions and see their results—in short, the unity of consciousness." As the secondary, less general and less complete fact, he denied that imitation was in any special way a help towards explaining the situation as a whole—a view which present-day Gestalt-Psychologie, I suppose, would be generally admitted to support against the more mechanical theory. In the new section in the second edition of the *Logic* referred to in the letter Bosanquet repeats his contention "that Imitation is merely a later and partial aspect within the character of relevant response, which belongs to the principle of non-contradiction developing in a world of Identity and Diversity of experience, which is to it as the world of organic being is to the principle of Life." What gave importance to this contention in Bosanquet's eyes was that the imitation-theory seemed to him the virtual denial of the reality of any general will founded on the apprehension of a real community of interests in political society.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Dec. 4 1911

MY DEAR PRINGLE PATTISON,

I think what I must have referred to was a paper summarising a controversy with Baldwin,—the final paper appeared

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

in the *Psychological Review* x. 4. July 1903. I have only one copy, so I don't send it. But the 2nd ed. of my "Logic" has a new section in Vol ii sect. 4 c. 7. "Genetic Theory and Imitation" embodying it. I don't know that I ought to have called it a reply to Pragmatists; it was in connection with Baldwin's Genetic theory, and it was only at that last moment that it seemed to me to raise the whole question of pragmatism.

You are very generous in speaking about my lectures, as you have been extraordinarily kind all through the business. I hope the book, when it comes out, may not be an awful disappointment!

Mrs Pringle Pattison would realise that I could not call upon her; I meant to have apologised before hand when I dined with you, but it escaped my mind. Pray remember me to her.

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXIV

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Jan. 3/1912

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

We were much pleased to get your New Year's greetings from English soil.¹ Please accept ours, and also give them to your parents, whom we remember so well at St. Andrews.

Everyone speaks well of Reyburn;² he looks a nice fellow, and certainly will not have the Oxford manner—the absence of which, I recall, you made a *sine qua non*. . . .

¹ Hoernlé had just been appointed to the newly created Chair of Philosophy at Armstrong College—part of the University of Durham—in Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

² Hugh A. Reyburn, graduate and D.Phil. of Glasgow University, succeeded Hoernlé as Professor of Logic and Psychology at the University of Capetown.

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

I hope and think you'll like Newcastle. I wrote you about it before, I remember. Northumbrians are acknowledged, at least by themselves, to be the finest race of men on the earth's surface, but they need a little knowing, and here too, no Oxford manner! I am sure you will be a success. (That sounds a little pointed in the juxtaposition, but it wasn't meant so). Oh yes, the first lot of Giffords should be out in a few days. I wanted to make sure of seeing *it* through the press myself, at least. The Edinburgh people were kind; but that is no test, really. No, the book does not satisfy me except in the sense that it does say, haltingly, some things I very much wanted to say. Those who care enough to feel the tout ensemble may get something out of it. But most will be scandalised on minor points. The 2nd ed Logic is due too—almost a more anxious business.

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXV

Bosanquet's First Series of Gifford Lectures was published at the beginning of 1912. Of these and of the illness referred to in the letter his wife writes: "Before 1911 he was preparing the second edition of his Logic, and then came the Gifford lectures, which I believe he considered to be his most important work. There was only one serious interruption to his work of this period, and that was when in October 1910 he was obliged to go into a nursing home for three weeks. For many years he had suffered from a very trying complaint, which at times became almost intolerable, and at last it was decided to see whether an operation would help him. For a time he found relief, and was able to carry on through 1911, but in January 1912 he was obliged to go into the home again. After that he became gradually more free from any recurrence of the trouble, though only through the exercise of the most scrupulous care."¹

¹ *Bernard Bosanquet*, pp. 124-5.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

55 BEAUMONT ST.

MARYLEBONE

Feb. 23, 1912

DEAR DR. WARD,

This is just a line to say cordially how kind I think it was of you, considering both your recent ill health and your preeminent position in the philosophical world, to think it worth while to write me a *real* letter about my book, rather than the customary formula that one expects at some future date to find it interesting.

I am myself tomorrow leaving this nursing home, where I have been 4 weeks, rather for treatment than for any single operation; for a very persistent and annoying trouble.

So I feel a sort of extra-philosophical sympathy with you, and though it can make no difference to what we are or may be obliged to think and say if we meet "under shield" I felt compelled just to send you this recognition of our common humanity and thanks for the trouble you have taken to put your case to me. I will consider it all as carefully as I know how before the autumn, and may find an opportunity to say something—I don't know that I shall—in the later lectures.¹

I believe in fact that no one can or will pull down your first Giffords "Naturalism etc" from the position of something like a classic. I don't grudge them that. I daresay they contain much higher class work than I could do. I only wanted to tell my own tale, and make clear things wh. interfered with it. As I get older, I think more of the former clause, and worry less about the latter.

With best wishes and hopes that your health is now firmly reestablished. Don't trouble to answer.

I am

Yours v. sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

¹ Ward comments: "He didn't."

“*Then a Work on Metaphysic*”

LETTER LXVI

MERTON COLLEGE
OXFORD

March 17/12

DEAR BOSANQUET,

I arrived in Oxford yesterday having been abroad since early in December and I found your three volumes¹ for which I send my best thanks. I was about to read them in any case on my return, and now I have an additional reason. It is a satisfaction to me to see that at last your *Logic* is in a second edition. It is a mixed satisfaction, for it is really a shame that it was not called for long ago. But let me not think of that but rather that a second edition is out, and that you have been able to add so much new matter.

The new book I will read first and the subject is one which can't fail to interest me. I unfortunately find myself now able to read for no more than two or three hours daily if that. Still that will be enough, I hope, in time.

I hope to republish some of the things in *Mind* I have written of late years with one or two others, not yet published. I have been able to get on with this a little since December but all is uncertain.

Many thanks once more for these books which I hope to read very soon.

Yours truly

F. H. BRADLEY

I would have written before but nothing except letters is sent on to me when I am away.

LETTER LXVII

Although Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* did not appear until 1920, his views were by this time well known through the "various published papers" to which he refers in the Preface of that book.

¹ The two volumes of the *Logic* and the first Gifford Lectures, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

THE HEATH COTTAGE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

DEAR ALEXANDER

Oct. 9, 1912

I am very glad to have your letter, which gives me an occasion for writing a line that I rather wanted to write. Yes, I will certainly let the University print my paper.¹ I have no other plan, and shall be very glad it should appear in this way.

I chose my subject—I don't say it is well worded—really with reference to your interest in it and the work you had done upon it. It seemed to me appropriate to give this such recognition as I might be capable of. After I sent in the subject, it occurred to me that as on such an occasion—a sort of “Gastrolle”—you would not wish to criticise severely, I might be really referring to your views at a time when you could not well correct any misrepresentations. And now I know, what I have guessed for some weeks, that you won't be able to be there, this suggestion comes back upon me rather to my regret.

But I feel pretty confident that I shall not say anything you will dislike. To begin with, on that subject I must adopt even more than usual the role of a learner, for though I am intensely interested, I do not know the literature well. And then, if one is arguing in good faith, one's references to other people need never I think be annoying. My chief point would be the great stimulus you have given to the discussion and the great originality of your views. I am in fact taking the opportunity to work the literature up, and I don't yet know what sort of results it will bring me to. I should be awfully vexed to annoy you by any gaucherie in the choice or treatment of my subject. But I feel sure I shall not.

It is jolly to think of you having a good holiday in Italy. I

¹ The Adamson Lecture on *The Distinction between Mind and Its Object*, published by the Manchester University Press in 1913. The criticism it contained of the “Neo-Realist” doctrine of this distinction, particularly as represented by Alexander, and the conclusion to which it points, are of special interest as prophetic of the direction which Realism has taken in the hands of A. N. Whitehead.

“Then a Work on Metaphysic”

am afraid you have for a long time had hard work and no play, though it has not had the proverbial effect. I hoped you were off for the whole year. It must have been from Mary Dendy that I heard about it.

It is very pleasant that you didn't wholly condemn the Giffords. I hoped my heresy about mind and body¹ was rather in your line; I have a still worse one,² in amendment of it, this year, wh. I think perhaps will be nearer you! I always feel that there is more to learn from you than from almost anybody now, though not necessarily by direct agreement.

My wife is very fairly well, thanks, and is coming to Edinburgh with me on the 18th for the Giffords.

With all good wishes for your holiday.

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LXVIII

The question of volition was receiving new attention in these years both from psychologists and metaphysicians. Bradley had attacked

¹ Developed in Lecture 5 of his first course on *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, which aims at establishing the essential continuity of mind and body, the former being regarded as an “inherent character within the physical process coming to light under conditions of relative perfection” (p. 175), a “supervenient perfection upon certain conjunctions of external elements” (p. 193), instead of as a self-subsistent eternal angelic being coming “from out of doors.” See letter to Ward below. It was of this lecture that McTaggart wrote in his review of the book (*Mind*, July 1912): “Almost every word that Dr. Bosanquet has written about the relations of Mind and Matter in this lecture might have been written by a complete materialist.”

² In the introductory lecture of the second course, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, he speaks of pushing the view of mind developed in the first a little further (p. 1), not of amending it. What he does in Lecture 3 is to treat the process of “Soul-making” as one by which the content of life and mind are *elicited* by the “omnipotential principle,” the *nisus* towards totality, “from external environments of which the substances which act as its vehicles themselves form a part” (p. 78). How far this conception of the nature of the *nisus* brought him nearer Alexander's is another question, which has recently been exercising his critics. See *Mind*, July 1934.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

the question in a series of articles in *Mind*. Stout and Ward had maintained the unique and unanalysable character of will, schools of thought were designated as "intellectualist" or "voluntarist" according to the prominence they gave to ideas or volitions in the life of the mind. Professor G. Dawes Hicks thought that the time had come for a general clearing up of the obscurities which attached to the subject, and in an important paper on "The Nature of Willing," published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, of which he sent a reprint to Bosanquet, sought to show that from the inner side "there is no unique, simple, unanalysable component that can fairly be indicated by a perfectly general phrase such as 'I will,' " and that from the outer "We need radically to change our ordinary conception of the body and its operations if we are to understand the way in which it serves the function of an organ of the mind." Both these views fell in with the line of thought which Bosanquet had developed in *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and Dawes Hicks had quoted from it (p. 219) with approval the statement that "finite consciousness and the finite self come late on the top of immense stores of unconscious mechanism and adaptation, which are, to all appearance, its precondition." With his usual modesty Bosanquet in a subsequent letter expresses his nervousness "as to how the experts might receive his trespass into these matters," and his corresponding pleasure at having the support of Dawes Hicks's authority. He added, "I am sure that you are working in the right direction. I hope to see a much more sane attitude in the discussion of 'will' and 'attention' in the next few years."

MACKENZIE'S PRIVATE APARTMENTS

58 AND 60 MELVILLE STREET

EDINBURGH

Nov. 18, 1912

DEAR DAWES HICKS,

I write just a line in consequence of looking at your new Aristotelian paper, wh. seems to me most instructive. I know you know all things in philosophy, but I just wondered if you had it

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

in mind that J. A. Smith's doctrine referred to on slip 5 is drawn from Benedetto Croce, see e.g. *Filosofia della Pratica* p. 205.

Smith, I am told, is captivated by Croce, wh. seems to me a pity. I am very glad you are throwing light on the subject. The expression "autonomy" and rejection of the "primacy" of will or intelligence are straight from Croce.

I daresay you knew all about it; I only wanted to strengthen your hands in case you might happen not to have noted the point, and some one might bring it up at the paper. I wish I could be there but fear I can't

Yours v. truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER L X I X

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Feb. 27, 1913

MY DEAR PROFESSOR WARD,

It was very kind of you to write to me as you have done. There is no one whose character and attainments would lead me to desire his favourable judgment rather than yours. And I am glad to think that in a certain very real sense I command your sympathy, as you do mine; though the paths on which we have started forbid explicit agreement. We are both, perhaps, getting too old and too near the final experience (at least of this life) to find much pleasure in scoring off one another; and I shall not be the less ready to learn from your books, that you do not intend, as you say, to make the world sensible of my errors.

I am much stronger in health than I expected ever to be again, when I wrote to you from 55 Beaumont Street this time last year. And I hope and believe that your own health has been very fairly reestablished.

It is very welcome to me that you and others have been so ready to accept Alexander's candidature for the B.A.¹ I should

¹ The British Academy, of which Alexander was elected a Fellow this year.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

think philosophers have seldom been so unanimous. 11 out of the 15 members of the section have expressed themselves in his favour, one way or another.

I am so very glad, if I may say so, that your friends, among whom I venture to include myself, are moving to have your portrait painted. It is a right recognition of your distinction—and it should be a very fine picture.

With kindest regards from my wife, who never forgets that she was your pupil, and from myself.

I am

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LXX

Miss Oakeley had sent him a proof of her article on "Time and Eternal Life," which appeared in vol. lxxv, No. 152 of *The Church Quarterly*. In it she sought to vindicate the reality of time on the ground that "the historian has an approach to concrete reality certainly as sure as the approach to any other universal," quoting in support von Hügel's statement that "self-conscious spirit is revealed with the greatest fulness in specifically human history." In the course of it (p. 340) she had seemed to attribute to Bosanquet the view that timeless reality involved a *totum simul*. After receiving this letter she was in time to insert the disowning passage from it. She had also suggested (pp. 339 and 355) that his view showed a divergence from Plato's—an accusation not likely to be lost upon him.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

DEAR MISS OAKELEY,

July 3, 1913

I only came home yesterday, and found the proof and your letter here. So I fear I am too late to be of any use to you in respect of the article, and I will accept your permission to retain the proof, which of course is of the highest interest for me.

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

And there is nothing in the criticism which I could object to in detail, so that you could or should have made any change. It is of course an enormous compliment that you should, with whatever result, have spent so much attention on my books! What I am inclined to feel is that they express my experience as well as I can do it. I don't say others can't and won't express a better experience and express it better. I must, in the main, leave it to find its level. But I will hint at three main points very briefly.

1. I don't admit the timeless real to involve simultaneity or a totum simul. This I understand to be a Temporal characteristic, involving two or more temporal successions (as indeed Bergson points out). My idea of a timeless whole is more after the nature of what Nettlehip suggests in *Remains I*. 10.¹ I am strongly inclined to formulate a view that people confuse a timeless below time—that of abstractions e.g. mathematical truth—and above time, e.g. that of a concrete whole. But this is another story. Anyway, a timeless experience is for me a peculiar concrete, having nothing to do with the temporal comparison involved in every form of "simul". Its psychological conditions render such a comparison impossible.

2. About history. I start from the logical analysis which pronounces the narrative judgment in every case contingent and ultimately false. Is this doctrine of Bradley's *Logic* (and, surely, of every serious modern *Logic*) denied? If so, that ought to be argued and explained. Empirical confirmation seems to me rapidly growing. Is it not striking that we know, so to say, no facts or important personalia of Socrates, Christ, or Shakespeare? and that the work of the professional historian, as apart from the documents which

¹ At the end of the short paper, "Immortality: Preliminary Thoughts": "We may say all that we call 'duration' implies a comparison of two or more different experiences, any one of which may be chosen to measure the rest by. 'Absolute duration' could only apply to a being which was *all* in *all* its experiences (not less in one and more in another). But then duration (in our sense) would not really apply to such a being; and this is what is expressed by saying, 'With the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.'"

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

are the product of the movement narrated, is more and more recognised as a transient makeshift, while the essence goes into sociology, art, philosophy etc? Is not the reason simple, viz. that the narrative or historical judgment is incapable of holding the content of great events movements or personalities? I quite agree that the content comes *through* history; but I cannot admit that as a valuable content it continues to be history. I do not think history can reform itself except by ceasing to be history; and that is now tending to take place.

3. I stick to it, with Plato, that Philosophy must recognise both change and unity. I take the survival of desire in its satisfaction as a simple type of what I mean. Almost all criticism seems to me to amount to saying you must choose one or the other. This seems to me to abandon the problem of philosophy, and at the same time, to abandon the fundamental note of all religious experience. I am sure the crux is here. My experience most strongly repudiates the survival of any such creature as I am. It demands the survival of a real which is my essence, but that is another story. I must break off. With many thanks.

I am

Yours sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXI

Address.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Oct. 26, 1913

LIVERPOOL

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I was delighted to get your letter—I was just thinking of writing to you.

... I have seen Harvard,¹ but only externally; it was in the vac.

¹ Hoernlé was "Visiting Professor" at Harvard from September this year to January 1914.

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

and no one was up. I quite agree with what you say of its appearance, and believe in the academic tradition. You must be having a good time and doing great good. I will go at once to a point I want to make. I have been reading Husserl in his *Jahrbuch*, who *so far as the question of method goes* seems to me much at one with the realists as you describe them, i.e. he thinks you can make essential (*Wesensmässig*) propositions on the faith of an *Anschauung* as you have it before you, wh. are as good as a priori, being wholly independent of experience, though read off from complexus before the mind. These are, *prima facie*, absolutely true principles, and no absoluteness or omniscience can transform them; such are " $2 + 2 = 4$ ": "a spatial object must be known through 'Abschattungen' dept. on points of view, and God could not know it otherwise" etc etc.

Now he says—I daresay you know all this—what I think a most extraordinary thing, about these "essential" and *prima facie* absolute truths viz. that though true, they may have to give way to better truths, if the whole course of experience brings such truths (*Ib.* pp 36–7 and elsewhere).

This seems to me only susceptible of one interpretation, and that would reconcile the Realists, and H's, point of view, with my absolutism.

It is, that in any complex before you, you can see a priori what it as a whole demands in the way of truth, and this, as the lesson of that whole, is a priori and unalterably true. But if you bring the same complex within a further whole, then, though still true under the former conditions, your a priori truth is not the truth concerning the new whole, and may be seriously interfered with, in expression, by the latter. Then it remains true that "The truth is the whole" but it follows actually from this that there is a priori truth for every whole, and the realists and H. are justified in saying that for any complex you can read off a priori unalterable truth wh. holds true so far as it alone is considered. This is the doctrine of the early lectures of my "Principles" and I believe it will stand. It is, in fact, rather a truism; but I don't see how

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

H's doctrine, with the admission I referred to, can be made to mean more than it.

It is most interesting to hear that you are working my books with those distinguished classes. I have no doubt plenty of faults will be discovered, but I hope the book may prove of some service.

I have been looking at Lossky in the new Logic book.¹ He says Ground and Consequent is the true principle of judgment, and implies that this frees him from a dualism wh. he finds in H's "factual" and "essential" judgments. I like this.

I hope you are enjoying your work, and not doing too much. You meet your bride in England, I think; you do not go to S. Africa to fetch her?²

You will see Reyburn's article in October "Mind". Stout agrees w. it a good deal; and I think it v. good. I am answering it, very politely.

I am at Liverpool for three days, with my nephew Carr Bosanquet the archeologist a v. interesting fellow. My wife would send kind regards.

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

I heard Driesch lecture in London the other day—most beautiful lecturing, and his use of the blackboard wonderful!

Remember me to Prof. Toy, if you see him.

Bosanquet wrote a critical notice of the first volume of the *Jahrbuch* for *Mind* of October 1914. He finds himself unable to acquit the new Phenomenology of a tendency to confuse the *a priori* with the *prima facie*: "The true *a priori* must surely be absolute." But he thinks that "the whole attitude of Erkenntniss-theorie, pointing beyond itself to a world which it leaves disunited

¹ Published in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (Ed. Henry Jones) this year.

² Hoernlé had become engaged to Agnes Winifred Tucker, daughter of the Hon. W. K. Tucker, Senator of the Union of South Africa, herself a distinguished student of anthropology, afterwards to become Lecturer in Social Anthropology in the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.

“Then a Work on Metaphysic”

and unaffirmed, will undergo some radical transformation when once the question of first principles is seriously raised.” He recurs to the same point in his contribution to the volume, *Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (1915), with the same conciliatory suggestion as the letter contains. “Necessity,” he there writes, “is ascribed to intuition, not in any mysterious sense, but simply as looking carefully at a complex, and ‘seeing’ what it inevitably implies. And, as I gather, such an ‘intuition’, however sound under its conditions, may have to be reconsidered or amended (*Jahrbuch* I, pp. 36–7, 43–4) though conflict with a no less sound intuition based on a different complex. One might almost suggest that we have here the principle that ‘the truth is the whole’ applied to every relative totality, but so far only as the particular whole or complex will carry us. So understood, it would be a strikingly suggestive account of *a priori*sm.”¹

Reyburn’s article in *Mind* referred to at the end of the above letter was on “Idealism and the Reality of Time.” He criticizes Bosanquet’s treatment of time in his Gifford Lectures, as mediating between Hegel’s doctrine and that of F. H. Bradley, but failing to make his own position clear. In the first series of the Gifford Lectures he shows himself anxious to do more justice to the significance of time than Bergson had done. In the second series he speaks of succession as taken up into a system in which the relation of time disappears. (*loc. cit.*, 502). Reyburn’s own position is summed up in the words: “The aspect of succession is not merely a hindrance to totality, it may be a means to it. And any conception of the Absolute which ignores this leaves out much of the meaning of life” (p. 505). Bosanquet replied in the following No. of *Mind* at some length. The question he maintains is not one of the “reality,” but of the “ultimateness” of time, and he thinks that recent speculation on this, which “has been the meaning of the great philosophers who have criticized time,” is “an advance in detail.” It has tried to show how time and space are the “two great shapes of externality,” and this attempt is not furthered by

¹ For further agreement with Husserl in his criticism of “Critical Realism,” see *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 143.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

quoting "examples of finite experiences where externality appears as more or less essential, unless they are treated with reference not to reality but to ultimateness." Reyburn, he continues, seemed to agree that "in a full reality there is no such thing as a mere past, a mere present, or a mere future. Every event lives throughout the whole. But when we say this we have left Time, the scythe-God, far behind." He ends by correlating his view with the tentative observation in chap. xviii of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (where e.g. it is said, "The Absolute is timeless, but it possesses time as an isolated aspect, an aspect which, in ceasing to be isolated, loses its special character," p. 210) rather than with the negative criticism of chap. iv.

LETTER LXXII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

Feb. 1, 1914

You are back at work, I suppose.

. . . Your letter from N. York was most excellent. You must have seen a lot of vigorous people out there. You were not back in time to be at Durham?¹ Alexander is going v. strong with his Realism; we had an excellent meeting at the Brit. Ac. the other night and his speech in answer to J. A. Smith was really rather striking, I thought.

It was a great honour to me that you held a seminary on my Gifford Lectures. I am glad you found it on the whole worth while. Have I said to you that I want to give up the term Idealism and say "Speculative philosophy" or something of that kind. The muddle with mentalism is so recurrent.²

¹ At the meeting of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society that was held there the previous year, at which S. Alexander was present, taking part in the discussions on the line afterwards developed in his paper on the "Basis of Realism," later still in *Space, Time, and Deity*.

² Cf. what he says on this in the Preface to *The Meeting of Extremes*, etc., p. vii.

“*Then a Work on Metaphysic*”

There are some (short) new things in F. H. Bradley's new volume¹—v. striking I think. And he is wonderfully generous to me; gives me credit whenever he can; he is really a remarkably unselfish man.

We are pretty well here; and much looking forward to Spring. I wonder if your young lady has been in England before?

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXIII

The chapter in the *History of German Philosophy during the Nineteenth Century*, referred to in connection with Letter LXXI above, was given as a lecture in Manchester. It is interesting to compare what Bosanquet writes in the present letter about the ambiguity in Schuppe's position with what he there says as to “the difficulty of distinguishing the cognitive theories, whose names still carry some philosophical significance, from each other.” This he thinks is the result of the fact that neither what he calls the earlier “critical idealist” nor the earlier “critical realist” “holds together the entire experienced world as the reality.” Hence “as one is never quite sure that the idealist or positivist has not a thing in itself in the background (as Vaihinger clearly has—an unknowable real), and as the realist of Riehl's type makes his reality rather like a thing in itself (for you cannot get at it with any completeness), there is little to choose between them but a difference of emphasis.” With the later corresponding schools (e.g. Husserl and Cassirer as idealists, Külpe as realist) it is different—“you find in both groups a fairly comprehensive view of organized experience and the main difference is merely in the realist's conviction that certain objects are independent of mind.” *Op. cit.*, p. 202 and note.

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1919), containing frequent references to Bosanquet's work in logic.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Feb. 1, 1914

DEAR ALEXANDER,

About the 16th—I have arranged to go to my brother in law, so I will let that stand, though it would have been very pleasant to go to you, and it was good of you to ask me.

But I don't want to miss the dining at the refectory and seeing you and Herford¹ there. . . . I have destroyed my notes; they were quite unimportant except the actual passages I read. These are all from Schuppe's *Bestätigung des n. Realismus*, reprinted in the posthumous ed. of Aven(arius)'s *Weltbegriff*. Probably you know it; if not, shall I bring the book down with me? I shan't want it again for some time. It is a little comic; Schuppe seems to me querulous—he wanted to maintain naïve Realism, and everybody either disregarded him or treated him as a Subjective Idealist! Then he slips away fr. naïve R. at the end, going on about the Ich. There is some of Petzoldt, too, but I haven't mastered him.

I am uneasy in this lecture that I don't butter the Germans enough. I suppose the book is meant to be butter. I am just going to revise from that point of view! They seem to me to be, since 1870, almost wholly epistemological; and I don't really believe in epistemology. My conclusion at present, I thought in the night, flatly contradicts my argument; I argue their epistemology is all impossible, and conclude pathetically what a fine foundation they are laying for metaphysic. I mean, really, that they have stuck metaphysic into their epistemology. We must discuss things again.

Yours ever sincerely

B. B.

¹ C. H. Herford, Professor of English Literature at Manchester, much interested in philosophy.

“Then a Work on Metaphysic”

LETTER LXXIV

In a paper on “Neo-Realistic Theories of Mind,”¹ after noting the gathering force of the realistic movement Hoernlé had gone on to draw a distinction between the British and the American writers of this school on the ground that the former’s reality is just the physicists’ world reduced to its primary qualities, while the latter admits reals which are non-material though without thereby becoming mental. Alexander’s realism he described as materialistic in temper, but its materialism, like Sam Weller’s knowledge of London, is extensive and peculiar, seeing that it treats dream objects and imaginations as physical. In what follows, while admitting the paradox of Idealism in construing the universe in terms of mind, he argued that the paradox disappears when mind is regarded as the logical striving of the whole “toward reality in the form of finite minds from its fragmentariness” to self-completion, and found in Realism itself an illustration of this striving. “At bottom realists are fighting not *against* Idealism but *with* it.”

The reference in the letter to his “statement of Eucken’s position” recalls the important article which he had written for the *Quarterly Review* of April of this year on “The Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken.” By this time Eucken’s ideas were fairly familiar to English readers through translations and commentaries,² and some authoritative estimate of the value of his contribution to speculative philosophy seemed to be called for. Bosanquet takes it as typical of the “New Idealism.” Eucken’s own favourite adjective is “new.” Even the eternal order exists according to him “as a new kind of reality”! After an account of its leading features as decidedly, even violently, progressist, ethical, humanist, and anthropocentric—above all, anti-intellectualist (“Intellectualism can solve no ultimate problem”), and of the doctrine of the “syntagmas” or life-systems which Eucken illustrates by the “static” system

¹ *Proceedings of the Durham University Philosophical Society*, 1913-14.

² W. Tudor Jones’s *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken’s Philosophy* had recently appeared.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

of the Greeks, the "process" systems of modern Naturalism and Intellectualism, and the coming system of Personalism, he goes on to test it by the three questions of the reality of time, the place of evil, and the relation of morality to religion. Eucken's answers to all three founded on the view that "Faith in the Absolute is an *ignava ratio*" are found to break down in ambiguity, self-contradiction, or open defiance of fact. What, for instance, with reference to the last of these questions, is clearer in all religious experience than that the more absolute the faith in eternally realized perfection the more burning and irresistible is the moral will to be at one with it. So of the syntagmas. Instead of giving practical direction for living, they are mere theories and an illustration of the worst form of intellectualism. It is as though one had built one's house of dynamite instead of mortar. Cognitive thought crushed within the pretended life-systems has exploded them into a dust of ideas by which no man ever actually lived. The article ends in the spirit of Green and Bradley, whose *Ethical Studies* are quoted as refreshing after this deluge of ethico-religious rhetoric in which, with its neglect of the greatness which men find in human nature precisely where to the untrained eye life is meanest and most squalid, the reader must feel as if the plain foundations of ethics were being washed away. Yet there *are* real life-systems from which the secret of life might be elicited by untrammelled cognition. But they are such facts as the gregarious animal, the tribe and tribal self, the family, society, and the State, with their uniting mind and will and their inherent ethics and religion. Of these we hear from Eucken hardly a word. And the reason is that "It is the self-conscious reforming moralist shut up in his narrow progressive system, and not the living citizen or artist or man of religion, who dominates the system."

In this article there is a note of asperity which contrasts oddly with the tone of his treatment of Italian neo-Idealism some ten years later, and which the date forbids us to ascribe to the exasperation of the War. The change for the better is partly, doubtless, due to the growing tolerance of age and partly to the softening

"Then a Work on Metaphysic"

influences of private friendship, but mainly, I think, to the different, if exaggerated, attitude which the Italians take up to the creative power of cognitive thought.

THE HEATH COTTAGE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

June 14, 1914

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

Very many thanks for your letter and for the paper on "Neo-Realistic Theories" etc. It seems to me quite excellent, and the distinction between the English and American position highly illuminating. Alexander seems to me, indeed, to have some suggestion of the "American" position, in as far as he says that mind is dependent on things rather than things on mind. But on the whole no doubt it is as you say. Avenarius takes something of the same line in his "full" experience. The percipient has more things in it than the non-percipient object and that is all the difference.

It is exceedingly interesting that you are, as I think you have told me before, developing as an idealist; though I quite realise the largeness of your views, and that with all your time before you, you may develop into something very different, and beyond the idealism I have known. But it looks to me at present as if in the coming generation you might stand pretty much alone—an exciting position; unless the reaction in Germany of wh. there seem to be some symptoms, comes off. I wonder if you have seen Joël's Rektoratsrede at Bâle (1914) "*Die Philosophische Krisis d. Gegenwart*".¹ It speaks pretty much of the same difficulties and

¹ The "Rede" is available in pamphlet form in the third (1922) edition. The "crisis" consisted according to Joël in the antagonism which philosophers had found between the formality of thought and the wildness of life. The solution of it was to be found in the recognition of *Life* as a self-forming, self-organizing principle instinct with a logic of its own. The "progress towards a metaphysical attitude" is clear in such a sentence as: "Am Absoluten erst messen wir das Relative, und im Relativen erst entfaltet sich das Absolute" (p. 45).

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the same symptoms wh. had struck me in making a lecture on the German Philosophy of the 19th cent.; I will send it you when the vol. it is to be in appears. There is a strange, expressed, contempt for Metaphysic, along with a decided tendency to progress towards a metaphysical attitude, in e.g. Husserl and Cassirer, wh. together with other phenomena "intrigues" me a good deal. I am 66 today, and I wish I could know what philosophy will be like in 50 years time. But it will be for you and people like you to determine.

I am glad Merz liked my statement of Eucken's position; it was a horrible labour.

I wish I could be at Durham¹ but it is impossible. Remember us to your people at Oxford. I hope they are well. And then you go off on your "Great Adventure".² I hope it will be very prosperous and happy. With kind regards from both of us to you, and may I add, to your wife, though I have never seen her.

I remain

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ Where the Annual Conference of the *Mind* Association and the Aristotelian Society met in July.

² The acceptance by him this year of an invitation to join the Department of Philosophy at Harvard.

PART IV

THE WAR AS TOUCHSTONE OF
IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY

“With them (Hegel and Green) I feel fairly well fitted out in a philosophical point of view.”

I

LITTLE of Bosanquet's correspondence seems to have survived from the early months of the war. But the letters which follow are a sufficient indication of his maturer reflections upon it and a mirror of the attitude of those of his philosophical friends with whom he was in closest sympathy. What this attitude was likely to be had already been forecast in the address, referred to in the following letter, which Haldane had delivered, just a year before its outbreak, to the American and Canadian Bar Association at Montreal under the title of "The Higher Nationality." The theme, as Haldane himself describes it in his Autobiography, was that "we were reaching a stage in which we might well hope that the Ententes between the nations I was addressing and on the other hand between them and France and Russia as well as Germany and Austria, might be so directed as to lend themselves to a still further-reaching Entente. In the spirit of this larger understanding we might hope for and find the best in other nations, and so develop a world-wide 'Sittlichkeit' or sense of good form, as distinguished from mere law or pure ethics, which should provide a firmer basis for International Law and reverence for International Obligations and establish respect for the rights and duties of foreign nations." In the address itself he quoted the prayer of Grotius, "may God write these lessons—He who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in their hands. And may He give to those persons a mind fitted to understand and to respect rights, human and divine, and lead them to recollect always that the ministration committed to them is no less than this, that they are the Governors of Man, a creature most dear to God." But he added that its accomplishment appeared to be still a long way off, and that, while we must work for that accomplishment with our utmost strength, we could not be certain of a speedy result." In the lecture on "Patriotism in the Perfect State" which he gave in the series mentioned at the end of the letter which follows

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(*The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects*), Bosanquet had the opportunity of preaching a similar gospel.

After lamenting that the "large and many-sided philosophy" of what he calls "the great time" had degenerated into a creed of violence and self-interest by "its passage into the hands of ignorant and biased amateurs, soldiers, historians, politicians," Bosanquet proceeds to a defence of the unitary conception of the State, against the attack that theorists were already beginning to make upon it as in large measure responsible for the war. Based as it is, in Green's phrase, on Will, not on Force, the State in our present stage of civilization may be said to be "the ark in which the whole treasure of the individual citizen's head and heart is preserved and guarded within a world which may be disorderly and hostile." Faced by similar wills in others, each State "ultimately and fundamentally is and must be determined by its own conception of its own welfare." It is this that makes the difficulty in the way of leagues and federations in favour of peace, as suggested by Kant and advocated by Norman Angell, seeing that these have behind them as yet no spirit of solid community such as we have in individual nations, and are apt to have a merely *de facto* existence. On the other hand, we have to remember that "*War is a feature of States not as such but in so far as they fail to be States.*" As the quarrelsome man is one who is "not well organized in his own mind," so the quarrelsome State is one that is incompletely organized to secure devotion to the highest ends within its own boundaries. Let our patriotism be "the desire for our own country of those supreme goods which are not diminished by sharing," and we have "a guarantee of the right estimate of values and therefore of justice and reasonable organization dealing with wealth and power both at home and abroad." "As the expression of this temper of mind, but not without it, leagues of States for the enforcement of peace might do good service." Coming as the last of the distinguished group which gave this series of lectures, he ended by calling on his hearers "to put aside rancour and venom, and with eagerness to recognize the

The War as Touchstone of Idealist Philosophy

merits of our adversary and to renew all international bonds." Anything else he declared to be "dangerous in the extreme and politically absurd. Punishment and humiliation let us leave to consequences and to history."

Sharing though he did at this time Hegel's suspicions of federations imperfectly prepared for in the internal life of the nations concerned, Bosanquet lived to become an ardent supporter of the League which was formed in 1919. Whether his earlier doubts were not justified is perhaps, in view of recent events, more open to question to-day than it seemed to many of us in those early days of enthusiasm.

LETTER LXXV

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Jan. 24, 1915

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

It was a very great pleasure and relief to me to receive your letter. One of the first things that occurred to me last August was to write to you; but I felt that there was just an off-chance that you didn't take our point of view—I felt that you were entirely free, and open to many influences which weigh less with us. And a fundamental difference would have been so painful and disheartening that I rather shrank from writing so you may imagine how pleased I am to get your letter.

We see and feel so little of the war in England, and in this quiet country place especially, that we feel almost wicked to be so comfortable. Of course it is our dominant interest; but it doesn't touch us in our detached lives. A nephew of mine, a captain in the regulars, was hit in the leg, and is home on sick leave; he was hit on the 23rd December and on the evening of the 26th he was in Guy's Hospital in London; when I saw him a week later he was getting well rapidly. Of course thousands and thousands are less

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fortunate. (He told us an odd thing, in his letters from the front; he said you mustn't believe what the wounded private soldiers say. They are overworn and excited, and romance, describing e.g. injuries and agonies as having happened to officers, who are subsequently found to be well and sound). We are perfectly confident and steady, without ultimate anxiety. Of course the suffering, at the time, of such huge multitudes is horrible. Another nephew, my wife's, an open exhibitioner of Balliol, first in Mods last year, applied for a commission in the new army, and will go out with the Army Service Corps in February; a very fine young fellow; would have sat for the Indian Civil next year. This is all anxiety; but it is all exaltation as well. The men's spirit is magnificent.

I agree very much with your general point of view. I have been reading Norman Angell's "Prussianism and its destruction"¹ (a rechauffé of *The Great Illusion*, brought up to date). I think he disposes very well of many commonplace arguments against him; but I don't think he understands about the State. One thing he got into my head rather cleverly; that the *Si vis pacem* etc, as you can't confine the advice to any one nation, means always that of any two possible opponents *each* must in principle aim at being stronger than the other, and that this is a flat contradiction, precluding any solution. You saw Haldane's address at Montreal (republished in his "Conduct of Life")—about an extension of *Sittlichkeit* and the General Will to a group of nations. That is the only radical cure, I think; agreements are of no use per se; it is the power and will to keep agreements that are the point.

¹ Norman Angell's *Prussianism and its Destruction* is a reprint of Part II of *The Great Illusion*, which was published for propaganda purposes in 1914. That the author would to a certain extent agree with the judgment that he doesn't "understand about the State" may perhaps be inferred from the admission in the preface to the 1933 edition of *The Great Illusion* that he should have "devoted more attention to clarifying certain points of fundamental philosophy, the data of which are to be found not in the Blue Books or histories or in statistics but in the facts of daily life and behaviour."

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You know the final sections of the *Rechts Philosophie*¹ of course; with them and Green's "Principles of Pol. Obligation" I feel fairly well fitted out in a philosophical point of view. Between Kant and Hegel the 2 sides seem to me fairly represented. I don't feel much difficulty about the incidental good of war v. the duty of stopping it. That is so with all evil, isn't it? I don't think war is at all exceptional in the amount of good it does, though I quite think it does a lot. I think the contingency of material goods and all that the recognition of it involves in character and the higher faith, is so deep ingrained in all circumstances and history, that any one special demonstration of it has no claim to survival on that ground. It is the rule, isn't it? Our life is a striving against evil; but if the evil were gone, finite life would be gone too. But you know all this better than I do.

You will have got our circular re abandoning the Congress, at least if you had given your name as a member. I had drafted something much warmer in the way of promising cordiality to *all* philosophers after peace; but this was all we could expect to get generally signed;² it isn't bad I think, considering that such people

¹ Esp. §§ 341-60, where Hegel glorifies what he calls "the Northern Principle of the Germanic Nations," as manifesting itself "externally as rational law, internally and to feeling, as faith, love, and hope"—a view which should be taken into account when the attempt is made to fasten upon Hegel the responsibility of contributing to the spirit which led to the declaration of war. The sections referred to in T. H. Green's *Principles of Political Obligation* are G. on "Will, not Force, the Basis of the State" and K. on "The Right of the State over the Individual in War."

² Even so, the Secretary, Wildon Carr, wrote, "we had difficulty. Though the majority signed, several refused and two . . . wrote to say they would not take part in any future Congress which invited Germans or Austrians to become members." *Tantae coelestibus irae!* The tone of the "something warmer" here referred to can perhaps be judged from the few sentences of it that survive in the form that was adopted: "We members of the General Organizing Committee desire to express our earnest hope that the confederacy of the entire philosophical world which has subsisted since the inauguration of the series of Congresses in 1900 . . . will not be set aside for a longer time than outward circumstances render absolutely necessary. We are confident that the common interest in philosophy which has expressed itself so

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as Haldane and Balfour have signed it. I hoped it might have done good, but the papers have taken no notice.

"Mind" has just come; I see your notion re Eucken.¹ I am glad of the line you take. I think the German savants, and their government, are surely in a curious frame of mind; a sort of intoxication, isn't it? You saw the Kuno Meyer² case, though not all of it got into the papers. I know the man, a most attractive person. But he wrote a most extraordinary letter to Liverpool University, saying that he could not give a certain course of lectures till after the invasion of England, wh. was quite certain, and then there would be other things to think of.

However, I am *most* preoccupied about getting ready a reasonable frame of mind and preparation for a reasonable peace. *If* the German people would take a disgust to their military system, and erect a true democracy, I think we should fraternise; but of course that can't be "octroyé" by strangers, to them. I don't think *mere* limitation of armaments *much* gain; it is the selfish spirit and the fallacies that go with it in all countries, that need rooting out. A set of lecturers of whom I am one are to lecture at Bedford College about (the) crisis, including G. Murray, A. C. Bradley, effectively in the past meetings of the Congress will prove to be an enduring bond." It was not till 1926 at Cambridge, Mass., that a full Congress was again attempted.

¹ Hoerlé reviewed Dr. Meyrick Booth's book on *Rudolf Eucken: His Philosophy and Influence* (published in 1913) in the January number of *Mind*, 1915. He gives Eucken credit for his forceful vindication of the reality of the spiritual life in which man is rooted. But he follows Bosanquet, whose article on Eucken's philosophy had appeared in the *Quarterly Review* of April 1914, in commenting on the abstractness and vagueness of Eucken's teaching as to what the future requires in the way of spiritual advance. In the course of his review he had referred to the apparent inconsistency of Eucken's championship of the rights of the lesser nations with his participation in "a recent manifesto" (the *Address of German Theologians to the Evangelical Christians Abroad*, in which a group of Professors and Churchmen, including besides Eucken such well-known names as Harnack and Wundt, repudiated Germany's responsibility for the War), which probably suggested Bosanquet's remarks upon "German savants."

² The distinguished scholar who held the Chair of German in the University of Liverpool. At the outbreak of the War he had temporarily left England.

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and Stout.¹ I hope this, with writing like Angell's, may be some good. I hope we shall ask no indemnity for ourselves; for Belgium there must be a heavy one. Will you give our kind regards to your wife.

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXVI

In the excitement of the first year of the War I had written to Bosanquet, L. T. Hobhouse, and possibly others under the belief (probably a delusion) that a corporate statement on the ultimate issues of the conflict (moral, political, and religious) by British philosophers, who on the whole adhered to the tradition of the great German idealists, might help to clear the atmosphere. The answers I received were not sufficiently encouraging to justify going on with the project.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

April 25, 1915

DEAR MUIRHEAD,

About your letter of April 11, and its very interesting suggestion of something like a corporate restatement of questions at issue. I am afraid I do not feel equal to taking part in such an enterprise. Though as convinced as ever of the fundamentals of, say, Bradley's philosophy, I am more and more desirous of shunning controversy, and of placing myself as a student at the point of view of the younger men so far as I can accomplish it. I cannot expect to have very much more time, and I want to spend what I have to the best advantage in learning what there is to be learned and making up my own mind on the new aspects of things, e.g. in Logic.

The one undertaking which sometimes suggests itself as possibly

¹ See above. p. 152.

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a duty would be to write a book on Moral Philosophy; but even this, for the reasons I have indicated, I doubt if I shall undertake. It would not be really new, and as Bradley is going to republish *Ethical Studies* I doubt if anything more would be useful.¹ I am more inclined to spend my last years in clearing my own mind, and writing essays of criticism and papers on more special and difficult points, rather than going over well-trodden ground. I do not work very long hours, and I must husband my time. . . .

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXVII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

ENGLAND

July 11, 1915

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

It was very pleasant to get your letter, with its account of your work and its picture of your wife and yourself in your vacation cottage. And I am naturally very much pleased that my own philosophical efforts continue in some degree to interest and perhaps to influence you. I wish I could know where you will be in philosophy, say, twenty years hence. I am awfully glad you enjoy Plato. I think Burnet special pleads a little.²

About what I mean by mind³—I was not aware of the triple usage wh. you find in my writings, but that of course is not the

¹ Fortunately, he was not deterred by these considerations from publishing, three years later, his *Suggestions in Ethics*.

² Presumably in his heresy of inverting the usual view of the relation between Socrates and Plato.

³ The view of mind here referred to as "a world of content" was doubtless that which he intended to work out in the book of which *Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind* (posthumously published) is a fragment. On p. 20 he writes: "The mind is a number of things growing, interworking, progressing. All the acts are different: they are the behaviour of experiences inspired by the laws of mind. But there is nothing to be called 'the mind' of which there are empty acts exercised upon objects."

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least reason why it should not exist. I certainly should wish to be regarded as starting from what you describe as the third meaning that of a world of content or experience, and I should be satisfied if I could show that the two others arise naturally when one speaks of mind in its various degrees of finiteness.

I will put it in this way. I have sympathy with the view that consciousness is only a relation—is the world of objects coming together—a “new realist” view, I think. It seems to me just the converse of my view that mind is the world at its fullest. Well then, if you allow degrees of anaesthesia, sleepiness as Plato calls it, dissociation as I call it in the Gifford about Dante,¹ or finiteness as I suppose Bradley would call it, you necessarily get phases in wh. the partial mind is opposed to an externality—to what it is unable to include and absorb, but for the same reason, it seems to have a quality within different from anything without. This is merely the result of its being partly a whole and having the quality of such (every whole has its unique quality, my Logic unit) and partly not a whole and so opposed to “things” wh. fall outside its quality, as e.g. nervous movements when considered as in spatial externality. Everything takes on a new quality, doesn't it?, when introduced into a new whole. The important thing, for me, is to remember that the reality of mind from wh. one should begin, is at the top, in meaning 3. For exposition, it is much commoner and more “intelligible” to begin from below, as if there were a world of independent objects wh. draw together and make mind. Then you get realism or materialism. But really, the process is the opposite; only the dissociation itself is necessary to the fullness of the fullness.

So in Alexander's case you have a partial world over against fragments of a world.

How there can be finiteness at all—sleep or dissociation—seems to me the ultimate mystery. But one can see that if there was not, there could be nothing.

¹ See *Principles of Individuality and Value*, p. 277, where he is speaking of Dante's religion and the elements it includes as a type of the highest.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

I don't know if this is any use; probably not.

As to meaning, you yourself said what seemed most valuable to me about the way meanings get solidified with the word-sound. You know how by staring at a word one can make it look foolish; I suppose it is only then that in a language one knows, one begins to get the word as a mere shape or noise. I remember being much puzzled as a student beginning logic by the apparent rapprochement of mere verbal thinking, wh. I found condemned, and e.g. Wallace's account of pure thought in Hegel, dispensing with imagery. The "highest" and "lowest" thought seemed so like each other.

But really, is not the word itself capable of performing the office of an image? Is not the great point to realise the nature of meaning, and with it, of the whole organised world, as "intentional" i.e. as in a different dimension altogether from that of any immediate experience, whether the word or any other image? I often used to think (partly in connection with the contrast of *word* and *sentence*) that it was a mistake of principle to look for a separate meaning corresponding to every word. I felt rather as if a significant sentence operated by producing a change in a transcendent object—the object "meant"—wh. is part of the permanent world corresponding to thought and does not arise *de novo* and separately for every significant word. The sentence, by affecting our immediate experience, modifies the object of thought; leaves it a little different from what it found it, like a sculptor's model after he has worked upon it. But we must be *at* the object of thought—the world wh. is meant, *ab initio* and throughout (as Stout says e.g. his *St. Andrews Quingen(ten)ary paper*).¹

Well then, such a phrase as identity in difference takes you ipso facto to a character of the meant or intentional world. It is itself an immediate experience wh. is one with that character. The difference between image and meaning is not the difference between one content and another, but between an immediate experience

¹ *Some Fundamental Points in the Theory of Knowledge*, republished in his *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, p. 353.

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and an intentional object. You have the whole real world out of wh. to develop the character of the object in detail if you choose, and if you wish for a further explicitness I suppose you call up further and further objects by further and further words. But I take it that in the first instance the 3 words just point you to the feature they designate, as an element in the object-world, and you recognise them because you are familiar with the object-world in all its systematic character.

I was impressed with Husserl's *Jahrbuch* and *Untersuchungen*¹ from this point of view. I daresay this again doesn't meet your point. I feel it as something to wh. I am myself awaking with difficulty, though I have been after it all my life.

I hope all will go well with you in September, and your new house be satisfactory. We are of course much interested in your (collective) views of the war, and quite count on your sympathy, although I agree that the U.S.A. will probably keep out of it, and that it is better she should.

We are pretty tranquil about the result, having once grasped that the loss of life is inevitable. I think Germany has ceased to expect a military decision in her favour; and in a war of endurance she has no chance against us. Of course I do not argue that the good byproducts of evil make evil desirable; but one notices how very striking they are. We shall, I hope, be quite a new people after the war—shall have found out so much to be unnecessary wh. we thought was essential.

With kindest regards from both of us to both of you.

I am

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXVIII

It may come as a matter of surprise and even as a shock to some readers of these letters that the two most distinguished philosophers

¹ See what Husserl says on "Meaning" in *Ideas*, § 124 (Eng. Tr., p. 345 f.).

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of their time in England, Nero-like, seem to have found in these strenuous and unprecedentedly serious days nothing better to correspond with each other about than the nature of *play*. What might seem to increase the irony of the situation is that in place of letters originally sought for as defining the relation in which these men stood to each other in matters of supreme philosophical importance, those that follow should have been the only correspondence of any extent that seems ever to have taken place between them, or at any rate that has been thought worthy of preservation. But in the case of both, the sympathetic reader will have little difficulty in seeing how altogether natural and human they are. Having made up his mind that the supreme duty of the non-combatant was to use the talents and opportunities given him to the best advantage in his own field as far as the general distraction allowed, Bosanquet turned to what he once called the "gospel" as he found it in Bradley. If he could get to understand it better and free it from any ambiguity attaching to it in minor details, that would be all to the good of philosophy. It came therefore to him as offering relief from the emotional tension of the time to find matter for criticism and correspondence—the more irrelevant to external circumstances perhaps the better—in Bradley's books. To Bradley, if we may judge by the promptitude and fullness of his response, the occasion came with no less promise of relief, and he let himself go in what was perhaps the longest personal communication he ever made to a correspondent on a philosophical subject. But even with regard to the matter in hand and putting aside the importance and even strict relevance to the political situation of the second point in Bosanquet's letter (that of what is meant by "making allowance" for men in judging of their moral actions), there might be something more to be said, in accordance with Plato's dictum, which Bosanquet was fond of quoting, that "the science of opposites is the same," for a similar relevance of the subject of play as the opposite of the terrible earnest which was the key-note of the time.

Letting all this be as it may, and putting out of consideration

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the date of the letters that follow, they have a special interest as an example of the mutual respect in which the two men held each other's opinions, and particularly of the generosity with which Bosanquet was ready always and as a matter of principle to interpret the words of a writer *in partem meliorem* so as to bring them as near as possible to what he himself regarded as the truth.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Oct. 22, 1915

DEAR BRADLEY,

I send a couple of notes, one on a passage in your recent volume of essays, expressing a slight divergence of opinion on the question of "make-believe" in play; the other on a place in *Appearance*, which I found some difficulty in making clear to myself. I think I understand it now, but still it seemed worth while to put my difficulty before you, in order that you might judge for yourself whether any modification would make the passage more plain to the ordinary reader. There is not the least reason for your hastening to study either of the notes or for your answering them at all. I am quite satisfied to have submitted them to your judgment, and if they modify it in any way you can make a remark in some later edition of the books.

On *Essays on Truth and Reality* p. 58.¹

There does seem to me to be a sense in which play necessarily involves make-believe. It is, that play, to be valuable as play, or amusement, to be valuable as amusement, must, it seems to me up to a certain point be taken seriously; and yet, if taken quite seriously, they cease to be play or amusement. That is, play which is to refresh or distract the mind, must possess the make-believe

¹ Where Bradley criticizes the doctrine that play contains "essentially the presence of make-believe and illusion." In playing cricket, etc. "What am I pretending to do other than the thing I do? An outsider doubtless can insist that everywhere we have a mimic battle of this or that kind, but the mimicry surely exists only in the mind of the outsider, and for my mind as I play has no existence at all."

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that it is earnest. While you feel play or amusement, to be mere play or amusement, i.e. not to matter, they do not, I should have thought, take you out of your self, that is, do not effectively amuse or recreate. I connect this with what I thought a parallel case, the not getting pleasure successfully while you consciously hunt for it.

I thought this must be the explanation of what has often puzzled me, and is the basis of many shallow criticisms (as I think them), viz. the amount of toil and distress we are willing to incur in games and in sport. It seems to me that these things are a sort of make-believe of duty, or at least of very serious interests; and that if they were not so, they would not be successful as diversions, amusements, recreations.

Of course, as you say, if the make-believe passes wholly into earnest, we are "making a business of" the game or sport. On the other hand, well-meaning friends urge us "not to make a toil of a pleasure". But we, who are in the mood for the game, know that if we did not, if we were not so far serious as to take the rough with the smooth, *as if* the whole thing were a duty, we should not get the real fun out of it. There is a more or less amusing satire in Trollope, I think in "The Duke's Children", on the supposed duty of killing your average of birds on a moor; but I think if one treated the business of shooting as a thing just to be taken up or laid aside at one's caprice—as an amusement which didn't matter—one wouldn't really get the fun, wh. lies somehow in the pseudo-duty, in an interest wh. seems imperative, though one knows it really isn't. Cricket, I suppose, is a very stern master, and just in it I should have thought the saving sense that its seriousness is a make-believe was very necessary, to prevent its swallowing you up body and soul.

A man who aimlessly strikes about with his stick gets, I should have said, no appreciable amusement out of it; but if he sets himself, say, to decapitate each weed at a single blow, it at once becomes an interest, but difficult to leave off and liable to (slight and relative) sense of failure. In short, to be well amused, I should have said,

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you must think you are taking the thing seriously, though you must not really take it seriously.

I don't think this if it were right, would make any difference to your view in the main (62-3). I suppose the sense that some pursuit which interests us very much at the moment has little value ultimately, is found all through life, and constitutes no sharp division between play and earnest.

On Appearance ed 2 p 434.¹

This passage has puzzled me a good deal; as I now think, by my own fault; but I will put the point before you, in order that you may judge if the expression of the passage needs modification.

My puzzle turned on the meaning of the phrase "make allowance", "allow for". The puzzle was, that you treat this phrase as expressing what involves an abandonment of the position of "crediting to a man merely what comes out of his will" (p. 433). Whereas I could not get rid of my first impression, that "to make allowance" or "allow for" was the essence of this position.

The reason of my difficulty, I now think, was that I took "to make allowance" or "to allow for" as = to estimate a factor with a view to cancelling or disregarding its effects; while you take it, I imagine, as estimating a factor with a view to crediting it, giving it a place in the estimate or judgment of the whole. Thus in the sentence "If we take two different individuals"—"if in judging them we refuse to make the very smallest allowance"—the latter phrase reads to me as meaning "wholly refuse to pardon or cancel the inferior man's faults on the ground of his disadvantages". That would be the popular meaning of "making allowances", say, for

¹ Where Bradley discusses the view that in moral judgment we have to do with the state of a man's will alone and that a man "is morally perfect if only he will but do what he knows." "If we take two different individuals, one dowered with advantages external and inward and the other loaded with corresponding drawbacks, and if in judging these we refuse to make the very smallest allowance—in what have we ended? But to make an allowance would be to give up the essence of our doctrine, for the moral man would no longer be the man who wills what he knows. The result then is that we are unable to judge morally at all, for, otherwise, we shall be crediting morality with a foreign gift or allowance."

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a man who had a hereditary tendency to drink, would it not? Then, I thought you must mean, refusing to do this, you would end in a frightfully unjust condemnation of the inferior of the two individuals. But it seemed to me that this, "to make allowance" in this sense, would not be to give up the essence of the doctrine in question, but would be the same thing with that doctrine. For the doctrine aims at estimating the external conditions in order to remove them out of the moral judgment, and to judge morally only by what is left, viz. by merely what comes out of the man's will.

In the same way about knowledge, if we insist that it is morally irrelevant, we are, in this sense, allowing for it completely. "You must make allowances for his moral ignorance" would = you must estimate his ignorance and its influence and deduct what is due to that, and judge him by what remains viz. his supposed moral will. Of course I quite see that this might be nothing, or nothing, at all events, that we could find out. But in *Ethical Studies* 215 and 219 you did not seem to me to think this a fatal objection to stating the problem of estimating moral level in this way. You have a little modified your attitude since then, have you not?

But from the words "we should be crediting morality with a foreign gift or allowance" I came to see, rightly as I hope, that you meant by "making an allowance" just the reverse of what my first impression had been. You meant by "making an allowance," allowing moral credit to the man for the effects of the conditions called external. Then in the first sentence "in what have we ended?" you meant that if we refuse to give credit on external grounds we shall be counting an obviously much better man as on the same moral level with one obviously much worse; and by allowing for difference of knowledge you meant—not, refusing to judge hardly of the man who has the less—but crediting the man who has more with the better morality it helps him to, and debiting the man who has less with the worse morality his defect of it produces. Then of course you are doing what the inward morality theorist would say was "crediting morality with a foreign gift or allowance".

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Is this, or something like it, however clumsily I have expressed it, the meaning which in general you intended to convey? It makes the passage read all right, I think, but the strong habit of construing "to make allowances" otherwise still makes me hesitate to think I have got it right. Perhaps my phrase is really "to make allowances" for the *man*, and yours, to make allowances for the conditions, a somewhat different usage.

My only object is to get the place in Appearance absolutely clear. I am sure the book will live, and I think your friends ought to do all they can to free it from any difficulties, while you are here to be consulted; I hope you are fairly well.

Yours truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXIX

3 CLAREMONT CRESCENT

WESTON-SUPER-MARE

Nov. 17/15

DEAR BOSANQUET,

I am sorry not to have written before but I had to go to Oxford for a College Meeting for one thing. And I had to think over what you had sent, for another thing. It is, I found, very interesting the *first* note I mean. I won't say anything yet about the second as I have not the book here and must refer to the passage as I don't remember it well enough. I am going back for a time to Oxford in a day or two and you shall hear from me.

As to "play" you will see that I am not yet quite clear, though I see how I was wrong in part thanks to your paper. I however still don't see that "make believe" comes in always.

Are you thinking of writing on the subject? I wish that you would. I can do nothing. I am trying to write something to go with the reprinting of my book on Logic, but I can't get on and really now am not equal to real work. However I am struggling. With many thanks.

Yours truly

F. H. BRADLEY

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NOTES ENCLOSED

I agree that I was more or less wrong in two points. (i) I agree that, if play were felt not to matter *at all*, it would cease to be play. (ii) I agree that, as to the consciousness of control, it is not possible to say that in all playing it is actually there as such.

(1)(a) It is better perhaps to begin by considering an imaginary mind, that acts spontaneously from itself with no collision in itself. Would this mind have any consciousness of earnest or work at all, on one side, or of play on the other? I think not. It *would* have a feeling of satisfaction and value. And it would have (we may say) a feeling of "uncontrolledness"—*but only positive*, and with no idea of actual or possible control.

Does this state of mind exist in us? To some extent I think it does.

(b) What is the consciousness of "work" or "earnest" as such? It implies a "must," a necessity—as against a deviation.

(c) And the consciousness of play—as play. Does this not imply a reference—a negative reference to some "must"? I think it does.

(2)(a) Do I *always*, while working, have the actual consciousness of "work"? I think not.

(b) Do I *always*, while playing, have the actual consciousness of play? Again I think not so.

Is there not a positive substratum, the same in each, which, if any reference to something else falls away or is in abeyance, leaves both much the same? I think this is so.

(3) Can I combine consciousness of work or earnest with that of play, and vice versa? In some sense I think yes.

(a) Suppose, while working and in my work, I come on a field where sportive detail is proper, my consciousness is altered. In a sense I feel that I am playing. What I do still matters, but I am set free (within limits). If I reflect, or if I tend to deviate beyond these limits,—I am aware of a control. Apart from that I feel uncontrolled (*positively*). It is only with reference to my task that the detail now does not matter in comparison.

(b) So while playing. Because what I do does matter in itself—apart from reference to its control—which latter need not be before my mind—therefore my play becomes itself earnest in reference to deviations from itself. It is they which now are mere trifling as against serious play, i.e.—relative earnest.

The consciousness of *mere* playing would therefore seem to be that of *trifling*—as such—i.e. of relatively and so here absolutely worthless deviation. This appears to be an abstraction—as you suggest.

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(4) When I *am* working I *need* not *always* feel that I am working—and vice versa with play. When I *do* feel that I am playing—how far is my sense of uncontrolledness positive—and how far negative? Is the mere positive side enough for the sense of playing? I do not think so. Then in what shape and how is the reference to control there? If *actually* there—how? If intermittent—then is the sense of play intermittent?

(5) How far is everywhere the control, which everywhere in life is there somehow, there is an actual awareness, and, if so, how? For instance generally in attending—how far need I actually attend. How far in morality need the limits which guide me be actually for me as limits, and, if so, how. Intermittently? Or, if all the time—then in what shape? We should agree that in a sense the more the feeling of duty disappears in morality so much the higher is the morality. The more the negative side disappears, that is, in the positive. But how far and how the control comes to consciousness is everywhere a terribly difficult question, *psychologically*, I think.

LETTER LXXX

MERTON COLLEGE

OXFORD

Nov. 22/25

DEAR BOSANQUET,

I have come back here and looked at the passage which certainly is not clear. I am sorry indeed that you should have had so much trouble with it. I will certainly alter it on the next opportunity, if that comes.

You pay me a *very* great compliment in thinking my book worth so much attention, and I can assure you that there is no one whose opinion weighs with me as yours does, or whose work (amongst the living) I put higher or value more.

I had your MS. typed, as I find that makes things *to me* easier to understand. Did you keep a copy? Now I have two shall I return your MS?

On second thoughts I do so now.

Yours truly

F. H. BRADLEY

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NOTE ENCLOSED

Appearance p. 434

I have apparently used "allow for" in the sense of "bringing into the account", and with no implication of "striking out", rather than "crediting positively". I do not actually *remember* what I meant in the passage 434-5 foll. but I read it now as follows. . . .

"If in these two cases you refuse to bring in natural conditions, your judgment is monstrous and not really *moral*, but the opposite. And yet you are forced to this judgment—which cannot be *really* moral at all. For, if it were so, you would (in case 1) set down as moral what were "gifts", and (in case 2) perhaps credit the man *positively* with what is the result gained by setting off his natural disadvantages, and by making him an allowance on that account".

I *think* this is what I meant and it should have been clearer. The point is that, on the view criticised, the judgment is (a) opposed to real morality, and (b) the morality it asserts is *itself* due to natural conditions and impossible in fact, if they are struck out.

The whole question of moral estimation I find very difficult. If I ever can republish Ethical Studies I will try to reconsider it.

LETTER LXXXI

MERTON COLLEGE

OXFORD

Nov. 12/15

DEAR BOSANQUET,

Many thanks for your letter. I am glad to hear that you found my remarks on play etc of some use. But I could not, I think, agree to publish them as they are now. Perhaps you will deal with the subject, or hereafter (failing that) I might possibly do something. But I don't know when. I do not get on with what I am doing, and can't I fear, attempt anything else—if I am to do anything.

As to the control, I think certainly that it is the occurrence of something *incongruous* that forces it into consciousness. But what exactly it is with which this something is felt to be incongruous is not easy to answer. In some cases perhaps a mere emotional state. In others perhaps the idea of my being or doing this or that—

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this idea associated with my present environment, which therefore tends to "recall" it and me. But it is a difficult question, I think, always.

I am sorry that I can't do more now on the "play" question and what I have done is too rough for me to like it published. But I am glad that you approved of it.

Yours truly

F. H. BRADLEY

LETTER LXXXII

MERTON COLLEGE

OXFORD

Nov. 25/25

DEAR BOSANQUET,

I am glad to hear that my explanation was more or less satisfactory. I am sure that it really was wanted, as at first sight I did not see exactly what the passage meant myself—and it would be better to alter it—if an opportunity comes. Many thanks for pointing it out to me.

As to the remarks on Play which I sent you, perhaps my brother might like to see them at some time, as well as your Note, if you care to send it to him. I can't send him anything as I have only the notes made in my Note-Book, all anyhow.

I find that about a year ago I made some notes* on comparative degrees of morality with a view to deal with the question, if Ethical Studies ever goes into a second edition.

Yours truly

F. H. BRADLEY

I had wholly forgotten that I had done so when I wrote to you.

LETTER LXXXIII

Hoernlé had written a long letter to Bosanquet after reading his *Gifford Lectures* raising certain points which had struck him as involving difficulty. He writes to me that he has no copy of his own

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letter; but the questions he had put can be gathered from the quotations which Bosanquet makes from it in the Memorandum referred to at the beginning of the enclosing letter, and, as there are few of Bosanquet's readers who have not felt a difficulty on one or other if not on all of the points that are raised, I have printed it as it stands—I trust with sufficient regard to his prohibition with respect to Bradley's notes and sufficient gratitude to Hoernlé for having extracted it from him and permitting me to use it here.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

March 5, 1916

DEAR HOERNLÉ,

This attempt at an answer has extended to a fearful length, and you are not bound to read it or reply to it or do anything about it you don't like. I will only ask one thing. If in theses or otherwise anything about the discussion gets into print, do not let the quot.'s from Bradley's M.S. notes to me get into print; as he is very sensitive to anything being printed wh. he did not write for the press. I merely used them as they seemed to me so simple and pointed. I have had them—3 sheets of notepaper—since a few days after Kn. and R. was published.

I have a copy of my answer. Have you one of your letter? If you have not, I will return it to you.

I ought to have had mine typed, but economy is the rule today! I tried to write it out as clear as I could.

Many congratulations on your child.¹ We are both well; of course the war is a weary burden, but no one here thinks of peace except on our terms. We welcome the activity in the West; we think it is the road to a decision, for which we are fully prepared.

Kind regards from my wife. She wants to know what the baby's name is.

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

¹ A son had been born to Hoernlé in the preceding September.

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MEMORANDUM

1. "Divorce of idea from existence". Four remarks in restriction of this expression.

- i. Every idea without exception qualifies Reality.
- ii. Every judgment is existential, directly if Categorical, indirectly if Hypothetical.
- iii. The subject in judgment is never a mere idea or thought-content, but always some aspect of individual self-existent reality, though qualified by the content of previous judgments.
- iv. To determine whether an idea or thought-content is one with existence, ask whether or how far it is individual and self-complete.

2. "Real and Ideal in one". These two must both fall within the true reality, and, as one, must possess its character. In it the ideal cannot remain merely ideal, nor the real something opposed to the ideal. "Real" here, being *prima facie* opposed to ideal, must be used in some restricted sense, as = given, or "actual". The whole phrase indicated, I suppose, the claim that our best interpretation was at bottom of one piece or of equal stability with the actual wh. it interpreted. As a meta-physical expression the formula seems self-contradictory. There can be no distinct provinces within the true reality, demarcated by a shifting line, like that between our "given" or "actual, and the ideal wh. passes into the actual. The grasp is toilsome, because, in holding the two in one, we hold each in a character beyond its *prima facie* nature. If not, they could not be in one.¹

My change of view seems to me to have been from a "sollen" of unity to a recognition of its essential conditions.

3. "The world of science"; how far discursive? This = asking how far does the world of science live in the medium of judgment, remembering that the subject in judgment is always self-existent and individual reality?

It seems to me that this question does not arise about any of the other worlds of "advanced" or "concrete" experience. None of these ever seem to live in the medium of judgment. Thus the selection of the world of knowledge for criticism raises, quite justifiably, a special problem—

¹ In the note on *Knowledge and Reality*, p. 19, Bradley repudiated the suggestion that he meant to suggest another world outside the intellectual. He meant merely a completion in which the intellectual would disappear as such. The admission in the next sentence of a "change" in Bosanquet's view will not have escaped the reader interested in the question referred to at the beginning of the Preface.

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the hardest of all. It seems to me one with the problem which caused Nettleship to demand the rehabilitation of the concept in Logic (Remains I. 146)¹ and Caird to adopt a similar attitude (I have not a reference.² On this cp. my Logic I. 33 and II. 293³ and the reference to Green (Works III. 144-5⁴ to wh. add Prolegomena to Ethics, sect. 47⁵) with the implied criticism in Bradley's Logic, 533, "some strange implications—". Green meant by thought practically the system of the real; and if so, of course, it is not discursive. But is it *our* thought?

Undoubtedly we can speak of "the world of science" as in some sense "one" and "a whole". But it is not easy to say to what exactly we refer in speaking so. I think we ought to mean "The universe as viewed by science"—a very limiting condition. Then I should say that as a subject it is an aspect of self-existent reality—qualified by an ideal construction, but not by a *mere* ideal construction.⁶ Any predicate attached to it in a judgment is, I think, discursively thought, and betrays the aspect of knowledge as discursive. The state of the case will become clearer when we speak of immediacy.

4. "What more is it" (as world of concrete experience) than mere sense-perception and feeling? That depends, surely, on the mode of experience. It may be Faith, Will, Aesthetic Feeling. But no experience which is not bare intellectual thought, is, as such, qualified by an idea in judgment. An idea in Will, or in aesthetic emotion, is different from an idea in knowledge and has an immediacy and existence in its own material. Knowledge *about* these is discursive qua knowledge, but does not make

¹ Cf. p. 105 n. above.

² Perhaps *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, I. p. 378 ff. would serve, but one might write *passim* in Caird.

³ "Judgment is not, in relation either to impressions, ideas, or concepts, a mechanical combination of parts which remain outside each other," I. 33. In II. 2 and 3 this is the ground of the answer to the problem there set with reference to Inference: "How can one content claim to be true of Reality on the strength of another content distinct from the first?"

⁴ Where Green is explaining the limits of discursive thought and the ground of our recognition of this limitation, viz. that the real world "forms one inter-related whole because related through a single subject."

⁵ Where the distinction is made between thought as "a faculty which is born and dies with each man" and as "a function in the way of self-consciousness as implied in the existence of relations and therefore of determinate facts."

⁶ In omitted note Bradley disclaimed the view that reality can be for us "an ideal construction only."

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them discursive. They are all forms of finite experience and have their own inherent defects; but this defect is the peculiarity of knowledge as such. On the non-intellectual forms of thought, and their analogy to knowledge, see Gifford I. 61. The common element I take to be the *nisus* to the whole which takes each of them, being finite, beyond itself. But this assumes pure and abstract shape in knowledge alone.

5. "The only solution" (top and end of p. 3 of letter). I refer to my Logic II. 297. Immediacy is not a stratum but a phase of experience, and one into which *any* experience may collapse. I agree that you *can* see the character of the Absolute, in some measure, in any experience. And I don't *think* Bradley would deny this. But in as far as you have immediacy, I think the character of knowledge is subordinated. You cannot have qualification of reality by the content of ideas, at least in explicit judgment (dist. from what probably takes place in the lower animals), still less inference, and yet have the total experience as a whole with the character of immediacy. The two things are quite exclusive. The distinction and opposition over against the self-existent real is the very essence of the idea as used in judgment. Because the very meaning of thought as an intellectual activity is that some feature of the self-existent acts freely by itself and carries you beyond it. I have spoken in 4 of thought in the wider sense of the *nisus* to the whole e.g. when the will widens its object, or is faced by incompatible objects, or indeed in any form of satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

6. The two senses of the categorical, and, along with this, the concreteness of sense-perception and that of thought.

(n.b. my discussion of judgments "falsified by non-existence of their objects" arises out of a passage in Bradley's Logic p. 47; cp. p. 93 ib. (Bk. I, c. II. sectt. 6 and 59). It is the question of the *prima facie* categorical meaning of certain judgments.¹ As to "gold" or other element (my example) the question would be one of fact, i.e. the relation they bear to the Absolute.)

I don't think you can get rid of the dual standard of categorical assertions, although the lower of the two standards refers to a kind of judgment wh. by a metaphysical estimate is false. You would have to forbid all thought and language wh. did not square with the highest metaphysical truth; and this, I take it, is impossible and undesirable.

In sense i, dealing with events (with the perceptible world of space

¹ In Bradley's note, which he here cites, the distinction is drawn between categorical propositions about *events* and about things like the universe or the soul which are, or may be, eternal, i.e. not in time.

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and time) we hold ourselves to be qualifying the absolute by a self-existent individual; and if its existence is denied, we take it that our judgment is denied. That is, we admit or assert that if the subject is non-existent our judgment is false. (In case of a hypothetical judgment we do not admit this. It is existential in another sense.) And this is to affirm categorically.

But our claim that the event or object in space and time—the subject of our judgment—is a self-existent individual, is a false claim (Br. Logic 1. II. 59) and the judgment wh. we habitually treat as categorical, is not really so. And yet the claim is inevitable; because the unanalysed object of sense-perception must like other objects pass beyond itself, and yet its lack of logical purity forbids its being a subject in any judgment asserting logical nexus. The only alternative, therefore, has to be adopted; and it has to be the subject as a confused whole of an indeterminate positive assertion. That is to say, we all always treat these objects, as they stand, as self-existent individuals, and believe that our assertions about them affirm their existence.

In sense ii we take the subject as a self-existent individual on its merits, universe, soul, God; these, as they stand, really are self-existent individuals; and so assertions in wh. they are used as qualifications of reality are directly existential, and so categorical; but moreover, are categorical truly, and not merely in a mistaken intention of ours.

It is the familiar old business of the three levels; common sense assertion, scientific (hypothetical) law, and true direct assertion of ultimate reality. I don't believe you can possibly get rid of them. You have the same series in concrete of sense, abstract of reflection, concrete of systematic thought.

The concrete of sense, then, is an apparently self-existent individual, to which sense-perception is adequate, e.g. a tree. Concrete of thought is a self-existent individual or one as nearly so as anything can be, to wh. no sense-perception is adequate (although it may include, as I suppose every experience does, elements drawn from sense-perception). The Universe, the soul, the British Constitution, the state or the moral world, suggest themselves as examples. These are far higher in individuality and concreteness and self-existence than a tree or a house, and are rightly taken as self-existent determinations qualifying true reality, i.e. as subjects in genuine categorical judgments. (As you say, discursive judgments about the moral life do not make the moral life a construction of discursive thought. The moral life is a wholly different mode of experience, and has, in its necessary alternations of fulfilment and non-fulfilment, its own analogue of the discursiveness of abstract thought.)

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"The categorical character of this world (i above) is secured by what?" In my view it is not secured at all. It is ascribed falsely, because of a *Schein* of self-existence. This is false because of its inherent inadequacy, judged by the standard of individuality; not because it was constructed by discursive thought. The universe, as an object of knowledge, was also so constructed, but it is individual and self-existent.

"Expansion of experience in concrete experience of religion does not seem thus discursive". No, because it is not in the sphere of knowledge. It is only in the sphere of knowledge that thought is discursive. It is a form of reality among others. Reality lives in all of them, but all, as finite experiences, have their shortcomings, and its is to be discursive.

This is connected, I think, with the reason you allege, viz. that the expansion is into the region of the perceptible, *in so far as* the perceptible is the region of intellectual ideas and assertions, and not of Will, or aesthetic experience as such. But I don't think the expansion stops within the perceptible. I should have said the point was rather that it is expansion by the abstract intelligence. Take Beauty. It is in a sense within the perceptible, but it is not a form of discursive thought. It is, qua beauty, a self-existent individual experience, not pointing beyond itself. Only of course, in fact, being finite, it always does point beyond itself, and is thus imperfect *as* Beauty.

7. Last sentence of p. 3 of letter. "In short, in some sense". I see no difficulty about any concrete experience except that of knowledge, admitting, of course, that all in their own ways fall short of individuality. Knowledge is very difficult to conceive apart from the medium of judgment; and the very point and meaning of judgment is to be discursive.

I admit your invisible world and a *quasi*-intellectual organisation, depending on the *nisus* to the whole operating in feeling or will, for the other modes of experience. I should accept our experience as we live in a great work of art for an instance; or, as we identify ourselves in will with the social good. For its application in knowledge, I expressed my solution so far as I have one, in 3 and 5 above.

I would only repeat here that the subject in judgment is never a thought-content, but always reality, qualified adequately or inadequately by a thought-content. So I don't think that to be a thought-content is a ground for objection to an individual's existence. It is on the *de facto* fitness of the term's significance to be or not to be a qualification of the real, that its claim, or its falsity, reposes.

The concrete universal *prima facie* has existence, as being an adequate determinate of reality. If in a particular case you say it—a man or a

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state or a god—is imaginary, as in poetry, say, you have to take it as subject of true categorical judgment, but under a conventional reservation wh. restricts it to an imaginary world. You hardly could describe a god, worthy of the name, so that he should not have a strong claim to reality.

The difficulty is increased by trying to analyse knowledge alone. Of course in “real reality” its world is unified with that of the other modes of experience, and its abstract or purely intellectual nature only appears at the growing point or border where it is being further determined in an artificially, or at least methodically isolated way.

LETTER LXXXIV

Josiah Royce died on September 14, 1916. The following lines, intended as an obituary notice, have been sent me by Professor Hoernlé, who doubts, however, whether this was ever published.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

ENGLAND

Owing to accidents of the post, which curtail the time at my disposal my words must be few if they are at all to reach their goal.

What I have admired, and what has inspired me, in the writings of Professor Royce, is the courage and high audacity with which he has carried forward the banner—I will not say of Idealism, that ambiguous term, but of a profound spiritual philosophy. I take as typical the sentence “As for me, I love the sea, and am minded to find in it life, and individuality, and explicit law”. He has always decisively committed himself, and has confronted the most ultimate and arduous problems, with the same spirit and enthusiasm with which the most passionate votary of a great religion might enter upon the task of commending it to the world. Only Professor Royce’s work has been done, as he may justly claim, not by the arts of the popular preacher, but by the lofty enterprise of the scholarly philosopher. What carries us with him is a lucidity born of his ardour not a facility born of unlaborious sentiment.

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It would not be becoming for me to enter, in the brief minutes at my disposal, upon the precise nature of his contribution to the problems which concern the real and the individual. It is more fitting simply to acknowledge the debt which I owe to the study of his Gifford Lectures, and to say that my own much slighter efforts to find a footing in these same regions would probably never have taken definite form but for his leadership and example.

If we look back for half-a-century over the English-speaking world, we shall be amazed at the progress which during that interval the pursuit of philosophy has made within it. Philosophy no longer depends on one or two or three of the nations of Europe. It has put a girdle round about the earth, and has set itself beyond any dangers which might appear to menace the culture of that older world. It is partly for this reason, because in him and in such as him we see tokens that the future of the human spirit is secure, that especially in this terrible year we rejoice to pay our homage to the high and many sided genius of Josiah Royce.

BERNARD BOSANQUET

December 7 (1916)

LETTER LXXXV

Hoernlé had published an article on "The Religious Aspect of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy" in the *Harvard Theological Review* of 1916. After a plea for the appreciative consideration of theories with which we do not agree, because of the enrichment it brings to our own intellectual life, he had gone on to show *first* that Russell's view in the famous essay on "The Freeman's Worship" and in the less known one on "The Essence of Religion" comes from his taking the world of existence in abstraction from the values of which in the concrete it always comes to us as the bearer, and which alone, in union with the *nisus* to perfection in ourselves, can make it an object which deserves and evokes our worship; *secondly* that Russell makes no attempt to maintain this position consistently and that at the end of his book, *The Problems of*

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Philosophy, in claiming that "contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts but also the objects of our actions and affections," he assigns to it a function it can perform only if values are reinstated in these objects. The essay is an early illustration of the drift of idealism towards the deeper study of the place of the conception of value in the universe, to which Bosanquet himself had so much contributed in his Gifford Lectures.

THE HEATH COTTAGE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

June 11, 1916

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

A thousand thanks for the study of Russell and religion. It seems to me just right, and puts the epistemology or metaphysic beside the other views very strikingly. I wonder where R. will end up. . . . His views about the war are not unreasonable I think; but the steps he has got involved in are undesirable. I all but gave my name to the Union of Democratic Control when it first started, but felt an instinct that it would develop into things one could not approve. Did you see a paragraph about Russell in court before the Lord Mayor. They fined him £100.¹ I am glad you spoke so courteously of him.

I hope your family are well. With kind regards from both of us.

Yours v. truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXXVI

Along with a number of articles written before the War on subjects which at the moment might seem somewhat irrelevant, Bosanquet's book, *Social and International Ideals* (1917), contained two in which he carried further the line of thought of his lecture in the series on the "International Crisis"² in defence of the State.

¹ The proofs of his book, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, were corrected in prison.

² See p. 162 above.

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By this time the hue and cry against it had gathered force. Bertrand Russell was pouring scorn upon it as a collection of elderly middle-class gentlemen in control of power, gambling with the lives of their fellows, and as the incarnation of the possessive instincts. Others were prepared to recognize its limited value, but sought on the principle *divide et impera* to control its powers by decentralization. Underlying all these attacks, Bosanquet sensed the view that the State in its essence represented force employed in the service of some particular, in the end sinister and immoral, interest. Faithful among the faithless, he had still the courage to stand by the doctrine he had learned from Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Green: *first* that, whatever its origin, the State continues in existence for the sake of the good life, and that "the healthy State, however strong, is non-militant in temper"; and *secondly*, that the best way for it to promote this temper both in itself and other States is so to organize itself internally as to develop in its citizens the love of justice and the spirit of co-operation towards that great end. In a word: "The royal road to peace is to do right at home, and banish sinister interests and class privileges from the commonwealth." Holding thus to the moral purpose embodied in the State and to its dependence for the realization of it on the possessions of a genuine general will, founded on the practice of "the art of living together," noting at the same time the absence of this essential condition in international relations as they were, he is still distrustful of the idea of a League of Nations as apt to lead merely to the alignment of more massed forces against one another.

In his review of the book in the *New Republic* of January 19, 1918, Hoernlé writes with whole-hearted agreement on the main issue of the nature and function of the State, but finds the argument directed against leagues and federations inconclusive and not wholly just to their advocates. The idea of "a central force" may be a delusive one; but the very act of federation reveals at least the nucleus of a general will, and such a common experience of intense suffering as the nations were at the moment undergoing was just that from which it might gather force.

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THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

March 17, 1918

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

I was very glad indeed to have your letter of Feb. 19. I had been feeling a desire of renewing communication; but as with yourself, urgencies of the moment come in and make one put off what is only desirable *in se*. First, I am very much interested in all your personal news and family affairs. I knew you would do what was right about joining up; but did not know if you had naturalised in U.S.A., so couldn't tell what form your action would take.¹ You have done all you can and the rest is on the knees of the gods. It is pleasant to hear of your boy getting on,—how time flies—. And, what you say of your book² is most exciting to me; I hope the rewritten work will come out before I get too imbecile to read it. It showed wonderful resolution, I think, to start re-writing it in a different form; and I am sure when the book comes it will be much more valuable for the effort. If I had done the same with my Logic, as Nettleship, who read it for the Clarendon Press,³ half advised me to, it would have been much better,—if it hadn't killed me before it was done! You suggest, in good-humoured joke, a view of our relation which is not mine. I have always hoped and believed that you would wherever you were, and especially in U.S.A. since you went there, carry on a reasonable philosophy with deep roots in the past; but I am quite sure it will be something much completer than my philosophy; and the reputation you are getting is I am sure from your own originality and insight, and not from anything

¹ Hoernlé volunteered for military service when the British Military Mission visited Canada to enlist British nationals.

² *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics* (published 1920). In the Preface he refers to his obligation to Bosanquet "in whose philosophical life work" he finds "the most vital and in the best sense empirical statement of idealism or speculative philosophy in modern philosophical literature."

³ See Letter X above.

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in my work more than one channel of the mere material handed down from the past. . . .

It was extraordinarily good of you to find time to write the review in the New Republic. My book of course was rather scrappy; but my determination to publish it even so was really a wager laid on my obstinate belief that the secrets of good life, even international, lie in the experimental details of the operative good will, and for me the whole thing is one, though only the better critics have seen, as you have, the import wh. the whole combination, expressed through these fragments, has for me. I am very grateful for the hints about opinion regarding my position, both in the review and in the letter. I won't go into detail, wh. would take a book, but will say something which I feel very strongly, though in public I should have to say it in a more round-about form. I suffer, in public discussion, I think, from what I really, in my own mind, hold to be a strength of my position viz. that I have two quite different publics and specialisms—one the philosophers the other that of social experts. I am quite happy with either apart; either at the Aristotelian, or in the chair with 50 to 200 experienced social workers before me; but I cannot unite these supports; they, as a rule (I do not speak of unusually instructed persons), know nothing of each other or of each other's experiences. Now my belief in the concrete universal, and all that, rests very much, and expresses itself on and in the vision of the living growth of social tissue by means of the detailed operation of social functions; and in insisting on this I believe myself to be, like a microscopist, *within* the actual growing point of social organisation and reform, and watching the living principles as they develop *pari passu* new will and new structures. The sort of details I mention in my book would indicate this to my expert friends in social work, from whom, and not from any merits of my own, I have gathered this point of view; and they would feel with me that we are all engaged in a vast movement, now quicker, now slower (*ohne Hast doch ohne Rast*) in wh. the communal will is articulating itself and no doubt differentiating itself in new forma-

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

tions, from year to year and month to month. I am most anxious to learn from all sources; but as a rule, I do think our publicists and paper reformers are without this experimental feel of the living structure. And it is this wh. makes me so confident on this ground. But any way I am very grateful to you.

Yours very sincerely

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXXVII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

May 5, 1918

DEAR MR PLATER,¹

It pleased and interested me much that you should remember and write to me after all these years. I could not say that I have a strong recollection of you, and if I had, and met you, it would probably prove all wrong. My old letter, which you enclose and I return, shows me what I thought, but does not prove that I was right. You write from a Rectory—I infer that you are an Anglican clergyman; I am a clergyman's son, and have always a respect for the sincere and hardworking clergy, though I do not always feel attracted by the dignitaries.

It is impossible to say in a letter very much in answer to what you ask; but there is a little book,² just out, which expresses what I most care for in my experience of life, and I am sending you my copy as a loan. I am afraid it must be a loan only—it will not take you very long to read. In these days even copies of a little book have to be economical—paper is so scarce.

I am seventy years of age next month, and though I have good general health, am not up to moving about very freely under war

¹ William Edward Plater was Rector of Yeovil. He had been a pupil of Bosanquet's in University College. With the Dean of Christ Church (Dr. White) he was the author of *A Grammar of the Vulgate* and the biographer of Thomas Hollis, one of the original benefactors of Harvard University.

² Presumably *Suggestions in Ethics*, which appeared in this year.

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conditions; so I haven't been to Oxford for a long time, and haven't seen the Master¹ since he became Master; nor have I seen his book, but only a notice of it.

I certainly think that on anything *connected* with *social* matters you could not do better than read my *wife's* books² (*before* mine, *not* as Mrs Fawcett to Fawcett) but she has not written exactly on morals. I think for the pure essence of what is good I get most out of Lewis Nettleship's Remains—now two separate vols., letters, fragments and lectures, (Macmillan) non-technical and very beautiful with a short life of him by A. C. Bradley. Nettleship's Memoir of T. H. Green is separately published now by Longmans, a little book, quite charming and satisfying to me—of course I don't know how it might suit you. If you dislike anything in my little book, please note that I do not dogmatise. I only call attention to things I care about, in addition, if you like, to what you privately believe in. I think Rashdall rather touched with Hedonism. . . . I agree to what you ask at the end, but it wants working out doesn't it?

With kindest regards and remembrances I am

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER LXXXVIII

An article by Hoernlé on "Neo-Realism and Religion" had appeared in the *Harvard Theological Review* of April 1918. Discussing at the end of it "the judgment of perfection" he had maintained that, "once we understand the sources of all that is valuable, we shall find evil among them." In illustration of this apparent paradox he had quoted William James's account of the boredom of a Chautauqua summer camp with all its culture and kindness, its cheerfulness and equality and had referred to Bosanquet's discussion of the same point in *The Value and Destiny of*

¹ Dr. Reginald Walter Macan had been Master since 1906. His book *Religious Changes in Oxford during the Last Fifty Years* appeared in 1917.

² See above, p. 86

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the Individual, p. 322. He had ended by asking whether such a view is optimism or pessimism, and answered that it is in reality the recognition of a value "beyond good and evil." Because it held to this he had claimed for idealism that "it is the only philosophy which is realistic to the bitter end."

The allusion at the end of the letter to Croce is of importance as an indication of the interest in Italian neo-idealism which was to occupy so much of Bosanquet's attention in the remaining years of his life. By this time the chief works of its founder Benedetto Croce were before the world. There were English translations of several of them and Wildon Carr's book on his Philosophy had recently appeared. The time seemed to be ripe for a review of it from the point of view of the older idealism, and it was into this task that Bosanquet threw himself in the long article which was to appear in the *Quarterly Review* of April 1919, and for which his review in the Oct. *Mind* of the present year of Croce's *Logic* reads like a preliminary study. As a matter of fact, dealing as this does with the logical basis of the whole structure of the new idealism, unhampered by the restrictions which the more popular journal imposed upon the writers for it, it lays down the principle of the criticism, of which all that he subsequently wrote on Croce and his followers was only the detailed application. He gives Croce all credit for bringing together thought and reality in his account of the singular categorical judgment as an affirmation of existence, and thus for "welding together the extreme poles of the logical world," but he accuses him of having dropped out the systematic structure of the whole which lies between these poles. This evacuation of *Logic* of the main body of its content he attributes to Croce's "rigid isolation of principles and impatience with details"; but from his later correspondence with the younger men of the movement it is clear that it was a defect which in his own view had to be redressed in order to give robustness to Italian neo-idealism and secure for it the place it deserved to occupy in European philosophy.

In the *Quarterly* article which appeared in the April 1919 number,

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after a reference to the attractiveness of a system which aims at freeing philosophy from the incubus of theological and metaphysical dogma and which offers us monism without mysticism, spirituality without transcendence, evil as essential but subordinate to good, he goes on to review its leading features by that time, and still more by this, fairly familiar to English readers: the acceptance from Vico of the exaggerated view of the lyricalness of early language, the arbitrary limitation of logic (already mentioned), history as one with philosophy in being the interpretation of individual fact, nature in its physical aspect as a creation of abstract thought and otherwise as falling within history, the over-rigidity of the distinction between "economic" and "moral" activity, error and evil as lapses into indolence or bias and without positive nature of their own. In what follows he develops the ground from which he was later to attack Italian neo-idealism in his controversy with its younger representatives. Starting from Croce's criticism of Hegel's supposed confusion of "distincts" with "contraries," he shows that he was himself really parting company with what was of fundamental truth in Hegel's Dialectic: "The connection of the nature or movement of reality with the conception of a whole. . . . Philosophy is mutilated if we do not recognize as its central problem the nature of reality, its degrees, and its criterion." As "a simple test" he proposes the indubitable fact (which Croce denies) of "implication forwards" in the leading forms of experience. It is thus that not merely is aesthetic experience (as Croce contends) implied in the higher form he calls "philosophy," but itself "anticipates the whole reality"; and that religion has to be conceived of, not as superseded, but as "explicated" by philosophy, and shown to be, in the words of William Wallace, no mere revelation from an external source, but "the truth, the complete reality of the mind . . . the crowning fruit of all scientific knowledge of all human affection, of all secular consciousness." "This conclusion," the article characteristically ends, "is the consequence of the attitude for which reality is the whole, and we should like to believe that Croce is not unsympathetic with it."

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THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

June 16, 1918

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

Very many thanks for "NeoRealism and Religion". It is quite a delightful utterance, and I hope will do much to clear up the true state of questions. I am very proud and pleased that you refer to my discussion of the quotations from Wm. James, and I hope that we are quite together in the matter.

You take the judgment of perfection to be a judgment of the quality of the universe, not a mere expression *de facto* of the desirability of life as it stands? That is what the mystical aspect does for you; it is an insight, not merely a verdict; is it not so? I was not *quite* sure at first that anything of this kind came out as plainly as I should have hoped; but the "j. of perfection" must be a judgment about the "whole", and this makes the meaning certain, I think. You wish to appeal mainly to the direct experience, and there I am sure you are right; it is what is so much needed, and what you cannot get people to face. It is a capital piece of work. I haven't read Perry;¹ I am struggling with Croce, on whom I have to write a Quarterly article.

I hope you and family are well and as happy as one can be in these days. I think the Americans are beginning to make the enemy uneasy, and the result seems pretty plain. Remember me to Hocking if you see him. My wife sends kind regards.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ Presumably R. B. Perry's book, *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, which appeared this year.

PART V

THE YOUNGER MEN

“I am more and more desirous of placing myself as a student at the point of view of the younger men.”

"Though as convinced as ever of the fundamentals of, say, Bradley's philosophy, I am more and more desirous of shunning controversy and of placing myself as a student at the point of view of the younger men so far as I can accomplish it."

So Bosanquet had written in 1915. With what diligence and with what results he carried out this programme in the later years of his life we know from his book on *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*—his last complete work. The "extremes" he had particularly in view were the neo-realism which had its chief home and most "audacious" representatives in America and the neo-idealism which was represented chiefly by the school of Croce and Gentile in Italy. We have already seen in connection with his correspondence with James Ward¹ how he had become convinced that the time was coming, if it had not already come, when, in opposition to the subjectivist drift of some professedly spiritual philosophies, it would be necessary to emphasize the place of nature as an objective system possessing rights of its own. Neo-idealist writers seemed in danger of forgetting what the older idealism, when in its right mind, had always insisted on, namely that it was as true to say that man could only come to a knowledge of himself through nature as that he could only come to a knowledge of nature through himself; in other words, that nature communicates itself to man at least as much as man communicates himself to it. We are thus prepared in this last phase of Bosanquet's philosophical development to find him in warm sympathy with some of the central features of realism as expounded by the best-informed of its representatives: its readiness to recognize man's kinship with the external universe, the significance of the idea of "the whole" for mind, and with this, in spite of attempts like Alexander's to interpret time as the stuff of things, the opening it left for the view of nature as a "mere mode of being of the universe subordinate to its ultimate totality."

¹ See Letter XLVIII.

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I had hoped that there might have come to light letters from some of the neo-realist writers of the younger generation in which the points still at issue between him and them, as these had emerged from the conciliatory pages of his book, would have been brought closer home, perhaps been brought nearer reconciliation. With the exception of one or two letters to Alexander, the philosophical correspondence of this period that has survived proved to be rather with the not less interesting group of younger writers, who, while on the whole standing with him on the ground of the older idealism, had developed it, particularly on the side of religion, on somewhat different lines from his own. On the other hand, whatever disappointment this gap may have caused was largely compensated for by the survival, referred to in the Preface, of much of the correspondence in which he found himself engaged with some of the leading representatives of the Italian school of neo-idealists in the very last years of his life.

The Younger Men

LETTER LXXXIX

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Jan. 26, 1919

DEAR MR. PLATER,

I am interested to hear about Hobhouse's characterisation of me,¹ or is it the reviewer's? It doesn't matter. I don't think I shall read his book—I don't feel I learn much from him, and books are expensive since the war began; and time is not cheap.

About your question. What occurs to me as worth considering is whether you aren't drawing too sharp a distinction between fundamentals and applications: I mean, why not judge of applications as you do, you must do, of fundamentals? Are you not asking yourself, in essence, where is that higher self which I must obey, and ensue in others? And in fundamentals you answer, I suppose, as I do, "in God". . . . But then we both have to ask "where do we find God"? And being old men, I suppose we have tumbled upon some kind of working application wh. guides us in answering this too, or we could hardly have lived so long. Well now, in social matters and politics, haven't we to judge as we have judged in fundamentals all our life long? We try, with constant errors, to identify ourselves with "the best". We find it, don't we? everywhere and nowhere; everywhere in suggestions and broken lights; nowhere complete; but in some regions completer than in others. Is *Vox populi vox Dei*? One tries to distinguish the people drunk from the people sober; one looks for what really suits the common welfare, not for what people shout for at the moment. How do you judge of a sound and wholesome family life? Do we not judge of a social or political life in the same way? On the whole, you know it when you see it. We carry a criterion about with us, which is really our trained judgment

¹ Presumably in the *Metaphysical Theory of the State*. On this as a criticism of the idealist theory, see *Mind* of July 1924.

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of the good, though we may never have put it in general shape. Societies etc are not judged as numbers, but by the completeness, harmony, etc of their will. Patriotism is of many brands; they are distinguished, surely, by their compatibility with the goods wh. are not diminished by sharing; the supreme values.

All this must be everyday stuff to you—what I want to suggest is why don't you use it in judging all these questions about society and autocracy etc. By their fruits ye shall know them. As a rule, I suppose, an end, purpose, that fits a myriad of men's lives together, is higher than one which only answers for a few; but obviously this is only a rule of thumb—great poetry etc is not in fact a universal possession, though it would be if people were capable of possessing it. Well I must stop.

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XC

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

March 29, 1919

DEAR MR. DEAN,

I venture to send you a few lines (pages, alas!) with reference to your great book on Plotinus,¹ from the only point of view from which I can. That is to say, I must approach it frankly as an ignoramus about Plotinus, and must merely try to convey an idea of the manner and extent to which I have found the joint position, yours and his together, helpful and fruitful to my own mind. It would not have seemed to me fair to take up this attitude in a published review of a work on which so much learning has been expended, though I believe a very useful notice might in some cases be written in that way. At all events it is all I can offer, and I take the risk of its not interesting you.

¹ *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, by William Ralph Inge, 2 vols., London, 1918.

The Younger Men

I have pages of notes and references, but, on consideration, have decided not to use them explicitly. You are a sufficient judge whether anything I attribute to you represents what you think, and I see no use in arguing that you really hold any opinion which you disclaim. So I will try to write shortly, and on main points only, though really I have in mind what might grow to a big book; and I might even try to write something akin to such a book if time is allowed me.

I take it that what interests you most is the problem of the Absolute and the special type of experience to which it is accessible, carrying with it the whole conception of the unity expressed throughout the Triads; and next, I suppose, or as a sort of reverse aspect of that, would come—would it not?—the “overflow” doctrine, connected with the transcendence of God, and so with Theism.

Now, *roughly speaking*, I can follow (i) the former of these with the deepest acceptance and gratitude, and am quite convinced by your argument that the apparent remoteness and beyond-one-anotherness so to speak of the highest realities in Plotinus is only apparent, and that the experiences both of “spirit” and of the absolute are genuine experiences and their recognition of the profoundest religious value; but (ii) the “overflow” doctrine is difficult to me, and I confess that I should hold, as so far advised, that it is barred by such an argument as Bradley’s in *Appearance* pp. 245–6.¹ On Plotinus’ own showing, would not abstinence from creation place the supreme essence in contradiction with itself, “the good would not be the good”?

Recurring to (i), I am most grateful for your insistence that the mystic is interested in the reality he finds, and not in the curiosities of his consciousness. I am sure that is the right road, and most necessary today. And, in passing, I would say how highly I value your procedure by long quotations. Over and above the permanent value of your own argument, the store of

¹ Where the error of introducing quantity into the idea of perfection is exposed.

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passages from Plotinus—e.g. the great chapter on the “Absolute”—will be a source of delight and instruction which will give the book a classical value, even if it had not one for other reasons. The passage from St. Augustine on what he found and did not feel is marvellous. I had never seen it.

But the reservation “roughly speaking” must apply, I fear, to my agreement with (i), though also I hope, to my disagreement with (ii).

About (i) what I most heartily go with (to begin from this) is the identification of eternity and values, and the discrimination against mere duration and the popular fairy tale of the “future life”. Your description of the Christian view of immortality, in so many words, in one passage, could not, I should have thought, be bettered. But I have found myself accumulating a whole store of references to express a hesitation which I feel as to the meaning in which you practically accept Plotinus’ “Yonder”. I will focus my doubt in one pair of references only. I enjoy and heartily go with the fine sonnet by Lanier (II. 102) while quite recognising that it presupposes a special, not common, experience and point of view. But the very splendid French poem (end of II) and the sentences just before it, though I admire, I do not enjoy, except as poetry. Without arguing, I would venture to indicate that here and elsewhere I *feel* you, with Plotinus coming back towards a certain abstractedness and remoteness of the highest things; in wh. the *ἐκεῖ* and *ἐνταῦθα* regain something analogous to their popular significance, though on a very far higher level of thought than they ordinarily symbolise.

(Did you ever happen to notice,—I never did, I believe, till I re-read the passage the other day—that in Republic 508 E ff. *ἐκεῖ* and *ἐνταῦθα* are purely grammatical words of reference “former” and “latter” *ἐκεῖ* referring in fact to the sensuous symbol, and *ἐνταῦθα* to the ideal world? It is a trifle, but shows how entirely the words are for Plato devoid of fixed dogmatic associations.)

“What, in the French poem, does the *Là* imply?” I find myself

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asking uneasily. Is it something which I cannot have on earth or in any finite life analogous to this life, but am more likely to have in some unimaginable experience after death and apart from any finite existence; and if so, why? My own gospel on all this is the page and a half in Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality* 468-9;¹ I have no doubt you know it. Of course I do not deny the possibility of forms of experience now unknown to us; but I do not think it sound in principle to presuppose that we are to look to them for our supreme values. Our values, I take it, come in our work and in our world, though they take us beyond its everyday level. We are not to look, in principle, for another world, consisting as it were of pure values and nothing else; at least, so it seems to me.

Is not Plotinus touched with the error—the worst, I think, in Plato and Aristotle, though more transcended by them than is usually supposed—of treating the animal or sensual nature as the source of vice and sin? This question is profoundly connected with the implication of “yonder”, is it not? The “fall” is really also the rise, is it not? Is it not our spiritual infinity, that, seeking satisfaction in a finite life, produces together and in one texture our sins and our values? No really serious and human temptations spring from our animal passions as such, I think.

I have put together some references about this, *Principle* p. 344. Aristotle quite sees that human temptations are mainly “acquired tastes” (*ἐπιθετοὶ ἐπιθυμίαι*). It would be an exaggeration, but would make my meaning clear, if I suggested that our values are the pattern of which our sins are the seamy side.

I am alarmed lest the “Là” points to some expectation of a special finite experience giving us eternity disjoined from finiteness. And this I cannot grasp. It *sounds* to me *like* bringing back the spurious immortality at a higher level.

But now as to (ii) I think I can minimise my divergence, as with (i) I was minimising my agreement. Would you let me say

¹ Ending: “It is here, it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is waking reality.” See p. 250 below.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

that, though really the perfect being must include the whole, yet, because of our weakness, which sets us always confusing "the whole" with "everything", we must be allowed to *treat* "the whole" as one special being among others—strictly a contradiction in terms, but necessary perhaps to our apprehending its supremacy or divinity. Then might you not go on, "the whole" *par excellence*, the central real, gives rise to what is beyond and outside it, and so on, *in the sense* that to experience the "all" as "the whole" is beyond our power, and we *must* get at it through a special experience such as is portrayed in (i); admitting, then, that "the whole" taken as the supreme, does not include "the all" "to which it gives rise"? I don't see my way further than this towards the overflow doctrine.

(May I note that I am practically, i.e. in *feeling*, impatient of the "yonder"? Am I wholly wrong in fancying that we are much more deeply at one with nature and life than the Greeks were? I don't mean to say anything such as popular infidels might take me to mean, if I say "I want nothing but this earth". But I do find values in "nature" and "the meanest things" and the spirit of life (as in Meredith's nature poetry) which I don't much believe Plotinus or perhaps any one in that early age had at command.) I don't—can't—feel that my spiritual home is elsewhere, ἐκεῖ. ἐκεῖ in quality, if that has any meaning, yes, but not in removedness.

So often you seem to me to say quite all I want, but then again a feeling for a yonder which is a yonder in something more than value, seems to come in, and disturbs me. That it might be so, I should readily admit; that it must be so, would seem to me to imply some line of connexion wh. I cannot apprehend. If it is only that there must be eternity I can quite go with that; but that *I* am necessarily to have it, more than I have now—!

One or two points off the main road, though linked with it.

I don't quite think you attribute to Plato all the depth and modernism that I do. I wonder if you ever found time to glance at my Companion to Plato's Republic. It would not tell you anything objective that you don't know; but I adhere to my principles

The Younger Men

of interpretation, and I don't think Burnet would condemn them on the whole, though he has criticised (without naming me) some points. I am very firmly convinced that we are only at the beginning of Platonic interpretation. The ridiculous rejections of his greatest dialogues showed how far the scholars were from understanding his drift. I am sure we do not modernise him with nearly enough boldness, and in many respects we ascribe to him precisely the opposite of his real views.

I feel quite sure that Greek ethics of the great time is firmly based on the craftsman's experience, the formation of mind and body to right liking and action by practical habituation, completed by communication of the central principle. Also that the unity of spirits—the Pauline spiritual unity—is the basis of the Republic (the great passage of course is 462 D. cf 362 οὐκ αὐτάρκης of the individual and Bk. iv init. "the only solid happiness is that wh. each has in the whole"). The doctrine of true satisfaction in Bk ix bears an analogous relation, I think, to the more intense expression about the "living water" in N.T., and this relation is typical, I believe, of Plato's relation to Christianity.

I defer to your knowledge and judgment of Plotinus, but his use of Plato's terms does make me feel sometimes as if I was in presence of a dogmatic hardening and abstracting of terms which were quite simple and natural as first used. I feel this about the ἐπέκεινα passage. It seems to me necessary and almost simple in its place, but to acquire an almost non-natural meaning when heavily stressed by later thought. You would agree that a true dialectical advance is necessarily from abstract to concrete? I shrink from the dialectical *pyramid*.

But I am arguing, which I did not mean to do. Such is the vicious effect of half a century of philosophising!

There is an aspect of your concluding chapter which disturbs me a little.¹ I had been trusting, that though the outlook for the

¹ Referring apparently to Dean Inge's comparison of the social conditions of the time with those of Roman Society in its decadence, and the fear he expresses of a like "fiscal tyranny."

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

less wealthy bourgeois might be serious for a time, yet for the bulk of the English population, and, I thought, after a little, for those elsewhere, we were really at the break of a new day, better than any before. I *expect* great catastrophes from time to time as civilisation becomes so intricate and the temptation to materialism so strong; but I do believe that people are learning where the reliable values are. I don't believe pre-war civilisation was on the down grade. I don't think the war could have made all the good stuff anew; it seems to me it could only reveal what was there.

I am grateful for your occasional kindly notice of my work; and for your book itself, opening up to me a completely new vista of Greek thought and a fine classical source of ideas which have permanent value for life, I cannot be too grateful.

Yours very faithfully

BERNARD BOSANQUET

I apologise for the length of this letter. I have a copy, so that if you should be too much occupied to pay attention to it, I shall still have the benefit of having focussed my thoughts on the subject.

LETTER XCI

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

April 11, 1919

DEAR MR. DEAN,

This is just a line to thank you for your very kindly answer to my letter.

I think that perhaps Bradley's phrase ('Truth and Reality 469) "owe their existence to finite wills" needs to be illustrated by reference to op. cit. 339.¹ I fancy the stress is on the word existence,

¹ "Truth, beauty, and goodness must appear as temporal facts, but their essence does not consist in that appearance. It transcends the lapse of time and the flux of change, and it everywhere in this sense is eternal." See below, p. 250 and n.

The Younger Men

and he means not that finite wills create them, but bring them into temporal being. The question how far we "make" truth is in his mind, I imagine. We attain or produce it, but we don't make it be true.

It occurs to me that it ought to be a gratifying reflection to you that you have produced a book which has in it so large a store of good reading and thinking. What are the sheep to do, if they are not fed? Men will read something; and that there should be a fair abundance of worthy literature on the highest subjects, on which the more thoughtful minds may be nourished, is surely an essential of religious enlightenment. I have just, through a friend, lent Pringle Pattison's "Idea of God" to a theosophist lady, who, I hear, is much delighted with it. Many of these people, don't you think? would read good books as eagerly as foolish ones, if they were written by men of authority, and there was a general knowledge of their existence.

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XCII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

April 20, 1919

DEAR MR. WEBB,

I delayed acknowledging your book,¹ partly because I wished to read it first, and then, after I had looked into it, because I wished you to have before you (if you should choose) my article in the *Quarterly on Croce*,² which has just appeared.

I have a number of quotations and references to your book by me, enough to make a long review; but I think long arguments

¹ Clement C. J. Webb, at this time Fellow of Mary Magdalen College, Oxford, delivered the Gifford Lectures in the University of Aberdeen in 1918 and 1919. The book here referred to is the first series on *God and Personality*.

² See Letter LXXXVIII above.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

in MS are intolerable, and I will only say one or two things, in direct colloquial language.

I was very glad to get the book; it told me a great deal I did not know, and put many points with extreme clearness. That point about the Unitarian comment on the Trinitarian view of personality in God¹ is really almost humorous; I think you felt it so. The set of facts connected with that was almost entirely new to me (the lateness of the explicit assertion of personality).

Of course it was a gratification to me that you seemed to attach some importance to my views. Now I must use my space to try and explain one or two things, as I say, colloquially.

It seems reasonable that you should require me either to admit personal relations with the divine, or to identify the divine with the absolute. (In putting the stress on personal relation and not self-consciousness or the like of the deity—I got “fed up” with Lotze!—you make the matter easier to discuss. The meaning of the latter is so evanescent.) I can’t do either; and have a huge lot to say about both. But the first seems to me the more impossible of the two impossibles! Does not your p. 239² seem fantastic to yourself when re-read after an interval?—personal intercourse with ultimate Reality? Surely personal intercourse must be with what is one among others and ultimate reality must be what is all-inclusive. The phrase “one among others” expresses my final difficulty with all this way of looking at things. Bradley has insisted on it in A. and R. Could we come to terms on some such phrase as “the *basis* of all personal relations”? I could appreciate that, I think; but to me it excludes the other. I hoped you were coming

¹ On p. 62 Webb had quoted the statement of Socinus that “though God may rightly be said to be one Person . . . yet belief in the unity of his Person is not necessary to salvation; for those who hold that he exists in three Persons, however absurd their view, may obey his will as revealed by Christ and so may be saved.”

² Where Webb had spoken of religious experience as involving “a personal intercourse which will not be content to regard itself as personal intercourse with anything less than ultimate reality.”

The Younger Men

to that on p. 71:¹ but you go off on the personal side of the mortal benefactor. I have much to say of the mystical passion for the Absolute (Miss Underhill in the *Quarterly*) and of the self-identification with Nature and the heart of the world as the *true line of religious experience*. I see that if you hold Trinitarian doctrine *plus historical* Incarnation you do get what you state; but I cannot hold the second, though I do hold the philosophical Incarnation. Would you not admit that the former combination, resting the personal side on the human Jesus, is at least dangerous—the heavenly bridegroom and so on—there is a good deal that is morbid mixed up with it, is there not? About Dante—I have something to say. Does not the *direct* contact with the Trinity, being only in a spaceless point or the circumference of a circle, suggest anything to you? All definite personal religion comes to him through symbolic human beings, and through the universe—the wheels. Then, why not the Absolute? Because it is the whole; see how you resent the phrase “non-contradiction”;² yet it is the true and necessary description of the absolute. There is *at least* the difference between religion and metaphysic. I must stop, it is getting too long. If time is given me, I should hope to publish something further. I have something to say about reciprocity.

Yours truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER XCIII

Webb had criticized in some detail Croce's doctrine of religion as a form of knowledge bound to disappear with the advance of

¹ Where Webb had quoted from Pliny, “Deus est mortali adjuvare mortalem” as an illustration of views of God as immanent and immanent only, which might yet be treated as affirmations of a personal God.

² E.g. pp. 107 and 125, where Bosanquet's claim that “the proper name of the principle or spirit of the system, which determines the true mutual relations of all things and therefore (among the rest) of all persons, but which is not itself a person or persons, is non-contradiction” (*Mind*, October 1917) is criticized.

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philosophy. But he gave him credit for bringing out that "the denial that there is truly Personality in God must in the end lead to the denial that religious experience is an independent and autonomous form of experience at all". (p. 266). He had gone on to criticize the different view held by Bosanquet of the independence and permanence of religion as less logical, but at the same time one with which he had himself more sympathy. The reference to J. A. Smith, Webb thinks, must have been to views expressed in conversation.

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

May 10/19

DEAR MR. WEBB,

Very many thanks for your letter, which gives me much to think of.

About Croce—I am concerned that you and J. A. Smith agree in criticising my treatment of C's attitude to aesthetic and religion. I have ready two papers on the aesthetic, which would explain my view at greater length; one the Quarterly may I hope accept for October, but unluckily it is on a special point (The "Death of Art" in Hegel); the longer one which would state my view more fully, is I fear too much for the Quarterly and too long and popular for "Mind", so it may not get printed, unless I bring out some vol. of Essays.¹

It is a complex question, and I quite see what you say. But, very shortly, my view is that by denying any immanent whole such as to determine the rank and relations of positive terms (distincts) C. has forfeited his right to erect an order of types of experience; while so far as his language hints at a basis for such an order, he actually adopts, as regards aesthetic and religion

¹ The "longer" paper on Croce's aesthetic was printed in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* (1919) and reprinted in the volume *Science and Philosophy* (1927), with the shorter one "On Croce's Conception of the 'Death of Art' in Hegel" as an appendix. On what follows cp. p. 196 above.

The Younger Men

alike, as phases of knowledge, the characterisation, wh. as used by Hegel (so he falsely says) is fatal to the autonomy of both. It is true that in face of this contradiction he preaches the autonomy of aesthetic and denies that of religion. But this view of aesthetic, the more I study him, the more I take to be at bottom Chauvinistic fad, based on his obsession about Vico.¹ There is nothing in him to correct it, or to justify *any* order of experiences, the immanent whole, the source of dialectic, being denied. The priority, drawn from Vico, is essentially a blunder. How little there is any immanent order can be seen from the fact that there is no implication forwards from aesthetic to the other stages. I must go on.

I am not learned in the history of Christian theology; but what I meant by the philosophical theory of the Incarnation was that the finite world with all finite persons is the revelation of the absolute. I thought this was practically the logos doctrine as it came down from the Timaeus; but in any case it is Hegel's, and I think it is true. Jesus is then, qua human, a part, so to speak, of the incarnation; it is only the special historical tradition that makes him the whole of it—I mean, that is how it strikes me.

What you say about “in the name of” = “in the person of” and the worshippers' relation being within the process of the Trinity is, as orthodox doctrine, new to me. I don't think I ever met it in an Anglican work or liturgy or pulpit. It would involve would it not that the whole finite world—nature and persons—would fall within the process of the Trinity. We should then pray as one with the spiritual body of Christ, i.e. the community and humanity; and the personal relation, as of thou and I, would be superseded ipso facto.

But I should like to say that I am tending more and more to think that the main difficulty is in the apt expression of facts about which we are more agreed than we think. Of course the apt

¹ Croce's “obsession about Vico” showed itself particularly in his acceptance of the latter's theory of “the vast and profound imagination belonging to primitive man.” See *Science and Philosophy*, p. 411.

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expression is of enormous importance, because it modifies the facts, and I am hostile to agnosticism.

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

Very many thanks for the syllabus. I shall be much interested to see the second set of lectures. This letter, though long enough considering the handwriting, is too short to be much good. Don't judge me *altogether* by it.

LETTER XCIV

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

July 20, 1919

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

. . . . I have been looking again at your papers on B. Russell's religion and on that of the neo-Realists,¹ with great interest. I feel sure your treatment is right. . . .

I am just reading Norman Smith's commentary² to the Critique; it seems to me very instructive; I wonder what you think. The remarkable thing is that Kant should still seem so valuable, when it takes so much pulling to pieces really to understand him.

Well, we had peace day yesterday; our local bonfire spoilt by rain; but I hear the London processions were good. And now what? We are almost as anxious as during the war. But I have a feeling that now people have no future event to look to, but only their own action to guide, things may go better. With kind regards from both of us to you and yours.

I am

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ See pp. 155, 195, 198 above.

² Professor Norman Kemp Smith's *Commentary on Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason* appeared in 1918.

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LETTER XCV

THE HEATH COTTAGE
QUEEN'S DRIVE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

Sept. 14, 1919

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

.... I haven't answered what you told me about your work on your book. I think it is wonderful that you should have had the resolution to rewrite your book¹ completely, and I am quite sure the effect of this resolution will appear in an increased grasp of your subject. The book would in any case, I am sure, have had great value, but when it has been so thoroughly reconsidered and fresh pointed, as it were, it must have gained immensely in energy and concentration. I think the fluctuations in certainty that you speak of are natural and necessary—one's whole being goes in tides. To some extent with me they are mitigated because my faiths are apt to be centred outside my own work; I feel a sort of hold on tradition and its great incarnations, and feel more or less warranted as their interpreter. Probably that is a confession of some want of originality. But of course I know the feeling quite well and admit that a relative whole like the State may undergo it as well as the individual. I am sure in your case it is merely accidental; your work cannot fail to be of substantive value.

It is of little use to write my impression of politics; the cable antiquates them so soon. We hope it is to be all right about the treaty and League. If America really stood out, I presume the bottom would fall out of the whole thing. It is rather a nightmare just now—of course one feels that one doesn't understand. I am never very uneasy about our labour movements, except when the government either yield or bluff unseasonably. I should like a

¹ Hoernlé's *Studies in Contemporary Realism* appeared in 1920. For his own account of the phase of his thought which it represented, see his article, "On the Way to a Synoptic Philosophy, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, vol. ii.

labour government with one or two good liberals in it. It is madness to go slow just now, I think, and Ireland too! We want to get going at once, with free imports and freshly organised coal production, I don't think it possible to work the mines under a government bureaucracy, with the rule that no official can be dismissed, wh. is practically the rule of government service in peace. But Haldane has sketched the possibility of training Government servants on another basis, like the young Army officers, who will lead their men as in war etc. I think there is something in this (Did I say all this before? I really can't remember).

I am seeing through the press a new logic book "Implication and Linear Inference"¹—it won't be out before Xmas I should think; not a very long book, but I am much interested in it. Also I am preparing a 3rd edition of the State, and am going to say a good deal about The New State² in it.

I hope and trust your mother will get safely out to you in October. I would have tried to see her in Oxford if I had known she was still there. I forget whom I called uneducated. . . . But I quite agree that one should avoid calling names. I should like to leave the world with no enemies!

. . . . I haven't seen your review of N. Smith on Kant³ yet. I thought the book awfully good, and to my own astonishment read it through twice, with great profit I hope. I have been recurring to Spinoza too, and have re-read Duff on Spinoza's politics and ethics.⁴ I think it quite an excellent book, and it makes one

¹ Published 1920.

² Miss M. P. Follett's book, *The New State*, was published in 1918 and was reviewed by Bosanquet in the July number of *Mind* in 1919. He found it in detail and exposition an advance on any other treatment of "the State considered as a collective will" with which he was acquainted. What particularly attracted him in it was the writer's idea of the practice of "the art of living together" in the daily contact of neighbourhood and occupation as contributory to the discovery by the individual of his real will. See p. 47. above.

³ Hoernlé reviewed Kemp Smith's Commentary on Kant in *The Philosophical Review* of May, 1919.

⁴ *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy* (1903).

The Younger Men

or two points, I *think*, wh. Green, missed, in the politics. With kindest regards from both of us.

I am Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XCVI

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

MY DEAR HOERNLÉ,

Sept. 23, 1919

I was so preoccupied yesterday about the argument re Our Ignorance in Asking,¹ that I forgot the most important thing in your letter, viz, that your book is complete and will be out about Xmas, and the title of it. It should be—will be, of the intensest interest to me. I cannot be here forty years hence, but you will be, and I may see from your book a little now of what the philosophical world will look like at that date and later.

I congratulate you on the completion of the rewriting and on the resolution which enabled you to carry it through, and I am sure it will be of the highest value,

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ Hoernlé writes: "Appears to refer to a letter of the day before not kept by me." Whatever the argument was, we know Bosanquet's conclusion. Under the title "Our Ignorance in Asking": A Paraphrase of Goethe's "Denn die Wünsche verhüllen uns selbst das Gewünschte" he had written in March 1918:

"The gifts we longed and prayed for
The great gods send them down,
They send perhaps a martyrdom
When we desired a crown.

But though our wishes painted them
In fraudulent disguise,
The gifts we longed and prayed for
Are here before our eyes."

, *Zoar*, p. 28.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

LETTER XC VII

This is one of the many letters from their friends welcoming the "little book of verse" published after the War by Helen and Bernard Bosanquet under the modest title *Zoar* ("This city is near to flee unto and it is a little one." Gen. xix. 20). His part of it consisted of translations, mainly from Goethe, recalling (as in the title of one of them) "a voice from the old Germany," but appealing also for some of the great truths for which his philosophy stood to the poets who "have the deepest insight" (p. 252 below). His wife's part consisted of thirteen short poems of singular pathos and beauty.

16 QUINCY STREET

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

November 15, 1919

DEAR MR. BOSANQUET:

After a year of absence, we are again in Cambridge, where students and teachers are carrying on once more the forms of the pre-war world—I fancy with a little added doubtfulness on the part of the students, and a little added humility on the part of the teachers, as if with the knowledge that a sword has passed through the body of our wisdom.

We find here the little book of poems called *Zoar*, which is doubly welcome as coming from you and Mrs Bosanquet, and as being a nugget of what tired souls especially need just now, truth in the form of beauty. Here at least is authority and peace.

It is well to be reminded that there was a Goethe and a Schiller, and what charming and piquant bits you have chosen! I especially enjoy the answer of Goethe to Haller's "Philistine Mysticism",¹

¹ Freundlicher Zuruf, the well-known lines at the end of which are translated:

"Nature has neither husk nor heart,
She shows her all in every part;
But one distinction is eternal
If thou thyself art husk or kernel."

The Younger Men

and that truly wonderful Selige Sehnsucht.¹ Sometime, perhaps, you will translate also that drink song "Ich hab' mein Sach' auf nichts gestellt"—That belongs to us also.

Will you say to Mrs Bosanquet for me that her poem, *The Wanderers*, especially moved me? Such words, after all, do much to make a visible church of those very *Wanderers*; for recognition is the essence of the church, and there is hardly any joy on earth that compares with it. Let me say to her also—passing your ears by—that I understand that beautiful portrait in *The Rock*, and join in her reverence.

I am reading Hegel again this year in connection with studies in the Philosophy of History. How impossible it is to bury what has Geist in it!

With gratitude and affection to you both.

ERNEST HOCKING

LETTER XCVIII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Feb. 2, 1920

MY DEAR HALDANE,

I returned Rashdall² and Czernin.³ The books were so interesting that I read them quicker than I expected.

Czernin was very instructive and brought us both to realisation of much we had not thoroughly known, about the atmosphere in which both the Germanys lived during the war, their illusory hopes and calculations of all kinds. On the other hand we did not

¹ The even better known lines of which "Und so lang," etc., are translated:

"Die to live, for thou who hast not
Made this law thine own
Art but an embarrassed novice
In a world unknown."

² Hasting Rashdall's *The Idea of the Atonement* (1915).

³ Czernin-Morzin's *Kriegseindrücke und Erinnerungen eines freiwilligen Veteranen*, 1920.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

know how soon and how definitely Austria longed to be out of the war. The book gives one quite a new sense of contact with their minds.

About Rashdall, I feel that a great part of what he says is undeniable, so far as the strict substitutionary doctrine of the Atonement is concerned. But, outside the ecclesiastical world, I do not suppose that that is any longer of great importance.

On the other hand, I cannot think that his treatment of "Justification by faith" is theoretically sound, although it may have some support from the literal construction of St. Paul and others. I have carefully re-read Bradley (*Ethical Studies*) and Green (the sermons and Nettleship's chapter¹) and the Romans, and I do doubt whether Rashdall has *at all* grasped St. Paul's idea, or the true fact of the matter. He obviously and verbally, over and over again, propounds a "subjective" and "ethical" interpretation; which means that he has broken up the human-divine unity experienced in faith and has replaced it by the effect of one person's conduct on that of another. One plain result of this is, that, the old presupposition of the necessary Atonement having been abandoned and the unity experienced in faith being rejected, you have to *prove* the fact of the love implied in the death of Christ, and you cannot do it, as a *de facto* love. It is surely quite arguable that his Messianic ideas, so far from saving his disciples in any obvious sense, were the only thing that brought them into danger.

I think that against this subjective and ethical interpretation which makes the Atonement the *effect* of a *de facto* love, Dr. Denny's argument (p. 439 ff) is sound, and Rashdall's attempt to meet it is extraordinarily weak special pleading.

Rashdall's attitude to the fundamental interpretation of St Paul and of the facts by Green and Bradley is unintelligible to me. He never refers at all, so far as I could see, to the idea of the death in life daily reenacted in the member of a Christian community, as the death and new life of Christ in him.

Of course the Church is his first interest; but I really do not know

¹ "The Atonement," *Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, i. p. 39.

The Younger Men

whether he is informed about the philosophical doctrines or e.g. the position of the Friends or is practically ignorant of them. He just refers to a point of common knowledge about Dante, but I doubt his having any intimate knowledge of him. He obviously has an objection to "justification by faith only" and, as I say, he may have historical ground for it, but I am sure he does not understand it as we do, and as I believe St Paul did, taking his doctrine all together.

It is a little interesting to me as my little book,¹ based wholly on the opposite view as explained in "Ethical Studies", has just gone to Press. Of course I am in no way tied to the Church's interpretation, either for or against it.

I think it all-important *not* to reduce a religious conception to one that is ethical, and I think that that is just what Rashdall prides himself on doing.

I am sorry this is so long, and I fear the writing is bad. You are not bound to read it; still less to answer it. The books were a great treat.

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER XCIX

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

April 4, 1920

MY DEAR ROB,

I return the Swarthmore lecture,² which both of us have greatly enjoyed. Violet must be a very remarkable woman. The converging experiences of today upon this subject of the silent revelation are exceedingly striking. I suppose Maeterlinck is

¹ *What Religion Is.*

² *Silent Worship: The Way of Wonder*, by L. Violet Hodgkin, a sister-in-law of Professor R. C. Bosanquet, to whom the letter is addressed.

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

responsible for much; I find parallel ideas in one of the new Italian writers—there is an extraordinary new departure in idealism there—Croce and his band—e.g. the notion that the silence of night is not mere negation of sound but involves and elicits a peculiar response of the soul. I forget if I mentioned to you that queer but very striking book “Morning Knowledge” (by a British officer prisoner in Turkey)¹ it makes silence a central feature of the religious history. It is fantastic, very fresh and partly amusing; you might not like it—a little Bergsonian and pragmatist; but for a young man most remarkable.

I have learned very much from Violet’s lecture, and it will help me, I hope, to a right balance of effort in the time that may remain to me. It is interesting to compare the view with the habit of reading poetry or absorbing oneself in art, in which many people find their best moments. “In battle”, Lewis Nettleship said that some people find theirs. The ways of mind are very various.

It was delightful to see you; I hope you will come when the apples are on the trees and bring Nellie. I suppose we here share on a small scale about our little orchard the farmer’s feeling; the general confidence and special uncertainty of seed time and harvest. It is a form of religion; I used to note a similar attitude among our seafaring people in Orkney; a sort of quietness, together with readiness. If the wind didn’t serve, you must wait.

Oh yes; they sent me the circular about Handyside; but not the book.² I should be much pleased if you would send it me.

I hope you are all having a good time. Love from both to all.

Your affectionate uncle

BERNARD

¹ *Morning Knowledge: The Story of the New Inquisition*, by Alastair Shannon. Longmans, 1920. Noticed by Bosanquet in the July number of *Mind*, 1920. He notes the close affinity between *Morning Knowledge* and the ideas of Gentile: “it is strongly creationist, insisting, for example, on the senses as creative and not receptive. Its word ‘fiam’ corresponds to Gentile’s ‘farsi.’ Like Gentile too it wholly rejects the ‘pre-existent’ real or God. The world of space and time is, it would seem, to disappear in the end; whether literally, or only from a higher insight, I am not sure.”

² See Letter LIII n. above.

The Younger Men

LETTER C

THE HEATH COTTAGE
QUEEN'S DRIVE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

May 21, 1920

MY DEAR ROB,

I was delighted to get your letter and the rest. The lecture is quite charming.¹

I am very much obliged for a sight of Handyside's book. I have read P.P.'s preface and the first essay,² and it seems to me admirable. I will keep it till just before we go to Hindhead (June 1) and then return it perhaps without a letter, as we shall be full of packing etc. One is very glad to have your judgment of the man, to illustrate the book.

I am very sorry about Patten.³ I had a great respect and liking for him; though of course I did not know him very well. I hope he may be able to carry on his farming work. I have always thought the estate accounts, going so far back, might be most interesting social and economic material. I remember your father showing me some which recorded that they used to grow carraway seed at Thundersley! I think it wonderful of you to take up the job as you are doing.

Love from both of us

Your affectionate uncle

BERNARD

I daresay you know all about the romances of the modern business plant-hunters. There is both a biography and a novel

¹ As President of the Berwickshire Naturalists' Club, Professor R. C. Bosanquet had given an address on the Greek "root-cutters" (= herbalists) under the title "The Beginnings of Botany."

² On *The Historical Method in Ethics*, in reality a drastic criticism of it.

³ Farm manager at Rock, who had been disabled by a stroke.

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about a woman springing from Hamburg, and becoming rich and famous by the trade. The Girl of the Limberlost is a popular and sentimentalised form of the same thing. We were much amused by finding that H's brother the zoologist,¹ having found the Germans in that trade severe competitors and much favoured by our consuls etc took a very hostile and most unromantic view of them! I wish I had the German name. They were rare good books.

LETTER CI

Bosanquet's little book, *What Religion Is*, was published this year. It was the result, as he explains in the Preface, of the desire to be helpful to persons who, while feeling the necessity of religion, are perplexed by the shape in which it comes before them. His wife writes of it: "This little book is the culminating expression of his lifelong passion for helping others to find happiness where he had found it himself—in the life of the spirit."² After being long out of print, it was republished in 1931 in Macmillan's Caravan Library.

THORSHILL HOTEL

HINDHEAD

June 19, 1920

DEAR PROFESSOR WEBB,

I am asking Macmillan to send you a copy of a little book on Religion, and I want to explain to you, as having made the subject very much your own, why I wrote it. I had an object which I thought would be defeated if avowed in the book, and I want those really interested and expert in the subject not to suppose that I wrote from meddlesomeness or a desire to thrust myself in.

The thing is this, my wife and I have been greatly shocked and distressed by things we knew of publicly and privately about the harm done by "spiritualistic" and necromantic practices, leading sometimes to complete morbid absorption, and to consequent

¹ See p. 119 n. 2 above.

² *Bernard Bosanquet*, p. 141.

The Younger Men

division in families. I first thought of writing a furious criticism of. . . . Then we reflected that that could only do harm, awaken horrible irritation, and stiffen all the believers in their superstitions. And it seemed worth trying whether, without overt controversy, one could help a mind here and there—I do not hope for more—to recall its attention to the central truths of religion and its fundamental facts, and maintain the sanity and proportion of its faith.

I am greatly influenced by my admiration for a set of near relations of mine who are devout Anglicans and are really governed by their religion, and yet are most competent sane and efficient people, without a trace of morbidity, having a full sense of proportion, and of humour. The really strong and sound religious people are like that, are they not, as a rule?

I quite think it a serious thing to touch the ark, and I did not do it gratuitously. I wanted to say this.

Yours truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER CII

The idea of borrowing a dictionary and following the criticism of a friend's book into an unknown tongue would hardly, I should imagine, occur to many people. It seems a pity that Bosanquet's excursion into Dutch philosophy should have been so discouraging. In the first set of passages in his Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God*, referred to below, Pringle-Pattison seemed to accept Lotze's view (*Mikrokosmos*, Bk. II. c. iv) to the effect that "The beauty of colours and tones, warmth and fragrance are what nature in itself strives to produce and express but cannot do so itself; for this it needs its last and noblest instrument the sentient mind," supporting it by a reference to S. S. Laurie's *Synthetica*, vol. i. p. 115. "The physical conditions (of the blue of the hyacinth) await consciousness to reveal their final reality to mind; and their final reality to mind is their final reality in and for the object. The hyacinth and I are citizens of the same world." But in the second

Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends

set of passages he seems to acquiesce in the view that secondary and tertiary qualities are "aspects we recognize in nature" on the same level as the primary.

What Bosanquet here says is of great interest in connection with questions, founded, I can't help thinking, on misunderstanding, that have been raised as to whether such arguments formed "a legitimate part of his armoury" at this stage of his development.¹

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Sept. 3, 1921

MY DEAR PRINGLE PATTISON,

I write this line about J. Rahder's Dutch article on your "Idea of God". No doubt he has sent it to you; and it is primarily your affair. The idea of writing to him about it did occur to me; but the principal point which I might have wished to touch upon would have been his account of your views in the second article pp 137-8; and I could not have said anything to him about this without first ascertaining from you if my idea of your view was right. And if it is right, and if he is therefore wrong, it would rather be for you than for me to take the point up.

But I write because the passage concerns an old doubt of mine about your meaning; and if you could settle it for me in a word or two, it would be a great kindness. We are no longer in controversy, and I don't want to make any further use of what you might say. But I have a great desire to know.

The point is—is his opening line and a half in page 2 literally justified "P.P. expressly and repeatedly attaches himself to the (neo) realists' theory of knowledge"? I thought your position was much like mine, in terms of the quotations from Lotze and Laurie—that secondary qualities were rightly called objective, but only in virtue of the unity of human sentient experience with the

¹ See art. "Nature in the Philosophy of Bosanquet," by R. E. Stedman, *Mind*, July 1934, p. 330, and p. 28 above.

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real world, as a constituent of it. I won't argue about the position, but just mention that I do find some difficulty in reconciling pp. 120, 123, 124 and 132, with 127, 200, 202, 212. I hoped that, like myself, you thought it illegitimate to raise the question of the existence and nature of objects in abstraction from human experience; but some words in the second set of references made me doubt if I am right in this. *If* this, however, *were* your position, he would be distinctly wrong, I take it, in saying you attached yourself to the neo-realist doctrine. You take, I *thought*, very rightly and reasonably, the view that your position is realist, but with a rationale incompatible with theirs.

I never read any Dutch before; but the things he seemed to be saying stirred my curiosity so that I borrowed a dictionary and read the papers without much difficulty. But this method of heaping up descriptive adjectives is frightfully bad and formless, isn't it?

I hope you are well, and enjoying your leisure. I wonder what you think of the Reign of Relativity.¹ It is a considerable feat of general interpretation, is it not?

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CIII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

Sept. 10, 21

MY DEAR PRINGLE PATTISON,

I return the proofs with very many thanks. They are most satisfactory to my mind, and are just what I should have hoped they would be. I don't think I had seen the 2nd edition of the "Idea of God"—one is apt to get a little out of things living down here and never seeing anybody. I don't get about easily. I

¹ Lord Haldane's book, *The Reign of Relativity*, astonishing others as well as Bosanquet by its evidence of the author's vigour and versatility.

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am very glad both that there was a 2nd edition of it and that you are going to give further Giffords.

I shan't bother about Rahder, now I know you are aware of him, and especially as you don't think much of him. If I could have written in Dutch in his Journal it would have been different; but I don't feel his personal education to be my duty. I hope you will send him the proofs though. No, I couldn't understand who or what he was. I thought he must be an authority—he swaggers so. There is an American method of analysing philosophers acc. to “systems of reference” isn't there? When we were assigned to points on the base of a triangle, I felt myself in presence of something I didn't know. . . . I am very glad you are all well. I hope the next Giffords¹ will go well. By the way, I suppose you heard Stout's²—I should think they were exceedingly interesting. I have the syllabus.

With many thanks

I am

Yours sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CIV

THE HEATH COTTAGE

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OXSHOTT

SURREY

Jan. 2, 1921

MY DEAR HALDANE,

My wife and I have now read aloud together the whole of Hume Brown's “Goethe”,³ and I am moved to write once more to

¹ Pringle-Pattison delivered the Gifford Lectures in the following year on *The Idea of Immortality*. See below.

² G. F. Stout delivered the Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh in 1919 and 1921, on which his book, *Mind and Matter*, published in 1931, was based.

³ P. Hume Brown's *Life of Goethe*, entrusted to Haldane by the author to publish after his death. Haldane wrote a prefatory note and the chapter on the second part of *Faust* for it. See *Autobiography*, pp. 85 ff.

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thank you both for sending it to us and for having so largely shared in its production. To be taken right through the life and works of Goethe, with such objectivity and completeness, is a very great addition to one's previous knowledge of him, which was in my case, as it will have been in that of all ordinary people, confined to works and stories one had a particular fancy for. It leaves one with quite a new appreciation of the strength and weakness of his being, and of the complicatedness of his motives and tendencies. The chapter on Part ii of *Faust* I particularly admire, and was glad to have read, with its brief but complete account of the structure of the piece. I had never had the industry to study it right through, and your account will be an immense help to me in future. I have no doubt the view you take of its significance is right, and also your estimate of its greatness.

. . . . The book told me one most interesting thing, quite new to me, viz. the meaning of Hegel's reference to Humanus¹ (Osmaston's *Trans. of Aesthetic* 2. 395 note, Hume Brown's *Goethe* I 301). I hadn't the least idea before what Hegel was talking about in the place I refer to.

This is rather long to send to a busy man. I hope you are well, and I wish you a happy and very efficacious new year.

With kind regards from both of us, and the highest appreciation of the book, which will be *the* life of Goethe, of course.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CV

On the appearance of *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, by Sir Henry Jones and the present editor in 1921, Bosanquet took occasion in a review of it for *Mind* of July in this year to pay a glowing tribute to "the huge task of spadework" which Caird

¹ *Aesthetic*, vol. ii, p. 235 (1843 ed.), where Hegel says of modern art that with all the wide extension of its content it is yet a return of man to himself "und zu ihrem neuen Heiligen den Humanus macht," translated by Bosanquet: "and adopts St. Man for its saint of to-day."

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accomplished "in his unhesitating and unrelenting activity," and sums up his achievement "in three words": "together with two or three others he *set philosophy free*. . . . It was not that they brought an esoteric illumination from Germany. It was rather that they set out to abolish altogether at once the esoteric and the insular." In a further sense Caird's own special work on Kant set philosophy free, seeing that "with the instinct of a heroic pioneer he made straight for the centre of the labyrinth"—the point at which "the ends of the world had come together upon the modern mind." By the time Caird's work on Kant had been completed in 1889 "it was clear in principle to all men that the barriers were down. The spiritual world had taken its place as simply the natural world understood in the fullest light and within it, especially the moral life as the natural life lived at the highest intensity and in the largest enlightenment. . . . Philosophy had regained something of the amplitude and freedom which it had possessed in Plato's day; and its field, no longer parcelled into fractions, revealed endless fascination to inquirers in every corner of its connected whole."

The significance of the criticisms that followed, as a succinct statement of the difference of emphasis marking the older form of British idealism and that inaugurated by Bradley, hardly needs to be pointed out. In the first of the two passages referred to in the letter on the meaning of "self-consciousness" (for which Henry Jones was not responsible), Bosanquet complained that the writer seemed to have failed to recognize the extent to which so wide a use of the term as an ultimate principle of explanation was open to criticism, and pointed to the necessity of a further analysis of the forms of experience which the word is used to indicate. Can any consciousness in which selfhood survives as a dominant note be taken as representative of an ultimate reality? Similarly, in the second passage quoted he complains of the way in which the apparent opposites of the active individual, with his imperfections and his "progress," and the perfect whole, from which he draws inspiration and guidance, are reconciled as rather a restatement than a solution of the problem of their union in concrete experience.

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I have little doubt of the justice of these criticisms, but I prefer to think, as I believe Bosanquet did, that the failure was due rather to the defects of the exposition than to any want of truth in the enlarged view of Kantian conceptions that Caird had opened out to us by his work as a whole. Self-consciousness to Caird always meant spirit at its highest level and that meant the level at which the idea of self as such had passed "out of sight" in the "music" of devotion to the highest we know. What he suspected in Bradley's devastating dialectic (described by him in a letter as "all blade and no handle") was the suggestion that the self, in passing out of sight, had passed out of being, instead of remaining a substantial element, however "transmuted" in the whole. I believe that Bosanquet, in this as in so much else, was on Caird's side. He was certainly singularly sensitive to any suggestion that he was out of step with him in anything that was essential to a sound idealism.¹

With regard to Sir Henry Jones, whose Gifford Lectures on *A Faith that Enquires* were published this year, I fear that Bosanquet did not find reassurance by the later perusal of his book. In Lecture XI, largely devoted to a criticism of portions of his *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, the younger writer may have perhaps failed to do justice to the subtlety of his view of the reality to be assigned to the individual *wie er steht und geht*. But we have to remember the circumstances of illness and pain under which *A Faith that Enquires* was written and do the author the justice of interpreting his own view as a whole. In Lecture XIII he makes it perfectly clear that, no more than Bosanquet, would he have anything to do with an individual who, "as Browning thought,

'Stands on his own stock
Of love and power as on a pin-point rock.'

Man, in that case, would have a very scanty and insecure foothold. Man must be endowed for the moral enterprise, other hands than his must clasp on this spiritual armour."

¹ See p. 104 above.

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SURREY

July 9, 1922

MY DEAR MUIRHEAD,

I am glad you liked the notice of Caird. I think the book is a very good one; though I suspect that I differ a good deal from Jones. I've not seen his Giffords yet.

In both the places I referred to, 280 and 354-5, I had in mind what I took to be Caird's and Jones' attitude to Bradley; I thought you wrote as in sympathy with it, but wasn't quite sure.

On 280 I meant that I thought Bradley's rather destructive treatment of the conception of self-consciousness was necessary after the very generalised use which Caird and others had made of it; and on 354-5 I thought in the same way that in face of 355 the reality of the individual as such (wh. I take to be the central point of difference with Jones—I don't really know, for I haven't read him except in this book) could not absolutely stand. I am with Bradley; the ultimate reality of the individual makes all philosophy indigestible to me. I am really shocked at Jones' attitude, as I understand it, about immortality.¹ I didn't, and don't, think Caird went so far. But I am not thoroughly informed about either.

About your question of a book.² It all depends who would write, and if it wouldn't be too discordant a Dutch chorus. Would F. H. Bradley write? And then you'd want Russell, Moore, Schiller, Alexander, Stout. Would you let them attack each other?

It is mixed up for me with my private affairs. I am 74, and physically aging, with weak heart. Moreover, I am moving into a smaller house, like everybody else, and am full of the move. I have got a house in the Hampstead Garden Suburb, Golders

¹ On this see p. 249 n. below.

² The suggestion that afterwards took form in the two volumes on *Contemporary British Philosophy*. It was Bosanquet's remark in this letter that "it might be fun to write something" which decided the answer to the "question."

The Younger Men

Green, where I move on Sept. 29, and shall have those gas and electric appliances which delight the modern servant's heart. So I can do nothing till autumn, and perhaps not much then. I am cut down in my working hours and always liable to knock up. I don't consider I can undertake any absolute duties. But it might be fun to write something, if you went on with the scheme, and I found myself able to.

You see how it stands. I hope you are well.

Yours very truly; my wife sends kindest regards

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CVI

Bosanquet had referred in his lecture, "The Distinction between Mind and its Object" (1913, see above p. 142), to the controversy between Manchester and St. Andrews. In the papers given at the Conference of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society held in Manchester in July 1922 (published in *Mind* of October in this year and January 1923) battle was joined again over the more fully developed form that Alexander had given in his Gifford Lectures of 1920-21, to his theory that *sensa* (form, colour, etc.) are characters of physical objects taken out of all connection with the knowing mind, and over the efforts he had there made to reconcile this view with the varying appearance of the *sensa* owing to the distance, position, or environment of the physical object. More particularly it centred in his explanation of the most important of these appearances by the selection which distance, etc., makes for the mind, causing the object to produce a partial effect. Stout had tried to show how impossible such an explanation was on the ground that "no such selection takes place, and also that, if it did, it would not be what is required" (*loc. cit.*, p. 400); and had adopted the ordinary explanation that the variation depended on the difference of "retinal excitation." In his reply Alexander had pressed the question how in that case Stout could still maintain that *sensa* fall to the side of the material object and not to that of

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the mind (*loc. cit.*, p. 8). To one who, like Bosanquet, suspected the term mental used in this connection to be misleading (*Mind and its Objects*, p. 29), this controversy was bound to appear to raise a false issue. The question for him, as he here says, is of the conditions as a whole under which sense-perception takes place physical, bodily or organic, and mental. To omit any of them is to falsify the solution.

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Aug. 8, 1922

MY DEAR ALEXANDER,

I ought to have acknowledged the Conference papers long ago. It was very good of you to send them. I have read Stout's criticism of you with mixed feelings. I almost think he makes his point, *if* you are tied down to take your "selection" very literally; I mean, treating the sensum as a bit of a whole quite homogeneous with it, cut out with a cheese-cutter like a bit of cheese from the mass. On the other hand, if you take it more widely, and say the "conditions" in each case effect the "selection", then perhaps the view approaches a truism, because any mental or bodily arrangements may enter into the "conditions", and the "selection" comes to include "influencing", and his view and yours hardly any longer exclude one another. So probably I should please neither.

I am not doing much work, because I have not been very well, though pretty comfortable at present, and yet in the throes of preparation for moving. We are going at the end of September to live at Golder's Green, in the Hampstead Garden Suburb. It will be smaller and easier to manage than this large garden, and we shall be near many friends. Our address will be from October 1

13 Heathgate

Golder's Green, London N.W.11

I am very glad indeed the meeting was a success.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

The Younger Men

LETTER CVII

The articles referred to at the beginning of the letter were on "Professor Alexander's Gifford Lectures of 1916-1918" and on "Mr. Bosanquet on Contemporary Philosophy," and were published in the *Church Quarterly* of January 1922 and October 1923 respectively. In the former C. J. Webb had given a sympathetic account of Alexander's view of the meaning of religious experience as we have it in *Space, Time, and Deity*,¹ but had criticized his theology as failing to meet the requirements of religious emotions as there described: his "God" can never be Anselm's "*id quo majus cogitari nequit*." Nevertheless, he had ended by emphasizing the value of Alexander's doctrine of Deity as pressing on theologians "the need of revising their conceptions of God's eternity and His relation to time in view of the conception of a creative evolution which is so important to the thought of our age."

The second article was upon Bosanquet's book, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, which had appeared in 1921, and in which the opposite philosophies of the new realism and new idealism were shown to meet in the doctrine of "the actual and ultimate reality of Time, progress to infinity as the fundamental character of the real," and were submitted to detailed criticism on this ground. As in the case of Alexander, Webb maintained the inadequacy of Bosanquet's own view of the timeless Absolute "when taken in itself unadorned by his grave and serious eloquence, charged as that is with the associations of a religious tradition much of which he would reject" to meet the requirements of the religious instinct. As against both views which he held to be one-sided, Webb argued that the Christian religion has always maintained both sides of the antithesis in the doctrine of the Trinity and Predestination on the one hand, and in its emphasis on morality and historic happenings on the other.

¹ Vol. ii, pp. 352 ff.

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13 HEATHGATE

GOLDERS GREEN, N.W.11

Nov. 14/22

DEAR PROFESSOR WEBB,

(Above is now my permanent address). I am much obliged for your letter and the articles. I am always both gratified and instructed when you notice anything I write; and the appreciative paper on Alexander seems to me very just, and that to a side of his work which has not, in my opinion, been sufficiently observed.

As to the special points you raise—my attitude to morality and history, I will begin by saying that I do not consciously depart from Bradley on these matters. I give references—*Ethical Studies* 293 ff. and the chapter on *My Station* etc. and *Essays on Truth* etc 438, 441 ff. I regard myself only as a populariser of the views set out in these places. I can never understand why such passages as the Concluding Remarks of “*Ethical Studies*” are not more widely employed in these discussions. To me they are the locus classicus on the subject.

I ought to explain however that in my application of them I use “*Morality*” strictly in a sense approaching to the Kantian. Bradley’s *Morality of My Station* etc (*Sittlichkeit* as opposed to *Moralität*) I take as a halfway house to Religion, depending on what is in some degree real, and not a mere ideal wholly in thought. This is the note of Kantian Morality. I am not criticising *it*, but anything like the Kantian law of Duty for Duty’s sake, with the infinite series.

Prefacing this much, I go on to say that to explain myself further to you in particular is singularly embarrassing to me. For, in stating Br.’s view as I see it, and as I thought he saw it, I should found it upon ideas which you surely both understand and believe in even more fully, if possible, than I do. The relation between religion and morality is surely settled once for all by the doctrine of Justification by Faith in relation to Works, within the N.T. itself and later. You must know all about this. I was brought up

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in it, in an Evangelical household, and have only expanded my faith under Br.'s influence.

Morality (Kantian) is individualistic, and rests on the sense of my imperfection against the *ideal* law does it not? Religion is a sense of unity, and rests on the effect of oneness with a real whole in wh. my defect, to me actual, becomes impossible. All the sophisms and dangers incident to separating the two attitudes are surely familiar, and we needn't go into them. But taking the two bona fide they are inseparable. Kantian Morality and the Sollen or Dover Essere is one of the sophisms, surely.

The relation to history is settled I thought by the doctrine of the Incarnation, which again I was brought up in, and have only expanded under Br.'s influence. To ask, why is revelation in part historical, is to ask why there is a universe expressed in particulars, and this again is to ask why spirits were not capable of "veder tutto" and then "Mestier non era partorir Maria" an extraordinary and instructive speculation of Dante! Of course I don't admit that revelation is *wholly* historical. The world of values transcends the succession of events. (See Br Essays pp 468-9).

I think with reference to your conclusion on p. 165 Essays 438 should be noted. Religion we take to be practical; and you cannot use ultimate truth in a practical attitude. And we do not think it possible to worship the Absolute. What is worshipped, at once must become less than the whole.

For my actual or practical attitude to History I refer to (Value and) Destiny 322 ff. I think this is right and sufficient. It places progress in spiritualisation—in learning true values chiefly by experience of the intensification and breakdown of others.

Don't you think it is madness in Croce to put all the best things ahead, and to speak as if e.g. Greek art and thought or Shakespeare or the values of simple life would one day be so transcended as to be forgotten? This is a rough but interesting test of attitude. I think the best is all about us, and *some* of it is probably fact. I don't believe the centre of things is altering and making itself better. I should almost venture to challenge your reading of eternal

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life and of the future on Christian grounds. But I don't think Metaphysic can do more than encourage an attitude in these matters.

I think the "progressive" attitude favours materialism; I mean ethical materialism. We should keep an open ear to the view that our civilisation is a beastly thing. I am *sure* this truth and its opposite *both* gain in applicability with time.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

Surely in the paper on Alexander 352-3 you concede to him much that you would not concede to me, when we corresponded about the personal relation to God in religion.

LETTER CVIII

The contents of the letter which Webb had written in reply to the previous one have to be inferred from what Bosanquet here says about morality, faith in relation to works, and the idea of a "finite God." On the last of these Webb had seemed to find a certain difference of attitude in Bosanquet and Bradley: "Mr. Bosanquet, though holding that to think of a God with whom we can be in personal relations is to think of a merely finite being and not of the Absolute, yet finds in the contemplation of the Absolute the satisfaction of his religious aspirations, while Mr. Bradley dwells rather on the thought that philosophy must recognize the God to whom religious devotion is directed to be not the Absolute, but, like all else in our experience, an appearance . . . the thought which is urged upon us by a very different school to Mr. Bradley of a finite God."¹ He had gone on to suggest that there was thus room on Bradley's view for an exoteric religion, even in the case of the initiated, and that Bradley seemed to regret that none such in which all could join was as yet available. No such view was likely to find favour with Bosanquet so long as it carried

¹ *God and Personality*, pp. 132-3.

The Younger Men

with it, as any popular religion was almost bound to do, the suggestion of a world of redress and compensation beyond the present. And what he repudiated for himself he was prepared to repudiate for his friend.

13 HEATHGATE

GOLDERS GREEN, N.W.11

Jan. 15, 1923

DEAR PROFESSOR WEBB,

I don't know if you expected to hear from me again. But your letter is so kindly and so interesting that I feel moved to say something more. Either of us, I recognise, has a right to break off when he pleases; you because you are in the full tide of work, while I am more or less on the shelf; I, on the other hand, just because I may at any time have to take a complete rest.

There is first something that might help a little, wh. from fear of confusing the sharp principle I have not more insisted on. You know F.H.B.'s famous Essay in E.St. "My station and its duties". Morality (*Sittlichkeit*) as interpreted in this spirit is not what he and I are criticising. The man, in this stage, is not essentially at odds with himself, not discontented and self-condemned. I have always said (what Br. makes certain distinctions hostile to) that it is for him almost equivalent to a form of religion, as in it you get a morality wh. is real for sight, if not in the perfection required by faith. What he and I were attacking was the bare Kantian principle, wh. no doubt had and has many followers, and does seem to me to give rise to the evils (e.g. casuistry) of wh. Hegel accused it, and I knew in the ethical movement how frightfully attractive, and how dangerous as an almost anti-social critical attitude, it was. I was always preaching to my friends and colleagues "If you think you are better than the everyday folk who do the world's work, because you can criticise them, you are jolly well mistaken".

I think practically this attitude might help to reconcile us.

Then I am not yet happy about the relation of faith to works. It is awful cheek of me to seem to pretend to know better than you

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but I thought it was a known and settled thing that you only get real and effective "works"—social or historical progress—where you have religious faith; that the paradox, "to be realised because real" is not a phrase, but the real power of life. Surely the relation is everywhere known and received as real, at least where Christianity is known. I give two quotations.

A T. H. Green Works III. 201. "The distinction (valid for all time) between the individual working as from himself, and working as from God that worketh in him".

B Japan The Spiritual Cry by Miss A. C. Bosanquet (my niece, for 20 years, and still, a missionary in Japan), in Yearbook, pub. by Federation of Xtian Missions, Japan: "A little while ago, educated people seemed to be carried away by ideas of complete moral independence and the sufficiency of their own will-power; the thought of 'Trusting in God', 'receiving his grace' or 'needing a Saviour' repelled them. Of late, there seemed to be more realisation of the failure of efforts to stand aloof from religion, more sense of the interdependence of man on man, of nation on nation, and, to rise higher, of earth on heaven".

Is not this contrast accepted, and is it not abundantly demonstrated that you only get the fullest work where you have the deepest and highest faith. It is a thing Wm. James never seemed in the least to understand, and I could not see why.

I didn't ever think Br.'s "somewhere and somehow" meant any doubt or remoteness! I only thought of it as a conviction that went so immensely *beyond* anything possible for sight, but not failing to include all of this, and more than any sight could possess. In fact, it would never have occurred to me that a conviction like Green's e.g. could ever be put in the scales as regards productive power with that of any Positivist or Progressist. Of course I do think the notions and methods of progress are mainly spiritual, but there I follow Spinoza in his great restatement; you can do from the spiritual aims all and much more than you can do from

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the material aims. Of course therefore I don't look for the same total transformation of life from history that Utopists do. I take it that man on earth is always finite, and therefore can never cease to be imperfect and sinful; and his progress can only be a matter of degree, and must *mainly* lie in learning how to transform and stand above material conditions. I don't think comfort *per se* a great gain, though in helping to kindness and culture it may be valuable. But the secret of man's being must always, I think be elsewhere—in faith. Even e.g. Caird didn't face this, I think, when he spoke of the far off supreme event (after Tennyson). I do think it all-important to face it. As I see it, no advance that leaves man finite can meet his ultimate need.

Are you right about Br.'s "Finite God"? The expression is a shock to me. In Index to Essays he has that heading, but it gives two references wh. are passages of the most savage irony *against* the doctrine. You refer to the relation to the Absolute? But I don't think it carries that inference—the human divine unity is infinite, I should say, always. About this, you have no doubt thought, but I just mention it; if you are going to make God = the Absolute, He must include man, as the A. includes *everything*. Can you conceive that, especially with a personal God? Even we find our main difficulty, I should suppose, in equating God and the Absolute, at this point, though to a great degree we treat God's will and Man's as one. But it seems to me final that nothing can fall outside the Absolute.

You know Green's "Sermons"?¹ I am very devoted to them.

Now I must stop, with many thanks for your gentleness in argument.

Yours v. sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

P.S. I didn't say anything about Naturalism. I don't think it important; the universe is so obviously experience, and it must

¹ Edited with preface by Arnold Toynbee in 1883, long out of print. They will be found, but without the preface, in *Works*, vol. iii, pp. 230 ff.

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all be of one tissue. I don't think we should be surprised at not knowing how; but I entertain no doubt that the values are in it on the whole as they are for us, with the relative difference you would expect. Anyone who seriously tries to hold on to the whole must feel sure of that I think.

LETTER CIX

WALNUT TREE HOUSE

MARSTON

NR. OXFORD

Jan. 27, 1923

DEAR MR. BOSANQUET,

This scrap is not intended as an answer to your letter of the 15th. which I did not indeed expect but welcomed all the more on that account. But, beside thanking you for it, I thought I would say about my attribution of a doctrine of a "finite God" to Bradley that I knew it was paradoxical in the sense that the phrase *suggests* a quite different kind of philosophy of religion from his. But I had already done this in "God and Personality" (my first Gifford book) pp. 132, 3 (last 2 pp. of Lecture v) and in Lecture vi. and had there also ventured to distinguish your view from his (pp. 132, 142) and in my other Gifford volume ("Divine Personality and Human Life") I suggested also (p. 252 foll.) that a certain difference wh. I thought there was between your tone and his about "individual immortality" was connected with this difference. I daresay I have simply misunderstood but I have sometimes wondered how far you would recognise any distinction between your attitude and his toward the question of the relation of the object of Religion to that of Metaphysics, despite the agreement in your express statements on the subject. But I have no right to press you about this: I only mention it apropos of my connecting the phrase "finite God" with Bradley: for which I should have apologised if I hadn't done it before!

I was very glad to hear from Muirhead that you had promised to write an account of your philosophy for his proposed book.

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I have been rash enough to do the same; but haven't done more than make a start as yet: and am dismayed to find how little I have to say—largely, I think, because I am *ὀλιγόπιστος*.

We have lately lost a common friend, I think, in Loch. He was wonderful in his cheerful courage under his infirmities at the end.

Yours sincerely

CLEMENT J. WEBB

The passage in which Webb refers in the above letter to a difference of attitude on the question of individual survival in Bosanquet and Bradley, parallel to that which he thought he found in their attitude to the object of religion is of great interest. "To neither," he had written, "does the evidence of a future life seem strong, still less convincing. To Mr. Bosanquet this appears no matter of regret, and he is satisfied with the confidence which his philosophy gives him in the eternal security in the Absolute of those values whereon our hearts are set. . . . Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, strikes a different note. One perceives that he has a genuine sympathy with desires for personal reunion with departed friends which yet he suspects of an inherent self-contradiction, and yet does not care decisively to shut the door upon the speculations and hopes which he, no more than Mr. Bosanquet, sees his way to encourage." How true all this was of Bradley we have learned recently from the letter which he wrote in May of this same year to Pringle-Pattison.¹ Speaking of his negative attitude to survival in *Appearance and Reality*, he there wrote: "The mood in which my book was conceived and executed was, in fact, to some extent a passing one. I cannot alter the book now, though I would not repeat all of it. And in particular I certainly would not say that 'a future life must be taken as decidedly improbable.'" He goes on to say that "for practical purposes we may come nearest the truth by embracing the idea of a personal survival and progress after death—continued so long as is best for us and for the Whole."

¹ Printed in Barbour's Memoir of him in *Balfour Lectures on Realism*, pp. 144 ff.

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How far Bosanquet would have been willing to make similar concessions it is impossible to say. He was too ill to reply to the above letter. It is likely enough that the difference to which Webb refers would have made itself felt in any reply he might have made. For it is certainly true that with all their deep-seated theoretic agreement there were perhaps no two philosophical writers of the time who contrasted with each other so completely in temperament. However we describe the difference, as that between rationalist and mystic, radical and conservative, simple and complex, classic and romantic, it was a sufficiently striking one. One might almost have reversed with regard to them Carlyle's description of the relation of John Sterling and himself and said that they disagreed in everything but opinion. Yet in the matter of religion there was, I think, one point not referred to by Webb, in which there was a difference of emphasis that went nearer being a difference in opinion than those he mentions, and in which the parts, as above indicated, seemed to be reversed. To Bradley religion was essentially *practical*. He is never tired of repeating it. It consists in the identification of the finite with the divine Will. "The real presence of God's will in mine," he declares, "is a religious truth far more essential than God's 'personality.'" To Bosanquet religion is of course practical, but only in the sense that there is nothing that doesn't both begin and end in some form of activity—if you like, of practice. He is far from confining it to an attitude of the will in the ordinary sense. The essential thing in religion is "absorption in a good such that nothing else matters."¹ The good may be any of the higher values (even, at a lower level, of the lower)—truth or beauty, e.g., as well as goodness. I do not think that it would be difficult to find passages in Bradley to support this view as in the well-known Introduction to *Appearance and Reality*: "Some in one way, some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both

¹ *What Religion Is*, p. 9. See also what he says on the origin of religion in his first Italian article, p. 292 below.

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chastens and transports us. And with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the Deity." But the difference remains and involved Bradley in the difficulty, as he himself was aware,¹ of speaking of Will in a being conceived of as impersonal, from which Bosanquet's view was comparatively free.

Returning to the correspondence, whatever its influence on Bosanquet, we are left in no doubt as to its influence on Webb. In the fine restatement of his philosophy of religion which, he tells us, he was just starting to write, without receding from the general position he had taken up in his Gifford Lectures, he speaks with a new sympathy and appreciation of Bosanquet's. Against Croce, the chief idealist critic of religion as he conceived it, he is content to quote from Bosanquet's letter as conclusive of the whole matter: "The paradox, 'To be realized because real,' is not a phrase but the real power of life"; and, as to the place of faith, "it is scarcely too much to say with Bosanquet 'that you only get zeal and effective "works"—social and historical progress—where you have religious faith' and 'the fullest work where you have the deepest and the highest faith.'"²

LETTER CX

This letter has already been printed in Dr. G. F. Barbour's Memoir of Pringle-Pattison in *Balfour Lectures on Realism* (1933) p. 142. Pringle-Pattison's reply to it has since been found by his son Norman Pringle-Pattison, W.S., who has kindly permitted me to print it below.

13 HEATHGATE

GOLDERS GREEN, N.W.11

Jan. 8, 1923

MY DEAR PRINGLE PATTISON,

I received your new book³ on Saturday, and having a quiet Sunday yesterday, read it through. I don't mean to say, that I can

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 432.

² *Contemporary British Philosophy*, II, p. 352. ³ *The Idea of Immortality*.

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have done it justice in such a rapid reading, but it was so interesting that I could not lay it down.

I think it is very good indeed. On all the points where moral dangers appear to me to lurk in popular views of the great subject, it satisfies me pretty completely. I welcome it, as sound and lofty teaching, and am unfeignedly glad that your great authority and your excellent exposition should be used in helping the public to such conceptions.

You will not of course expect that I should alter my own position, or entirely acquiesce in your representation of it. But I do not expect that I shall recur to the subject in public, mainly because I foresee no special occasion for doing so, and I am very content to leave the matter to the consequences which may emerge from the temper of our times and the general influences at work, including your books and mine, of which yours will be by far the more influential.

If I did return to the subject, there is one point I should stress more than I have done before; and if, as I think you mean to, you return to it, it would be valuable if you would say an explicit word on it. It is the influence, on the general feeling about a future life, of the change from orthodox tradition to modern speculation, and also modern superstition. See *Value and Destiny* 272 ff.¹

When I think of the belief in which I, and I suppose you, were brought up, as expressed by our hymns and liturgy "Who are these arrayed in white" etc I feel that it was a symbolism of something splendid and great, though untenable. Probation was to end with death; by a miracle, one was to be lifted into realisation of close proximity with deity.

That idea I think is going, and must go. Both more spiritual

¹ Where, on the authority of Plato and Hegel, he develops the view that "The longing for continuance is at bottom the longing for the satisfactory whole"—a whole which cannot be conceived as realized in the existence, however prolonged, of the "formal personality which belonged to the proper name of the conscious individual."

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views, as your own teaching about "eternal life", with the effort to banish remoteness and mystery from the idea of the future life, and more material views like those of the "spiritualists", are bringing about an assimilation between "this" life and "the other". With this change, the presumption in favour of conditions of spiritual progress in the other "life", differing in principle from what obtain "here", is tending, it seems to me, to vanish. If we can be as near God in "this life" as in another, it seems to follow that we can be as far from him in another as in this. And in views borrowed from the succession of lives on this earth, there is a strong presumption (in spite of McTaggart) against any transmission of experience or character from one life to its successor. And such views are increasingly influential.

With such an atmosphere as this, I do think our attitude must inevitably change. The certainty formerly offered to hope, is gone. There is nothing anywhere but probation. There are, in a sense, as you suggest, "elect" souls; but who can be confident that he is of the number? I don't know if Jones¹ had dealt anywhere with Browning's lines

"There's a fancy some lean to and others hate"
(Old Pictures in Florence)

but I think they represent a point of view which will become more and more influential.

However, my point is just the new idea of the future wh. seems to me to be gaining ground. If it is what the world is really coming to, so far as it holds to a future I can hardly think it will maintain itself. I think that a view like Bradley's in the conclusion of Truth

¹ On p. 352 of his *Robert Browning as a Philosopher and Religious Teacher* (1891), Henry Jones quotes verses from cantos xv and xvi of *Old Pictures in Florence* (ending, "We are faulty—why not? we have time in store") to illustrate the view, which he ascribes to Browning, that "defects in art, like defects in character, contain the promise of further achievement"—just the opposite, I take it, of the suggestion that Bosanquet finds in canto xxi. So precarious is it often to turn the poets into witnesses in the courts of theory.

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and Reality¹ will replace it. But I wish very much that you would say what you think about it in public;

Yours very truly

B. BOSANQUET

LETTER CXI

16 CHURCHILL

EDINBURGH

Jan. 14, 23

MY DEAR BOSANQUET,

I was much pleased to get your generous letter about my new book. That you should approve of its general spirit and temper—in spite of the difference between our respective ways of stating things—means much to me. I do not think that in our practical attitude to the question we are far apart, if you take mine as stated in the last four pages. I certainly feel that the less one thinks about personal survival, the healthier is one's state—and I do not think one naturally dwells upon the subject at all, so far as concerns one's self. The perennial root of such desire as there is seems to me to be the thought of those whom we have known and loved. And yet I feel most poignantly all that you say on that very point in your wonderfully searching Lect. 9. in *Value and Destiny*.

I do not feel like returning to the subject in the meantime but if I am ever tempted to do so, I will keep that chapter constantly before me as I write, and test anything I may say by comparison with its conclusions. And I should like too to rid myself of the lecture-habit and the idea of an audience. A meditation, a thinking aloud, after the manner of Marcus Aurelius seems the only suitable way of dealing with such questions.

¹ P. 469: "For love and beauty and delight, it is no matter where they have shown themselves, there is no death no change; and this conclusion is true. These things do not die, since the Paradise in which they bloom is immortal. That Paradise is in no special region nor any given particular spot in time and space. It is here it is everywhere where any finite being is lifted into that higher life which alone is waking reality."

The Younger Men

I am impressed by your way of putting the contrast between the old idea of something like a consummation and the modern idea (rather unquestioningly accepted) of continued probation and progress. Discussion would certainly be profitable. Perhaps if we drop the element of consummation we are losing what is speculatively valuable in the idea of immortality. I will certainly ponder what you say, but if any occasion arises, I hope you may still feel inclined to deal with the point yourself more fully than you have yet done in print.

I hope you and Mrs Bosanquet are both well. I am very rarely in London, but next time I am there, I should like to look in upon you at your new and more accessible address.

Yours very truly

A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON

Pringle-Pattison's view on the whole matter is contained in the finely balanced four pages to which he refers: "The idea of immortality has no religious significance and it loses all credibility if we separate it from the idea of eternal life as a realized possession. Apart from such a content, it becomes a sheer incongruity." "There are people," he quotes from Emerson, "who cannot dispose of a day; an hour hangs heavy on their hands, and you offer them rolling ages without end." Nevertheless, he goes on to suggest that the attempt to discard the durational form, bound up as it is with our imaginative ways of thought, may become an affectation. The essential thing is to keep hold of the truth that is thus envisaged, which is that "the hope of immortality" refers to no event in the temporal series like the coming of an eclipse but to "the supreme assertion of spiritual values, above all an assertion of the infinite value of the human soul that has realized its vocation and entered into its heritage."

How far Bosanquet would have acquiesced in condoning the use of temporal metaphors may be doubted. He was singularly averse to compromises, and his appeal in all that he wrote was characteristically, not to what A. E. Taylor modestly calls the

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Mittelmensch in himself but to "the reasonable faith of resolute and open-minded men."¹ In a letter to Mrs Bosanquet after the death of her husband, Mrs Gilliland Husband, an intimate friend of both, quoted a remark he once made to her in conversation on survival: "We have Browning's *Prospice*. The poets have the deepest insight." But this was "years ago." In later years I cannot help thinking that, if he had quoted this poem, his sympathies would have been more with its courageous defiance of the pains of death in the middle of it, and with the last words "with God be the rest" than with the temporal hope "I shall clasp thee again." Yet there remains this to be said, that he would never have been prepared to admit that any experience in the life of the soul as a merely natural being can touch its real life as something supra-natural, and he was, I believe, prepared to the end to quote Nettle-ship's saying, "Don't bother about Death; it doesn't count."²

¹ See *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 30.

² See *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 36.

PART VI

ITALIAN IDEALISM AT CLOSE QUARTERS

"I have a strong feeling that we are really, in truth fighting, on the same side, and that your attività and my nisus to the whole are different aspects of the same impulse and experience."

WE read in his wife's short account of his life (p. 139) that, true to his determination to devote his last years to putting himself in touch with the ideas of the younger men, Bosanquet was led, after the completion of his article on Croce's Aesthetic (see above p. 196), to read widely in the more recent Italian philosophy (now dominated by Gentile); that in doing so he was struck by the deplorable lack of interchange of ideas between Italian and English thinkers;¹ and that with characteristic energy he embarked on the attempt to remedy it by approaching the editors of *Mind* and some of the Italian journals with a view to having reciprocal reviews of English and Italian books; that his overtures met with a cordial response on both sides, and that he soon found himself inundated with more books than he could read, not to speak of reviewing, and sometimes involved in correspondence with their authors that gave occasion to lengthy explanations and equally lengthy rejoinders on their part.

The more he became absorbed in these private discussions the more he became inspired with the desire to appeal in print to a wider Italian audience on behalf of what he was convinced was a more inclusive and therefore a truer point of view than that which was represented by Gentile and his school. With characteristic energy and courage he nerved himself to write an article for Gentile's own *Giornale Critico* on Armando Carlini's recently published book, *La Vita dello Spirito*, which was generally recognized as summing up the teaching of Italian idealism.² In this book the author had raised precisely the point which seemed to Bosanquet to go to the root of the difference of their several philosophies in the distinction there made between Nature as something "already

¹ In spite of the pioneer work of such writers as Wildon Carr, J. A. Smith, and others.

² In noticing it for *Mind* (January 1922), Wildon Carr wrote of it: "If any one wants to be introduced straightway into the motive, aim, and direction of the philosophical movement—perhaps best described by linking together four names, Bergson, Blondel, Croce, Gentile, he will find no better propaedeutic than this."

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constituted," "created," "past," and mind or spirit as "constitutive," "creative," bent on an "ought to be" which lay in the future. This dualism was one which, as the denial of any living spirit in the world of Nature, a true idealism, as he conceived it, was pledged to oppose, and it was under the title of "La distinzione di natura e spirito" that he decided to launch his challenge. In a second article with the title "Il Naturalismo e la Filosofia del Tusso" he replied to Carlini's criticism of the first.

In the first of the two sections which follow I have printed his letters to his Italian friend Sig. Vivante in extenso; Vivante's replies I have rendered in somewhat condensed form without, I hope, doing injustice to them. In the second section, after much hesitation, I have contented myself with giving résumés of the articles he wrote for the *Giornale Critico*,¹ as also of Carlini's replies to them, trusting that readers of Italian who feel the importance of the issue, which is nowhere more clearly and simply stated, will have no difficulty in obtaining access to the originals.

¹ March 1922 and March 1923.

§ i. LOGIC AND ETHICS

LETTER CXII

THE HEATH COTTAGE
QUEEN'S DRIVE
OXSHOTT
SURREY

ENGLAND

Feb. 5, 1920

DEAR SIGNOR VIVANTE,

I deferred answering your kind letter till I should have carefully read through your book "*Principii di Etica*".¹ This I have now done, and have found in it great interest and much instruction. I have, indeed, much more to say, about it and about your letter, than I can reasonably say in a manuscript communication. I could not expect you to read many pages of my bad writing. Partly for this reason, I am asking Macmillan and Co to send you a recent little book of mine "*Some Suggestions in Ethics*" which may give you, if you care to read it, some idea of conceptions in which I seem to start from different bases to those which you adopt; especially this is so about "altruism", on which I will therefore say no more just now.

I agree to a great extent with what you say in your letter about the general value of Croce's position in the significance he attributes to words in their spiritual power, and I am glad, that, while believing in the reality of creative activity, you differ from Bergson in avoiding his unfortunate dualism. I most heartily share the view of "*Principii*" p. 6.

With regard to the comment in your letter on Croce's distinction between *Logica*, *Pratica*, and *Estetica*, I agree thoroughly that his

¹ Noticed by Bosanquet in the July *Mind* of this year, where he describes Lello Vivante as "thoroughly with Croce and Gentile in their creationism" but as "an original writer," and writes: "I do not at all deny that idealists have much to learn from the energetic and uncompromising attitude of these great Italian thinkers; and naturally I believe that all who are not idealists have *very* much to learn from them."

application of it to art, dividing the artistic expression into "imagination" and "practice", would be intolerable to any artist. But I cannot quite go with you in condemning the distinction itself. While admiring your lively sense of the unity of thought and action, I cannot agree that *any* unity can be truly apprehended if its essential differences are not at the same time grasped; and I complain of Croce not that he distinguishes too much, but that he fails to distinguish rightly and fundamentally the members of the spiritual universe.

And I fear that I differ from you in principle on the principle of "creation" itself, while assenting, as I said at first, to your love of unity and significance in activity. This (besides "altruism") is the second great doctrine on which I must part company with you. I hold it to be the crux and final test of all philosophy to grasp *both* aspects of the truth on this matter, and I give one or two references to the English writers whom you quote, in case you should care to pursue the matter further in their pages. Green Prolegomena sect. 308. Bradley Essays on Truth and Reality p. 383¹ (a very thorough analysis of the limits of the idea of "making"). My own Principle of Individuality and Value p. 327 and following pages.

I venture to take as an example your own Principii p. 12. What you there say of the artist and of the writer is, I think, *prima facie* true, and you would find that Bradley admits it to be so. But the crux is here, is it not?, that in each case the opposite is also true and quite undeniable. If you told any artist that his "creation" was *not* a revelation of beauty already inherent in the universe—not a revelation of pre-existing reality, he would beyond any doubt reply "Then I have failed". And if you yourself were convinced that what you have written was not true before you wrote it and independently of your writing it, then you would at once admit that what you had written was false. The idea of making is limited. You can bring into temporal existence the eternal values, but you cannot make them to be what they are. You cannot make beauty

¹ He meant 342 esp. n. 2.

Italian Idealism at Close Quarters

beauty, or truth true. You can only unveil, "re-veal", them. "Making" can only affect temporal existence.

This I hold to be fundamental in all experience and in Logic. The vice, e.g. in nearly all modern French thought, and, I fear in Croce, lies in never having apprehended the nature of difference in identity, so that novelty and logical necessity are held to be reciprocally exclusive, whereas really they cannot exist apart. The old example is enough. In $7 + 5 = 12$, 12 must be *in* $7 + 5$, or the proposition would be false; it must be a new creation, or the proposition would not be instructive. Bergson follows Tarde and other writers of the kind, who have no idea of logic.

But I am writing at too great length. I greatly admire your p. 122 in *Principii* and go most heartily with you in it, and have nothing but admiration for Italy in this juncture.

One thing more. Some of your technical terms are difficult to a foreigner, who does not know all the associations of your words, especially "assunzione infinita", to which you attach so much importance.

"Assumption", to us, means, first, something like hypothesis, postulate, (Meinong's "Annahme"). But, I take it, that is not your usage at all. You mean by it perhaps "a taking-in" "taking up" (I remember the phrase *Assunzione della Vergine Maria*) "inclusion" perhaps "implication". You mean that the subject in its fulness, indeed, that everything wh. has life, involves implies or potentially includes, infinity? I see (p. 219) that the subject in its particularity has no "assunzione". I am quite in sympathy with this idea.

"Esigenza" means "demand"?

As to the significance of art for philosophy, I believe, and have maintained in my *History of Aesthetic*¹ that modern objective idealism sprang out of the aesthetic doctrines formulated by Goethe, Schiller and others between 1870 and 1900; beauty being the one obvious synthesis and the completest type of reality.

I wonder if you know Bradley's "Ethical Studies" (1876). Unfortunately, he would never reprint it; I hope it will be reprinted

¹ See esp. 441 f., and cp. *Science and Philosophy*, xxii.

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soon. To me it is the greatest modern book on Ethics, as he is the greatest living philosopher (to me, I mean).

This is really intolerably long; with kindest regards

I am yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CXIII

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

ENGLAND

Feb. 18, 1920

DEAR SIGNOR VIVANTE,

I received your letter two days ago, and this morning there arrives Gentile's beautiful book "Pedagogia"¹ in two volumes. I shall value it very highly, and shall begin its study as soon as I have finished my second perusal of your work the "Principii".

I hope you have by this time received my little book about Ethics, which is quite a small thing compared to the splendid volumes you have sent me.

I shall be much interested to hear further from you.

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CXIV

To the same

THE HEATH COTTAGE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

ENGLAND

March 27, 1920

MY DEAR SIR,

This will be a somewhat long letter, I hope that you will not find it much too long. I have no typewriter here, and I am aware that my hand writing leaves much to be desired.

¹ *Summario di Pedagogia come Scienza*, reviewed by Bosanquet along with his *La Riforma della Dialettica Hegeliana* and Vivante's *Principii di Etica* in the July number of *Mind* this year.

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About your shorter letter:—I am very glad that you think we are in agreement on the whole about Altruism. I must confess that I do not much like the *word*. I do not like admitting, as it seems to me to admit, that we, who are members of the body—the spiritual body—of society, or Christ, or humanity, can be in a relation of otherness at all. But waiving that point, I am glad that in substance we agree. On one minor matter I am not sure if I am interpreting your letter right. When you say (page 2) “that this its own intrinsic value cannot be excluded”; and (on p. 4) you observe that I wish that the highest value should be sought “in the objective value of the object of search not in a certain disinterested character of the action itself, a certain kindness and generosity in it etc” this is in both cases, is it not? a reservation on our agreement, to the effect that I do not attach the same importance that you do to the altruistic quality of the action, which is its “intrinsic value” and “kindness” etc. I am not perfectly sure that I have understood the connection of the sentences rightly; but I think this is what you meant. If I have understood right, I agree that the point is a difficult one. A trifling act, which is a proof of love for another, seems to have a value which it could not have if done simply for oneself. This is your point is it not? I should incline to say that the rule of positive value holds even in this, and that the quality of the act must by its direction and nature, show the rationality and sincerity of the love it expresses. I refer to a quotation from Hume, in Green’s *Prolegomena* sect. 247 footnote, which argues that the goodness of an action can never spring from a regard to its goodness; because its goodness is a condition precedent of this very regard. You cannot be kind for the sake of being kind. You must be kind for the sake of the service to the person you are kind to. Otherwise the prior question at once springs up “But was the action, which you did in order to be kind, *really* a kind action? Was there a ground for it in the circumstances of the case?” If not, it was like being brave for the sake of being brave—a fantastic disposition, morally dangerous. But this is only a minor doubt. I am happy to think that in the main we agree.

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I am grateful for your explanations of "assunzione" and "esigenza". I hope that now I understand them.

With regard to your longer notes, I will return to them directly. But first, I think, it may be helpful if I say a little, in the way of gossip or description, about the general philosophical situation as I have been led to see it, and as to the position from which, therefore, I approach a movement like that of your great Italian thinkers—say, Gentile, with whom, I take it, you sympathise on the whole. If we could have *met* for an hour or two, we should soon see how we stand. But as it is, I do not know how far the position and traditions from which I have learned, are familiar to you; and vice versa, of course, your own are an unknown quantity to me.

I was very glad to learn that you are in possession of Bradley's principal works (I don't know if you have the "Principles of Logic" which he never reprinted—he is just now working at a new edition of it). I do not know how far you have found in them anything that satisfies you; but I gather, from something in the *Principii di Etica*, that you are dissatisfied with a good deal in them.

Now, I am a follower of Bradley, though I was a pupil of Green and still value his work very highly. But Bradley's system is very complete and original, though founded on a very profound study of Hegel. In the English-speaking world of philosophy, I do *not* say that the majority of thinkers agree with him, (for 1. the Realists and Bertrand Russell's party, with 2. the Pragmatists and 3. Bradley's friends divide that world into perhaps three nearly equal parties) but I do say that every thinker would admit him, personally, to be the greatest philosophical genius, and the man with whom all recognise that they have to deal. Since the appearance of *Ethical Studies* in 1876 I have recognised him as my master; and there is never, I think, any more than a verbal difference or difference of emphasis, between us. If you were not told of this situation, you might think me strangely obstinate and perverse in my attitude to your own ideas and to those of your great countrymen. And again, you would not see the reason of my

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feeling that for me to argue fundamentally and at length with you, when you have Bradley's books at hand (and though difficult in places, he is the most brilliant of English writers on philosophy) would be really making you study, in my bad writing, and in inferior form, what you have in your possession in the best possible form, and when you read what I write, you will be apt to say, "But this is only Bradley again", *and so it is*.

Having said this, I am most willing and anxious to do the best I can to facilitate an understanding between us of what we are respectively aiming at in our philosophy. But there is one thing more to mention. I am preparing a study of your own book, together with Gentile's *Pedagogia* (which you so kindly sent me) and his *Riforma d. dialettica Hegeliana*, and a curious English book "Morning Knowledge" by a British officer prisoner in a Turkish camp, wh. is in sympathy with ideas not unlike yours. This will I hope appear in "Mind"—you see "Mind"? but cannot appear there till July at earliest. So I will say something now to show how your "Notes" strike me, while hoping to treat the whole Italian movement more completely, though still shortly (as "Mind" is very full) in July; and in print, which will be better than this dreadful MS.

I am very sorry that by a slip I referred to page 383 of Bradley's "Truth and Reality". This, of course, as you say, was not the passage I meant, which was *op. cit.* p. 342 especially footnote 2, and more largely the whole passage from p. 334 to p. 344 inclusive. In the words of the footnote "The reader perhaps—" to the end of the note, I find the best statement I know of the place of truth in the universe, and the whole passage is for me decisive as to the idea of "creation" in truth, and progress in ultimate reality. One might compare the important passage *Appearance and Reality* ed 2, 499–500 which explains how the illusion is possible. The whole chapter xi in *Tr. and R.* seems to me very valuable.

I do not know what your attitude is towards William James. But one side of your views and Gentile's reminds me of one side of James' thought, and I think that Bradley's note on James'

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Radical Empiricism ("Truth and Reality" 149 ff.) bears on it, especially on p. 153 the distinction between transcendence of experience and transcendence of immediacy. I should lay it down that if transcendence of *experience* is maintained, the universe is cut in half (as by the Kantian doctrine of Ding an Sich). But if transcendence of *immediacy* is *not* maintained, there is no universe at all. Our doctrine of Judgment also bears upon the being of reality. The Real, we hold, is the true subject in every judgment, revealing itself, in the judgment of the particular mind, in accordance with the conditions expressed in the logical subject of the judgment. Everywhere the Real utters itself in and through the mind, but it always utters itself in appearances, and the whole system of appearances is the whole life of the real, wh. never appears, so to speak, in propria persona.

The watchword of our philosophy is not "preexistence" but "the whole". We do not accept time and succession as more than an "appearance"; and if e.g. necessity is to be discussed on the basis of succession involving preexistence (which to us is not an ultimate basis) it is not the succession, but the positive presence of the whole so far as unimpaired by the succession that is important or essential. It is plain that if the succession were complete i.e. if every term were wholly novel, it could make no difference whether A or B had preceded C; there would be no connexion at all. But for us, though succession disguises the connexion, there is, yet present throughout the succession a positive identity of the whole—identity in difference—the other great watchword of our philosophy.

This presence of the whole, and the ultimate reality of the whole which is present in the succession *is* the transcendence of immediacy, and begins so soon as you speak e.g. of the Io at all, for it transcends the immediacy of the "atto"; and it is only by *this* transcendence that all the wealth of the universe is real. For none of it is given in the act of thought or will of a particular consciousness; but all is "implied". Thus what we compare are not a concrete act and a preexisting law but a particular moment of con-

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sciousness, which seems to us, as immediately given, a thin and abstract appearance, with "the whole" implied in it as the whole life of an organism is implied in every pulse-beat of its system. If you compare any judgment with the whole of knowledge (as e.g. my judgment that I can go to Rome implies the reality of the Antipodes) or any personal act of will with the general will uttered in the state (I enclose a paper¹ which illustrates this because it happens to come to me today—it has no bearing on the discussion except just that it illustrates the implication of a transcendence of immediacy) you see at once how the isolated act is abstract and all but meaningless while its significance and value depend on its implications. *All* meaning, indeed, is for us a transcendence of immediacy. This applies to Green's God, and to my Absolute. (Bradley and I do not, as Green does, identify God with the Absolute). We take the perfect experience, in which the life of the whole, while preserving contradictions overcomes them, to be a transcendence of immediacy of the same kind as the reality of the State, or humanity, or the Antipodes, of the I; and if the perfect experience is denied, we hold that these—the I, for instance—must all be denied also, and we should be left with the momentary and meaningless passage of images. There could be no thought; for thought, we hold, is essentially directed to an object which transcends immediacy. The dialectic which carries us to the Absolute seems to us wholly without a break.

Bradley is often attacked as Agnostic and even as maintaining the Ding an Sich by critics who, we think, confuse the two transcendencies (see *Appearance* 173., 183); and I confess that I am inclined to see something like this confusion in Gentile's position. For us, any total novelty or total creation, means something cut loose from the whole; and this of course means not life but death. The temporal and self-creative aspect, which is undoubtedly a genuine *appearance*, is only free from self-contradiction if we understand that in the "si fa" it is the whole which creates in

¹ Presumably "The Notion of a General Will," which appeared in the January number of *Mind* this year. See end of letter.

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virtue of the pervading life which it is. To consider any particular as self-creative would, for us, at once be a split and a wound in the living Universe. Gentile contrasts analysis and synthesis. But there is no contrast. They are absolutely inseparable.

It seems to us a mistake to look for the real in any one aspect of the complex system of appearances which *is* the *spirit*. The act of thought seems to us to have no prerogative over will and beauty and religion, in all of which alike the spirit lives, but none of which, by itself, reveals the whole. The nature of the spirit, in the Italian view, seems to me much too narrow. So, for us, Ruggiero, does not grasp the position of modern philosophy.¹ He sets against a life which is a true infinity, including all contradictions along with their solutions, the pre-Hegelian demand for a false or unending infinity, wh. is a mere continuation of the finite—the fate of Tantalus. But I must stop. I hope you may manage to read all this;

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

I enclose the paper on Will, which happens to come to me this morning, merely as an illustration of what I mean by implication, and the greater concreteness of “the whole” as contrasted with the immediate.

I am sorry the letter is so *very* long.

LETTER CXV

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

ENGLAND

February 2, 1921

MY DEAR SIGNOR LELLO VIVANTE,

I was delighted and puzzled this morning when I saw the beautifully elegant box in which your joint parents' kindly and

¹ See his *Modern Philosophy* (Eng. tr. 1921), p. 362 in illustration.

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welcome message came to me with its agreeable accompaniment. I return my very best congratulations on your marriage, and my very best thanks for the compliment you have paid me in making the announcement to me.

The little vase, too, is very pretty, and the almonds (which I am not too old to enjoy) are exceedingly good.

It is pleasant to think of you, as a friend in Italy, beginning a new life, as one does with marriage, just when Europe, and especially our two friendly countries are also entering on a new course of life. Things may be hard for a time, and I (I am seventy two years of age) may not see the new world. But you, who are now beginning, will, I am quite sure, live to see a better and happier future and a truer friendship among the nations.

Will you be good enough to convey my warmest thanks and congratulations to your parents and to Signor and Signora de Bosis? And especially above all to your wife, whose name Elena is that of my wife also, pray communicate my heartiest good wishes for her happiness and prosperity.

Yours very sincerely with kindest regards

BERNARD BOSANQUET

LETTER CXVI

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

July 8, 1922

DEAR SIGNOR VIVANTE,

I have now, as my last letter will have indicated to you, a second copy of your *Intelligenza nell' Espressione*.¹ You might prosecute me for what we call here "obtaining an object of value under false pretences". At first I thought I would at once return

¹ *Della intelligenza nell' espressione*, Rome, 1922, Eng. tr. by Professor Broderick-Bullock, with a foreword by H. Wildon Carr (1925), who explains that Vivante "has been largely influenced by his reading of English philosophers, particularly the works of Mr. Bradley and the late Mr. Bosanquet."

the second copy. Then, when I saw you had written my name in it with such kind expressions, it occurred to me that you might prefer that I should keep it, and be able to make it available (though I shall not part with it) for any English friend who might wish to know more of Italian thought. I am very grateful for it.

I do not know if you have read my last book "Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy", nor do I remember if I sent it to you. If you have not received it, please send me a postcard, and I will send it you. You refer to the old instance $7 + 5 = 12$, which is the title of a chapter in it; but I am not sure that your reference has anything to do with my book.

I have read your book with very intense interest, and bearing in mind what you tell me of an expression of mine which has had influence upon it. It would require an immensely long communication to do any justice to it; and I will begin by referring you to places in books which probably you know, but which will express my views more fully than is possible in a letter. . . .

I do not know whether you see the Times Literary Supplement, but I enclose a leader on Shelley, by Mr. Clutton-Brock, a distinguished critic, the marked passages in which show, to my mind, how near the belief in the Absolute, and that in the Life of Life, are together; or rather how inseparably they are bound up with one another. Do not return it. . . .¹

I have a strong feeling that we are really in truth fighting on the same side; and that your *attività* and my "nisus to the whole" are different aspects of the same impulse and experience. But I do not conceal from you that I find your book a little difficult. You dislike *explaining*, do you not? You are afraid of reducing an experience to dead data by analysis. So that Bradley's attitude to activity in the place I refer to may even shock you. To me, on

¹ In *The Times Literary Supplement* of July 6, 1922, Clutton-Brock describes Shelley as "the poet of Platonism, the one writer besides Plato who can make it beautiful." In his poetry, "The Absolute becomes the Life of Life, the child of light whose limbs are burning through the vest that seems to hide them"; for him "the Absolute was not a word but a world, and a wind blew from it laden with its scent."

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the other hand, the repetition of synonyms "intrinsecità", a priori, infinità and so on, is a little trying. I look for a development of structure, and do not feel happy without it. Partly this is the fault of a foreigner, who doubtless fails to appreciate the subtler shades of your language. But I think it also marks a difference between us. For me, to explain is not to reduce to causes or conditions, but to think in terms of the whole, and I cannot be satisfied with any experience which has not been so thought.

The quotations from Parodi will lead me up to a remark which illustrates our difference. I do not know his work otherwise; but to me he writes (in the quotations) like a man who has barely learned to read in the world of logic. If he had really learned to read, he would recognise that the verbal expression of an argument is posterior, and not anterior, to the argument itself; and that in reading, say, a syllogistic argument, it is a matter of course to grasp it in the sense which he describes as a sort of climax. So that (and this is my point) in calling it a "veritable intuition", he is insisting on an antithesis between it and something different—the verbal analysis of the thought—which from a deficient understanding of the nature of the word and sentence he fancies to exist, but which really has no existence at all *in logic*, that is, for anyone who is trained to read a logical argument—a facility which is not acquired without many years of arduous thought and practice.

Then, my further point is, having thus erected an unreal antithesis, he exploits it in order to invest his idea of thought, with qualities—those of a mere intuition—meant to justify the antithesis and be justified by it; so that the orderly structure and necessity of the thought disappear in his insistence on the single and immediate quality of the intuition. But of course it is an immediate which includes mediation; it is the self-development of a subject into a structural whole, whose necessity lies in its character as a structural whole. The mediateness and immediacy do not disagree, but involve each other.

I confess that I feel something of the kind about your *attività* and *novità*. I agree with you that all is activity and in one aspect

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is the ever new act which creates the world. But I miss in your account the structure of the world. I do not see, for example, how the activities of all the thinking persons are identical for you; but surely they *are* all members of one identity, and then at once every activity that can be given in a given mind is transcended by a whole in wh. it is a member, and which is as indisputable in experience as itself and very much more real and intense. I think any philosopher who denies the Absolute ought to explain his view of the State.

And so with your *novità*! I take it as fundamental that every experience is an identity in diversity. But you are so anxious to protect your *novità* against analysis, as it seems to me, that you whittle away the element of identity or continuity and attempt to preserve only the element of difference. But thus, I should urge, you annihilate the experience, and emulate Mr Bertrand Russell, who has been saying in his *Analysis of Mind*, that a man's face as a continuous whole is not a reality, but only the successive particulars which we see in it in moments—infinitesimal I suppose—are real facts. It has often been tried; but surely to establish a present which includes no past is a sheer self-contradiction.

About implication. Perhaps your language brings "implication" nearer to "implicit" than ours does. For us, no doubt, a thing may be only implicit, in the sense of latent or potential; and this as you hint is a fruitful source of fallacy. But a thing which is "implied"—as the 3rd angle of a triangle is implied in the other two—or as one end of a finite straight line implies the other—certainly has as good an existence as that which implies it. "Implication" means that everything is more than is given within it, and, starts you on a course of development wh. you cannot arrest before reaching the Absolute.

I must break off, this is much too long. Please tell me if you have "*Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*". With very many thanks for your books and letter; I am

Yours very sincerely

BERNARD BOSANQUET

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LETTER CXVII

(*From the Italian, abbreviated*)

Dated (end of July 1922?)

GENTILISSIMO PROF.^{RE},

I have read your volume "Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy" and once more your letter. I will reply to you with some considerations which have been suggested to me in the course of my reading of the book.

P. 21 "The judgment of which you make an object is no longer a judgment whole and entire" . . . "while you judge it (cognate accusative) and in judging it your activity is completely absorbed; it is one and indivisible" etc. cp. 11, 24, 25.

This unity of intelligence and the intelligible, and the conception of the truth which is lost except in the absolute, and here in particular the passages which I have quoted are examples of that fine, high, analytic and comprehensive investigation which has attracted me to the philosophy of Bradley and yourself. I mean above all the investigation of what Bradley calls "immediate experience", what you call, it seems to me, simply and without qualification thought, what I call activity, thought, final and actual value (entelechy). In this rigorous analytic investigation more than in any psychological one it is clearly seen that true psychology is, and cannot but be, philosophy and that it is called psychology only through ignorance.

P. 33.¹ The absolute (by which I mean the intolerance of any limit or contradiction) is in the activity at every moment;

¹ Where Bosanquet is criticizing the "absoluteness of self-creation ascribed by Gentile to the ego because we are supposed to be dealing with the transcendental self" as inconsistent with his admission that the so-called real world of the empirical self, including its discursive thought, offers an unstable basis. Vivante's reply is to interpret Bosanquet's ideas of the whole in the sense of a frozen and inert totality of existing things excluding all real change, instead of in terms of what he himself says of the identifiability of the real universe or whole with one and the same system of eternal values, as an intrinsic demand of our thought.

rather it is the activity at every moment. The attempt to define it as a larger or smaller sphere of experience not only takes us nowhere (as it seems to me), but corresponds to a materialistic tendency in those who require to see, grasp and define the spirit in actual forms, instead of looking for it in the intimate experience in which we have originality, reality and certainty. . . . The totality of all, literally all, existing things is never as I hold definitive, not only because even a wave of the sea adds something to the sea (as you don't seem to believe) and even a "revelation" is an addition, but above all because the identification of the universe or the whole with one and *the same eternity of values and relations* is an intrinsic demand of thought and activity, and does not depend on any consideration of persistent value in the universe or on the fact that actually there is a connection of all with all.

P. 144. "the life of its infinite context". P. 112. "that continuous life and unity". The word "life" has a definite meaning. I dislike its translation from philosophy into poetry, and its application to forms which only feign life, or to unities which have not truly the unity of life.

P. 197-8 "thought must be said to have its habitat primarily in the objective order and only secondarily in the individual".¹

P. 170 "(the) universal mind" "(the) all-inclusive experience". We know up to a certain point what kind of thing thought is: the principle of individuation and of universality i.e. of principles and relations, combining liberty and necessity, synthesis and rigour of analysis, non-contradiction and responsibility to the whole, form and matter, necessity of principles and concreteness of expression. To renounce a profound, rich, intense notion of what thought is (viz. activity, spirit) is certainly to throw overboard the treasure of philosophy. To speak of soul and thought in the universe, or in this or that world, in the same breath as of thought in the individual; to speak of activity (thought, will etc) collectively, as if it were the activity of individuals in a new value and in new

¹ In reality a quotation from Haldane's *Reign of Relativity*.

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forms of necessity and universality, language so crude and false is repugnant to you, and I do not attribute it to you. But a certain tendency in this direction seems to me to show itself in this volume where you have developed the part of your philosophy which seemed to me secondary and was less convincing to me. I seem to see a too facile treatment of objectivity, a too affectionate brooding over something which has not, and cannot be known to have, the unity of life.

(P. 44) In Hamlet (you seem to say) there is more reality than in a thousand individuals of flesh and bone (not I presume than in Shakespeare when Hamlet sprang from his brain and he was Shakespeare and Hamlet in one). We cannot dispose of living creatures so easily! For my part I should in that case have to throw my Principles of Ethics with all their implications and all I know—which would not be any great thing—into the fire.

$7 + 5 = 12$. The union of agreement and difference in reality, which you condense in this formula and the value of which does not escape me, is obvious. Nevertheless my own view, as expressed in my book, is that eternal, ever necessary identity, only exists in so far as it is intuited, or in so far as the activity or the subject in which it is supposed to be exists; determinate value or relation only exists in so far as it is thought, or seen in existing things, and its necessity cannot be made into an entity.

(P. 217) "If (any) one asserts that he knows the universe to be ultimately in change and in time, he must face the question of the kind and degree of its unity, or conservation of values; when he has given an account of this, it will be time enough to ask whether the change he affirms is a revelation of the unity he believes in, or a derogation from it. The problem, I repeat, is the central crux of philosophy". It is a satisfaction to me that the last words coincide with what I say myself (*Dell. int. nell' espressione* p. 90); "a derogation from it". I too reject that idea, rather that error, in the sense that it involves a failure to consider the full significance of the constancy of principles. Rather than "derogation" I would say "revelation" (though I prefer "creation",

"novelty", since the necessity is in the novelty not vice versa); but to say so is not enough, the revelation requires interpretation.

(P. 175-6) "The universe, the whole does not change". This proposition upsets all my ideas of reality. I maintain e.g. that the future cannot be anticipated; otherwise the idea and feeling of freedom, responsibility, guilt, activity, etc. would be inexplicable errors. And when you seem to me to reply to all these grave problems by saying that *possibility* "indicates a determinate condition, which, if completed in a certain way . . . would carry a certain consequent (p. 180)", and not another, I really do not believe my ears. It seems to me only too obvious that even a "revelation" more or less changes the whole. It is a further surprise when I read that by such a proposition you do not mean what it seems obviously to mean, but that "the whole can be said to change only *if it departs from its unity of character and value*" (cp. 181, 188; 192, 211.). Reduced to this the idea of change *would* seem to vanish. Who pretends that the whole changes its nature?

P. 205. "the extraordinarily restricted and arbitrary type of evolution with which the ultimate self-alteration of reality is identified by them". It seems to me that the work of philosophy is to seek to know reality where perhaps it is given to know it best and where it has most to say to us, i.e. in the forms of life, and in the forms of life which are nearest to us, and that is in the forms of thought, allowing it to show new connections unforced or less forced into artificial concepts, rather than to throw out fine nets and pretend to grasp the universe with them. The union with the whole pushed to such a point seems to me to correspond to a eudaemonistic demand savouring of optimism rather than of truth.

Odious and difficult comparisons! I do not wish to go further in this line. I will say to you instead what seems to me the principal thing as regards yourself, and what makes some conceptions and affirmations, which do not convince me, less strange: some titanic and mystical power (though in a different sense from the ordinary

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one) not Greek rationalism makes you seem like the prophets who said things at once true and untrue—true if one considers the cosmic force which moves you to say them, untrue if one considers the letter of the words and even their ordinary sense, and the particular arguments through which truth wells up after long obscurely necessary circles.

“Parodi” you say “would recognise that the verbal expression of an argument is posterior, and not anterior, to the argument itself”. “Verbal expression” is ambiguous: I will say the “intuition”. Now no one maintains that the intuition of an argument is anterior to the argument itself. The argument and the intuition are inseparable. It seems to me impossible to make the necessity of the argument a reality by itself apart from the intuitions or from the application of it. I can understand how you can reproach Parodi with an insufficient consideration of the moment of necessity; but it seems to me odd that you do not appreciate an investigation so delicate and serious of philosophical problems relating to the moment of freedom.

As to the books to which you refer me I cannot now profit by them as I have not got Bradley’s here, and I do not possess yours on *The Principle of Individuality and Value* which lately was exhausted.

I have addressed you as an equal without regard to the difference of authority and standing, because I do not know how otherwise to speak, and believe that thought and the living power of truth and of argument always drives us to that. I have written to you in pursuance of the effort to overcome my own lamentable limitations, and to come to a better understanding with you by responding to the demand which, like the *absolute*, and like the seriousness that nature puts into all her works, and that I should like to be mine, is in every moment of activity. Please accept my respectful greetings.

Yours

L. VIVANTE

VILLA DE BOSIS, PIETRALACROCE (ANCONA)

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The effect upon Bosanquet of Vivante's long letter was to convince him that no progress in their discussion could be made by taking isolated points of attack or of defence so long as there remained, like a wall between them, the failure to realize the fundamental distinction between thought as submission to the teaching of experience and the processes which are its psychical accompaniment. It seemed therefore to him that he would best show his respect for his correspondent as well as make clear the view he had himself arrived at in a life's work on the subject in the form of a memorandum on the views of Parodi as quoted in Vivante's book with approval. The quotation is from D. Parodi's *La Philosophie Contemporaine* (1919). It is too long to reproduce here. The sentences specially referred to by Bosanquet are: "En tirant la conclusion d'un syllogisme je suis libre par ce fait même qui j'ens comprends la nécessité; je la comprends, donc je ne la subis pas, mais je l'accepte, je la reconnais, j'y acquiesce; les prémisses ne me restent pas extérieures, c'est-à-dire contraignantes; mais saisies par l'esprit elle sont dominées, comprises par l'acte synthétique même où je les confonds en leur conclusion. . . . À chaque pas d'un raisonnement la liaison même des idées qui constitue la démonstration n'est pas démontrée elle même, mais est perçue, saisie, sentie come realable, come nécessaire, comme évidente." The reference to will and motive occurs in what Parodi says of the place of attention in keeping the terms together in their relation to one another and preventing the "growing exteriorization to one another" which would result in that which determines as being "moins des raisons que des impulsions, moins des motifs que des forces" which "draw without convincing us." The memorandum is interesting as a fuller statement than that in the article in *Contemporary British Philosophy* (vol. i, p. 66 ff.) of the view he had come to hold of thought as the control of subjective processes by the nature of things. It is his anxiety to emphasize this as against Vivante that makes him seem to the reader to be somewhat straining the difference between himself and Parodi on the main point.

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MEMORANDUM

PARODI ON FREEDOM, IN LEONE VIVANTE'S *DELLA INTELLIGENZA NELL' ESPRESSIONE*, p. 116 ff.

I will take for explanation my attitude towards the citations from Parodi on p. 116 ff., my estimate of which was found surprising.¹ My object is merely to explain myself; the point of view which caused me to write as I did.

I start, then, with a certain conception of the relation between thought and the mental or psychical process in general. It is, in my view, a peculiar relation, and demands attentive consideration. Thought (for those of us who hold these ideas) may be described as the control exercised over psychical process by the object. The object, in experience, we take to be that connected and persistent body of experience which signalizes itself by guiding and modelling the psychical process in general. Thought is taken to operate through what used to be called the laws of Association, including inhibition, though its nature was stated falsely (as a relation of particulars), and incompletely in not recognizing its adaptation to varied stimuli. The control appears most strikingly in the phenomena of inhibition, when the coherent mass of experience disappoints our expectations, and affirms other suggestions which agree with its own demand. An expectation, raised by Association and disappointed by experience, drops away, as we know, and leaves our psychical process in some new and modified form. This is what takes place, e.g. in the formation of every theory, and is what we chiefly mean by calling thought the control exercised by the object over psychical process. The object selects and affirms suggestions, ideas, and appearances, which will fit in with its own coherent whole, and rejects and negates what is discrepant with it.

There are then, in my opinion, two things to be kept in view, thought, and the whole mental process. The former appears in the latter; but there is much in the latter which is irrelevant and misleading as compared with the former. Our thought proper is always attended by psychical imagery, fancies, expectations, and suggestions, which are irrelevant and therefore misleading, and have to be inhibited—rejected or remodelled—if the course of thought proper is to be pursued.

Now to consider Parodi's attitude. His primary point is, is it not? that conditions do not of themselves furnish and produce their conse-

¹ Letter CXVII, p. 275 above.

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quents, that premisses do not of themselves supply their conclusions, and motives do not of themselves produce volitions. Therefore, I understand him to urge, the thinker or the mind (in the case of actual conditions you might say the agent in nature or in history) does something with the conditions or premisses, and the will does something with the motives, or adds something to them, by which they are transformed into their consequences (in fact), into their consequents (in logic), into their conclusions (again in logic), and into a moral act (in volition). And in this operation or transformation there is activity of the agent (in fact or in volition), or of the thinker (in logic); and in this activity the agent or thinker (for shortness we may confine ourselves to the thinker) is "free" and his action may be described as it is in the two paragraphs—"Libre, parce que" and "En tirant la conclusion"—on p. 117 of Signor Vivante's book.

P. 119 suggests to me the same point of view. There is, it seems to urge, in the act of thought something unaccountably self-evident, self-contained. I understand this to be connected with its alleged unique and specific quality, intuition in the sense of a particular insight, originating, as it were, from a particular grace, peculiar to the individual mind.

Now this point of view, as expressed on p. 117, is led up to by the sentences beginning "Il y a toujours dans la synthèse—la pensée ou la volonté—elles n'en sont la simple addition," etc. And what I cannot help feeling is this. What he speaks of as an analysis into a series of elements that is less than the synthesis, is to my mind *eo ipso* a plainly false analysis. It consists, surely, in taking factors which within the course of thought are conditions or premisses, or in that of will are motives, and isolating them from that total thought or will, in which alone they have this character, and then treating them, just because thus isolated, as devoid of this character, i.e. as not capable by themselves of furnishing consequents or conclusions or moral acts. But then, the analysis becomes false. That is to say, it is not the analysis of the object which is before us in the synthesis—the object constituted by thought or by the willing self. It is the analysis of quite a different object, a mere aggregate of elements in addition or juxtaposition. It is the analysis offered by Goethe's pedantic logician, who assures the student

Dass, was er sonst mit einen Schlag
Getrieben, wie Essen and Trinken frei,
Eins, zwei, drei, dazu nōthig sei.

I have dealt with this subject at length in my larger logic (*Logic*, i, p. 97 ff., 1st ed.—Ed.). I take there the instance of a watch. If you break

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up a watch into its parts, and destroy it, that is not an analysis *of the watch*. Suppose you hold up the mainspring, and say, "Why, this is a spring!" In doing this, you are not treating it as a factor in the analysis *of a watch*. To do that you would have to say: "I recognize this spring as the mainspring *of a watch* and one of such and such a make, etc." That is to say, your analysis cannot be true as an analysis, unless it includes the synthesis, just as your synthesis cannot be true unless it includes the analysis.

To apply this to the paragraphs "Libre——" and "En tirant——"; and for shortness, to speak here merely of premisses and not of conditions or motives. A syllogism does not consist of three parts, viz. two premisses and a conclusion, in their isolation. Thus taken, the premisses are not premisses, and the conclusion is not a conclusion. This division, marked by numbers 1, 2, 3, is a mode of statement which is only of use to impress upon students the *difference between* the course of thought in which these factors really are premisses and a conclusion, and the false analysis in which they are not. The current statement of logical textbooks is a false analysis and has done great harm to logical theory. Every syllogism is a single judgment.

Thus, then, the difference between the isolated steps and the complete argument is the difference between the failure to think and the thought in its full life, not between fragments, data which are premisses, and yet cannot give the conclusions, and something made out of these by a special activity of the thinker, which does give it. There are no premisses if there is no conclusion.

Therefore it seems to me that in reading the paragraphs "Libre——" and "En tirant——" we have two alternatives.

If the "il," "je," and "me" of these paragraphs refer to a thinking subject so far as strictly pursuing the continuous course of thought, then it is true that as such he is free "par ce fait même que j'en comprends la nécessité." This, I should add, is the true freedom which is one side of necessity, and I quite believe that Parodi has in his mind a partial conception of something like this. But his previous words, e.g. "conscient de soi, et de son originalité" and especially "se détache d'elles,"¹ do not suit well with this interpretation, nor do the words "je l'accepte,"² je la reconnais, j'y acquiesce"; they throw the thinker too much outside the thought, as if he were judging his own judgment

¹ Vivante explains in marginal note: "Detaches himself from them as pre-existing moments, when these thoughts or reasons were not yet truly reasons."

² Vivante: "Accept = recognize as premisses."

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in the moment of making it, as a thought placed before his mind, which he is making into something which in itself it is not ("dépasse les raisons")¹ which from my point of view is not a possibility. You cannot judge of the judgment which you are making, i.e. into which the object, which dominates your mind, is shaping itself while you are making it. And on p. 119, as we saw, there are other expressions, "pas démontrée,"² "sentie comme valable," which are not consistent with this interpretation. For this group of phrases appears not to recognize the objectivity of thought. In a psychological sense, indeed, both thought and actual mental process are called subjective; but for logic and philosophy, thought though within the mental process, is objective, and the only subjectivity is that of the irrelevant accompanying psychical process, which thought at every moment controls. Nothing in thought is individual in the sense of particular; it has no originality in the sense of peculiarity, but only the originality of passing beyond what is peculiar, and grasping the common and universal mind, in its concrete fullness. If *we* (the current and peculiar psychical "je" or "nous") interfere in any way, if *we* add anything of *our own* to the development of the object through its own character and qualities, if *we* put anything in the conclusion which was not there in the premisses taken together as a single judgment, then, as we know, the argument is vitiated and the conclusion is logically bad. If we do not believe that the complete course of thought is the same for all rational beings when the same data in the same world are offered—is necessary and objective—then our faith in reason is dead, and we are cut off from the real universe. *We* cannot alter the course of thought by a hair's breadth. The whole effort of science is to avoid the confusion which appears to do so. Our effort is to look on at it, and set aside all interfering factors.

Therefore I must think that the only interpretation which explains Parodi's language and attitude is to take the "il," "je," and "me" in question, not of the act of thought, which can never really express itself as a complete "je," but as the whole of the mental or psychical process, within which thought is a controlling factor, but with which it can never coincide.

Every time that the coherent and self-maintaining object disappoints or modifies our false expectations, beliefs, or fancies, or pronounces our mental imagery irrelevant and subjective in the logical sense, we recognize what it means for mental process to be controlled by thought.

¹ Vivante: "Surpass them for what they were."

² Vivante: "Not mechanically constraining."

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In this sense "je" and "me" are as particular and peculiar as anything can be, and they possess originality in the vulgar sense of contingency and eccentricity; and they have a sort of spurious freedom, the freedom of superficial association and arbitrary imagination, which, in the last resort, may surely be defined as thought the continuity of which has been interrupted. It is so when we slide from the central track of coherent thinking into some accessory and irrelevant consideration which our mere psychical process supplies.

But then, of this "je" and "me" it is no longer true that they "ne subissent pas" the necessity of thought. That is just what they do. Thought is essentially the control of them.¹ They are what in the whole effort of thinking we feel as interference and interruption, what we are perpetually striving to silence and exclude, knowing their admission or intermixture to be a fatal breach in the unity of thinking.

On the other hand, as it seems to me, if the "je" [is the self] whose act is true thought, there is no need for it to add anything or transform anything in order to *make* premisses into a conclusion. In it, premisses and conclusions are one continuous tissue, and out of it there are no premisses. The whole idea of doing something to, making something of, premisses, by adding a conclusion to them, is unmeaning and inapplicable. Thought is the development of an object by the unfolding of its own nature in coherent mental process, and needs no additional manipulation by which any being or agent exhibits freedom in transforming it.

I find, as I said, the same bias on p. 119, a tendency to regard thought as a magical and unaccountable (*pas démontrée*), indecomposably specific and immediate insight; a tendency to insist on it as a miraculous endowment by which the thinker exercises a power of recognizing self-evidence without appealing to anything beyond the isolated connexion which is presented to him.

Consider a little further the phrase "*pas démontrée*" on p. 119. It is meant, I imagine, to emphasize the self-contained and self-evident character of the vision, perception, or intuition, which is thought in its apprehensive act. Now what precisely does it mean? If it means that in the thinking of a necessary nexus there need not be any intercalation of intermediate terms between the terms of the connexion, that of course if true, but to exclude this feature is not to exclude demonstration nor to establish the simple specific immediate self-evident character of the intuition (*véritable intuition*). No doubt the intuition has an immediate

¹ Vivante: "Thought = intrinsicness."

aspect; every inference without exception being a single coherent judgment, possesses that character. But it has also a mediate aspect, open to criticism, and demonstrable in another way than by intercalated terms.

What is demonstration? [In reply, after quoting the witty passage on demonstration in Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, p. 235, "Demonstration in Logic" up to "other kinds of showing," he goes on:] We should not call mere showing in ordinary fact, mere observation, by the name of demonstration. It is demonstration when you show within and by virtue of a *preparation*. It is logical demonstration when the preparation is ideal, when we see or show a new relation of elements in a logical construction.

Now in this sense, which I take to be the right sense, every "liaison des idées" which "constitutes the demonstration" is itself demonstrated. It may not need to have intermediate ideas intercalated between the terms which are in liaison. This is a false idea of proof or explanation. But it does and must need to be exhibited within a logical whole such that if the whole is to be what it is, the liaison must also be what it is; and if the liaison were not what it is, the whole in which it is exhibited would also have to be other than we have taken it to be. The intuition is merely the vision of what the relevant whole inevitably involves. No liaison is, within itself, self-evident, or is a special self-contained act which confers on the liaison a unique quality due to the individuality of the thinker. In principle, every such intuition depends on the support of a coherent system, which, as it extends and reinforces itself, passes into the total system of experience. Any intuition, however apparently evident, may, in wider experience, in a new whole, find itself in conflict with other intuitions equally self-evident at first sight (see Husserl, *Jahrbuch*, 1913, pp. 36-7, cited in my *Implication*, p. 15). I have treated this point at length in my *Logic*, with reference to the Laws of Thought (*Logic*, ii, 229).

To confirm an intuition in the true sense, we never in real life recur to it nor repeat it *per se*; because we know it is not and cannot be self-evident *per se*. Macbeth is the normal type.

"Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling as to sight? Or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation——"

He does not appeal from seeing to seeing itself, but goes, for reinforcement of his seeing, to the *touch* he expects to find if the seeing was genuine. This is the appeal to co-existent correlations, and it is the essence of all intuition of truth. It is this coherence by which the per-

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sistent connected mass of experience controls psychical process; and this control is, as I said, what I at least mean by thought. In such thought the thinker is indeed free, but not in the grand sense of freedom; reality, the object active in thought, as was said of Nature by Bacon, *non nisi parendo vincitur*. It is a rise into the system of the universal which reveals itself in the control which thought exercises. Thus, as I understand the matter, there is simply no meaning in speaking of premisses to which thought, as an activity superadded to them, adds some *nescio quid* in bringing out of them a conclusion. Premisses are premisses only as continuous with the conclusion, and this continuity is not something added by thought as a specific quality, but is the essence of thinking as it operates by its universal laws.

I will illustrate the same point in the case of motives. "La volonté—dépasse—les motifs qui la fondent."

This phrase, from my point of view, must mean precisely the opposite of what I am sure Parodi rightly wishes to express. He desires to express, I believe, that wants only become motives in as far as they constitute a will. But what he says, calls up a picture of wants or suggestions already attracting the will (*already*, or how are they motives?), and over against them a will, not one with any or all of them, and therefore a vacant will, but prepared by some inexplicable magic of its own to *give* force to one or other of the antecedent suggestions. And in this its empty magic is its "freedom," as the "freedom" of thought lay in the empty magic which transformed an aggregate of premisses into a conclusion.

This is what his language "dépasse les motifs" naturally means. You have "motives" lying ready for choice, and the will beyond them, something different, "autre" which "dépasse" them.

I am accustomed to conceive the matter otherwise. Wants or suggestions, for me, only become motives when they are taken up into the will, which is another term for the organized self, or character, or the idea of that in which the man as a whole recognizes his good—that which he aspires to have and to be. This "will," then, is nothing empty, nor apart from, nor beyond, a queue of motives waiting to be chosen. It is the concrete idea of a personal good as constituted by the motives which are made motives by its acceptance and embodiment of them, and is not an unmotivated choice between wants and suggestions, or a mysterious giving of weight to one of these and not to another. The "will," in short, is "the man" conscious of a total purpose. The motives are the opportunities of life as they rank themselves within that purpose and as constituting it, being the particulars of the good which the man

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has taught himself to accept as his ideal self. No separation is possible between will and motive, nor can the one "dépasser" the other.¹

I conclude, then, in explanation of my point of view. Thought and Will are always the self-assertion of the whole concrete experience or human end against imperfect suggestions and wants which arise in mental process. It is true, therefore, as Parodi insists, that if you enumerate factors isolated from the whole and set out side by side, such factors, so enumerated (e.g. physico-chemical reactions in a living body) do not give you the whole (e.g. the life). But it is too common—and I am obliged to think that Parodi falls into the trap—to argue $a + b + c + d$, etc., added together do not constitute W (whole) or, say L (life) or V (volition); therefore there is an activity which is "autre" and "dépasse" them, and is in its result "évidente" though "pas démontrée"; something free and original, though empty (as having no initial preference): and this does something inexplicable to the factors $a + b + c$, by which it makes them into W or L or V; and this is what they mean by Freedom.

I, therefore, from my point of view, think it necessary to offer a *caveat*, to say, in enumerating $a + b + c$, etc., we have falsified the whole. We *can* find these within the whole, but when separately stated they do not represent what they are really in the whole. Thought and Will are just the complete and concrete life of the whole, in which it, as a whole, reveals new qualities, but not by any operation of a special factor called life or thought or will, as Parodi seems to me to say. He seems to me to be in the same class with the old upholders of "vital force," or "an indeterminate free will," or Bergson's "Élan vital" or Hans Driesch's "entelechy." All this springs from the false analysis which says that premisses do not give their conclusion, but require something beyond them to transform them into it. The "whole" is not understood.

Now for me, as I have argued at length in my book, *Principle of Individuality*, all these fallacies depend on the confusion between the determinate and the mechanical. The mechanical, as Parodi describes it, has, I should say, no existence except in inadequate analysis. The true mechanical, i.e. any working mechanism, is always a synthetic whole, as when a "machine" transforms a rectilinear into a rotatory motion. But spontaneity and capacity for variation come not with decrease of determinateness but with the advance in complexity of organization and delicacy of adjustment. "All behaviour, it is safe to assert, is determinate,

¹ Vivante: "Other here means the 'conditions.'" He "can't believe that P. means any contingency or chance."

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and its fine capacity of variation and spontaneity are determined by its delicately complex organization" (Alexander on Natural Piety, *Hibbert Journal*, July 1922). Its novelty comes, not through indetermination, but through the whole, which is a new factor, entering into the processes which, as "not giving their consequents," are conceived apart from it.

This is why I disapprove of the sort of analysis which Parodi offers, and the sort of argument for an additional "free," i.e. empty factor which he bases upon it. The argument, as I said, is much akin to that of Driesch, which I think is now universally recognized to be fallacious.

A concrete thought or a concrete reality needs no help to make it what it is. It differs from summation of parts, because it is a whole which prescribes its own mode of coming together. Life, e.g., is a new quality, arising in some physico-chemical wholes, not in all. But when life has arisen, the whole is not physico-chemical but vital, although it can be analysed without remainder into physico-chemical process. *This* is true creation, in which continuity is never lost, and the foolish theological association of "creating" with "making out of nothing," is abandoned. Any indetermination, any breach of logical continuity is fatal alike to truth, beauty, morality, and freedom. If my act does not express my character, how am I concerned in it or responsible for it?

Thus—I am only explaining my own position—ugliness, bad taste, bad morality, are for me one with bad logic, and bad logic is one with a severance of continuity, while perfect and reciprocal synthesis and analysis are the essence of good logic. If there is a gap in his logic a man can no more be acting or thinking freely than he could act physically if his spinal marrow were severed at the neck.

I have taken Parodi as an instance just because he is so plausible, and, I should guess, has a true instinct for concrete creativeness. But for me, as I have tried to express, creativeness is inherent in the synthetic character which is in all concrete reality *ab initio*; and if it has not been recognized in principle and at first we cannot put it in afterwards by adding a will or thought, which is a vacuum to conditions regarded as isolated factors.

LETTER CXVIII

(From the Italian, abbreviated)

Sep. 22, 1922

GENTILISSIMO SIG. BOSANQUET,

I have read the manuscript which you have been kind enough to send me. I will keep it, unless you ask me to return it.

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I certainly should agree with you that Parodi would have done better to have spoken, not of "premisses", but of preexisting judgments. Where he says that the connection is "not demonstrated", he seems to me to mean not demonstrated from without (as what truth is?). Where he speaks of will I am loth to believe that he means empty choice. That would be contingency, chance, and therefore, once more determination. He means the act of thought, which means spiritual integrity, an actualisation of the necessary values and relations of the activity through a power of concentration, like that by which the embryo recalls and repeats so many diverse visual forms and each of us has in him, in a sense, ages of life.

I think also that he ought not to say "motives" when he means the circumstances or conditions before they have become motives, or in so far as they are not included in the unity of the act. But he seems to me to be right in so far as he brings into evidence the novelty implied in the comprehension of a multiplicity of data in a single act of reasoning.

But the inaccuracy of certain expressions would not I believe have provoked your criticism had there not been the graver disagreement with the conception of creation and freedom, which seems to me the only possible one. I will try to explain myself clearly, though it will not be easy for me to bridge the gap between us. For in the first place our vocabularies differ more than I had supposed. You call *thought* what I call *an abstraction from thought*. Again objectivity according to you comes from things; according to me it comes from principles which are essential to and constitutive of what I call our "sensibility" itself. The dualism of a sensible and an intelligible world is fallacious. So too is the reservation of "thought" for what may be called the system or the intelligible reality, as opposed to the sensible reality. . . . Our sensibility as organ of knowledge seeks by a heroic effort to strip itself of itself and to interpret the world as a single system of intelligible (external) relations reciprocally and absolutely conditioned. Nevertheless I venture to think that the categories of externality and con-

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ditionality (the abstract forms of knowledge) has no right to arrogate to itself alone the name of thought, nor is it this that has most value and importance in thought.

It is by the category of *novelty*, or *necessity*, (= universality) expression (= individualisation) alone that the intelligence interprets itself, life and reality to itself. If it casts itself off from this category or principle it is false to itself. Without the conception of a true, total originality there is no understanding of life. *Pace* Bergson, conception with its principle of identity and non-contradiction and of individualisation is a function of life in general and not of reason alone. Existence and causality united in a single intelligible system is not the sum and substance of all knowledge. Take for instance a line of Shakespeare where we have the mind expressing itself in its wholeness. Here we have something internally coherent, everywhere identifiable in its diverse expressions. And by "diverse" I mean what is "new" in the sense of being unconditioned by the whole. "How unconditioned?" you ask. Unconditioned in the sense that the act or synthesis, so far as it is spiritual reality is wholly original, something claiming to be actualised according to principles, yet harmonizing with (*adeguandosi*) a complete system of material conditions, not one of which could change without involving a change in the synthesis. However much it demands and appropriates material conditions exactly corresponding to it, and wanting which this synthesis would not be, the synthesis, I repeat, is original.

It is here that the conception of freedom comes in. It is neither *empty choice*, nor *determinism*, nor a thing which is found only in a *determinate moment* of animal life or of the life of man or in a salient one (Stirner's stupid idea). Origination is in fact another name for activity or consciousness.

On the other hand I do not see how you can reconcile expressions like "effort of thinking", "striving to silence" etc. with a deterministic view. The proposition: "Spontaneity and capacity for variation come not with decrease of determinateness" (so far I

can agree as I do not believe there is any such thing as indeterminateness, though to say this is one thing, to say that everything is derived from the whole and explained by it is quite another) "but with the advance of complexity of organisation and delicacy of adjustment"—presents us with a *deus ex machina* like the "laws" of the positivists which fail to explain the why and the how of that which they pretend to explain.

The conception of a *nisus* given in advance and from all eternity—even were it a possible one—does not explain the presence of the principle as an actual value, nor the intelligence which has formed mammoths, ants, men, etc. or rather which actualises itself in these forms.

Following your manuscript I will note some other points. "then it is true that as such he is free 'par ce fait même que j'en comprende la nécessité?'" Freedom is something more than a comprehension of necessity: it is an actualisation of these necessities (whether of our sensibility, our sentiment, our thought, or our conscience) an actualisation whose degree of intensity (and therefore with the degree of value) is not given, and in which possibility is an essential element. A possibility of further actualisation of the mind's integrity in the richness of the material constitutes the reality of every theoretic and moral value.

(Ibid) "they throw the thinker too much outside the thought as if he were judging his own judgment in the moment of making it". Quite true: freedom is altogether one with every actualisation of inwardness. But the inward freedom belongs equally to thought and to the senses (which are essentially thought and only arbitrarily distinguishable from it). The senses obey and realise the internal originality which belongs to them. They do not err, or, if they err, they do so in the same way as thoughts also may err, by false assumptions etc. Our relative particularity and exclusiveness has quite another ground and reality than the crass fact of an irrelevant sensibility, as though our sensibility had not its own proper original and eternal necessities and its own proper objectivity.

It is true that "we cannot by a hair's breadth alter the course

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of thought"; but this is true also of sense; and it is true only if we identify ourselves with empty choice and with an external arbitrary activity, and only if we take the reality which we make or which makes itself and the reality which we find made as the activity of another. This reality we cannot alter in the sense of making it contradict its known essence, but not in the sense that we cannot make a difference in it. Can we or can we not? can there be or can there not be a synthesis more or less comprehensive, true and intense? And is not such a synthesis thought? is it not reality? and ought not that power to be understood in its inner significance and not veiled or withdrawn like a "pariah" in the face of other logical demands which may seem (though I do not think that they are) irreconcilable with it?

I shall be quite pleased if you run the glowing iron of your criticism (excuse the crudeness of the image) into my thought. Does my idea seem to you partial truth or downright error? I do not ask for a reply as you have already written so much to me, still less for a speedy one. I am unwilling to cause you trouble, and, if you do not reply, there will be no shade of protest on my part nor any expectation. But certainly the more you write the more pleased I shall be. I have your two volumes of *Logic* in Rome where I shall return at the beginning of November and can always refer to them.

Le mando i più devoti saluti

Suo affmo

L. VIVANTE

VILLA DE BOSIS, PIETRALACROCE, ANCONA

Sig. Vivante does not remember whether Bosanquet replied to this letter or not. By the time he received it he was in the throes of moving to Golder's Green and his health was already beginning to fail. We can only guess what his reply would have been. He would perhaps have been inclined to make the same complaint of Vivante as he makes of Parodi in the letter of July 8th, namely that he was apt to rely too much on certain phrases which had

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become the common property of the school, and too little on fresh individual analysis of the situation as found in actual experience. Perhaps in this he would have been right. It is the danger to which attachment to the words of any master exposes the disciple, and which Bosanquet himself is sometimes thought not wholly to have escaped.

Be all that as it may, the discussion had by this time been removed from private correspondence to the pages of Gentile's *Giornale Critico* by Bosanquet's article on Carlini's recently published book, *La Vita dello Spirito*, where we have now to follow it.

ii. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

(a) "The Distinction of Nature and Spirit."

After an apology for the double outrage he meditated committing on the fine structure at once of the Italian language and the Italian philosophy, Bosanquet quotes as the keynote of Carlini's book, *La Vita dello Spirito*, the statement on p. 130 that "Nature, the universe, in a word the object of sense experience is a factual reality which we think of as already so constituted that we are with regard to it in the position of spectators and as it were contemplators, not indeed indifferent to it, but with the consciousness that the deeper meaning (*le ragioni più profonde*) of our life is not to be found there." Leaving aside for the moment the implications of the phrase "already constituted," he confines himself in the first instance to the statement itself. Can we really accept it? By forcing the word "sensible" it might be possible to agree, but if we take it in its natural scope it is far from the truth. To cut man off from the world of sense as we have it in land and sea and their living contents would be to separate him from the springs of his mind's life. Even to insist on the alienness of external nature to ourselves is misleading. "The interest of man" we are told "is man; not natural history but human history." So interpreted man

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ceases to be man. Mere internality spells mere externality. Human history in the fertile sense is not the history of the human species; it is the story of the universe of experience.¹

Coming to the supposed ground of the distinction, it is not that the object of sense knowledge is outside experience. The object of knowledge is something posited and constructed by us. So far we are agreed. But there is something more. For to say this is not to reduce it to something, "constituted and experienced, a 'passato'" in contrast to "the moral reality which our action is continually summoned to constitute and *make to be*."

Nor again can the distinction be said to come from sense perception itself. Perception of a man, we are told, is the same thing as perception of a tree. The difference comes from the interpretation into which higher categories enter. Some objects present themselves as *subjects* whose "making" recognizes the making of others and is recognized by it. These belong to the moral world. The others are merely basal elements in our history which fail to evoke the higher categories. But is it really possible to maintain that there is any such break in the continuity of the two worlds? Does not the life of the spirit itself contain the two aspects in indissoluble union? Is it really true, as we are told, that "we have no communion with sea and mountain, draw neither joy nor strength nor courage from them?"²

If now we ask for the reason of this dualism we shall find it traceable partly to an epistemological, partly to an ethical source. As to the former, we accept the epistemology which refuses to recognize in nature anything which falls outside experience; but to say this is one thing, to refuse to recognize that nature as *within* experience has a positive life of its own and imparts spiritual impulses is quite another. "The Atlantic Ocean is no mere form precipitated from the private histories of millions of human sub-

¹ Correction of the Italian text from Bosanquet's MS.

² In the MS. version Bosanquet quotes *per contra*:

"Winds blow and waters roll
Strength to the brave and power and deity."

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jects. It has a magnificent private, individual life, posited certainly by our perception, but nevertheless a splendid gift and concrete revelation of the spirit in the sensible world, exactly as Dante is in the moral." The opposite view has its source, if not in error, at any rate in a very serious exaggeration of what is meant by construction in knowledge. "Thought (i.e. judgment) does not construct itself (this would be nonsense), but some grade of the life of the mind as it is lived in the whole and as this communicates itself in the act of construction. . . . It is thus that each of us in the great community of nature and of other selves makes his own little self."

The second reason is to be found in the distinctively ethical character of the philosophy we are studying. There is a sense in which every value can be called "moral" as contrasted with the physical. But "moral" may be used in the narrower sense of an attitude of the will to the "ought to be" in practice. And the mistake (or again the exaggeration) is to suppose that it is only through the latter that spiritual impulses come to us. Wordsworth's verses,

"One impulse from a vernal wood," etc.,

teach another lesson.

The pre-eminence assigned by Italian philosophy to the moral world in the narrower sense is in reality a survival from the ethical individualism of Kant, the criticism of which and of the intolerable and unsatisfying abstraction of individual perfectibility in Hegel has here been forgotten. The view that "religious faith springs in the first instance from the ground of the moral world" (p. 198) is certainly wrong. Religion springs up in direct contact with the universe and particularly the sensible universe. It is "a sigh for divinity, analogous to fear and adoration, developing through faith and will into union with the good and with the supreme power." Religion in fact is the concrete whole which contains morality as an abstract side of itself, as Spaventa seems to have seen. The fine passage towards the end of the book in which the

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writer insists that "spirituality belongs not only to the world of action, but also to that of perception, and we ought therefore to find God underlying not only the moral problem but the problem of external reality"—suggests that we are not so far apart. Yet so long as the "moral" continues to be confined to the narrow sense of the ethical there is still something that divides us. He ends by quoting the passage on p. 287 of Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, in which the shallowness of the dilemma on which onesided reflection seeks to impale the religious consciousness ("If real, how realize? If realize, then not real") is exposed, as to himself conclusive of the whole matter.

Carlini's reply was published in a "Postilla" in the same number of the *Giornale*. After a polite acknowledgment of the importance of the event of Bosanquet's "coming amongst us" with his article, the writer goes on to attribute to him an approach to the subject persistently "naturalistic," and based upon an appeal to a "thing-in-itself" entirely independent of our consciousness, thus reviving points of view against which the whole idealistic philosophy from the time of Berkeley had in reality been directed. Bosanquet himself holds that the objective world is a construction? How can he also maintain that it is something that we find? As to the limitation of moral reality to the response of the will to the "ought to be," what Hegel denounced was not this but an "ought" that never became a reality. Neo-idealism escapes this criticism in so far as it holds that there is no reality—nothing of value—beyond the act of free spirit. As to religion, we Italians find the mysticism of a Bruno, calling on us to lose our "little selves" in "the abyss of incomprehensible excellence," as unsatisfying as Bosanquet finds our doctrine of an *ens realissimum* consisting of "the greatest reality already actualized." Finally, as though to illustrate the facility with which his idea of the object of religion passed unconsciously into something more, Carlini offers as an equivalent of it the definition of God as "the absolute subject and the absolute object."

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LETTER CXIX

(From the Italian)

PISA¹

VIA S. GIUSEPPE 12

ILLUSTRE PROFESSORE,

20.III.'22

I think that you have hit the exact point of our disagreement when you indicate its origin in the problem of knowledge. I know Bradley's book *Appearance and Reality* though I do not possess it, so that I postpone to another occasion a fuller consideration of the passages which you quote. I shall hardly be free from a pressing piece of work on which I am engaged for a few weeks; when I come to review your volume for Gentile's *Giornale Critico*² the indication given in your letter will be useful to me. It seems to me clear meantime that our differences resolve themselves into this: that you in the problem of knowledge start from a dualistic position and try, proceeding from this, to arrive at a unity which alone can secure the objective validity of the knowledge; I, on the other hand, starting from the philosophy of Gentile, in which this unity is maintained as the condition of the very possibility of knowledge and therefore *a priori* (inasmuch as the object is always a *known* evolved in the very process of knowing), seek thereafter to establish a duality, rather a dualism (object and subject) of a world of sense and a moral world within the unity of the absolute act, which is absolute, autocreative thought. English philosophy, including the contemporaneous, is exceedingly interesting and close to Italian in many respects. I try to get my students to study it, and, if there were a better supply of books in Italy, I should succeed better than I do.

Professor Mario Casotti (r. liceo di Pisa) would much like to receive a copy of the review which you wrote of his volume on Education,³ and also of your book "The Meeting of Extremes etc"

¹ Where Sig. Carlini, now Rector, was then Professor in the University.

² See Appendix. The "letter" has been lost.

³ This appeared in the October number of *Mind*, 1921. Although Casotti is a follower of Gentile, and with him resolves all education into self-education, Bosanquet finds in his demand for "a religious adhesion

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of which he would like to write a notice for the review *Levana*, lately started and already widely read in Italy. Can you oblige him? My good friend Pellizzi is coming shortly to Pisa: he will be able by and bye to bring him whatever you care to send. If it is not possible, do not trouble. Best thanks all the same: it is an honour to us that you take so much interest in our affairs. I read English but I do not venture yet to write it. You on the other hand read and write Italian as few do! Mi abbia con cordiale ossequio

Suo dev.

ARMANDO CARLINI

LETTER CXX

THE HEATH COTTAGE

QUEEN'S DRIVE

OXSHOTT

SURREY

July 26, 1922

DEAR PROFESSOR CARLINI,

I am very grateful to you for sending me the copies of my article and of your "Postilla". It was good of you to take so much pains to explain your views in relation to the ideas of an intrusive foreigner.

You must have much experience of philosophical controversy, as I also have, and we shall neither of us be surprised that we cannot at first—I do not say come to an agreement, for the world would be the poorer if all philosophers agreed—but come completely within reach of each other's intelligence. When I see what impression my book produces on you, or on anyone who may come to notice it, I will try to form a judgment, perhaps consulting Professor Pellizzi, whether Professor Gentile or yourself would care for me to try again an Italian article, or whether my intrusion is really so unsuccessful that it had better not be repeated.

and submission to reality," what "almost suffices to constitute a philosophical advance upon Gentile's attitude" of gratitude and reverence to the world, social and other, which helps to educate us.

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As you might expect, your view of my general position is not one which I should admit. My watchword in philosophy is "The reality is the whole"; and in this view I and those from whom I have learned conceive ourselves diametrically opposed to all forms of naturalism and realism, when setting themselves up for philosophies. On the other hand, I do think that respect for the whole involves a more restricted view of the scope and power of individual human thought than I seem to find in your recent philosophy.

This, I think, is the real issue between us—the "creative" value of human thought. What you say on p. 69 about the Atlantic is true, I think, except for the words "*produzione collettiva*" etc. Do you seriously mean that, assuming my power and knowledge in educated vision, the variation of the objects which I see, apart from any movement or alteration of my body or its position, is a creation of my thought, or of that of human individuals collectively? I am not, very likely, so great an authority as yourself on Berkeley;¹ but surely he gives no support to such a view. Cognition, for him, is always surely a revelation of the divine activity which sustains the order of nature, and is essentially beyond human power. I can hardly think you would dispute my proposition about the judgment if you considered it with reference to the implications of cognition. Every affirmation surely qualifies a reality beyond itself by a character of experience. If the reality is nothing beyond the cognitive act, then, surely, nothing is affirmed; no truth or information is conveyed.

But I must break off.

With best thanks and wishes

I am

Yours very truly

BERNARD BOSANQUET

¹ "For the correction of Bosanquet's claim for 'a knowable other than our act of knowing it,'" Carlini had asked, "is there any need of once again troubling the good Berkeley?"

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LETTER CXXI

FORTE DEI MARMI (LUCCA)
ITALY

11.VIII.'22

DEAR DR. BOSANQUET,

I must apologize for my delay in answering your letter of July 2nd. It was forwarded to me something like a month after it reached my house in London.¹

.... Prof. Carlini is here, living very near to me for the holidays. We are having sea sports together on these beautiful sands. Your polemic with him has suscitated much interest; I think he is now answering a letter of yours, which he shewed me. I am certain that your idea of sending another article in Italian will be very welcome. It is always good to put bridges between scholars of various countries.

.... With my best wishes

Yours devotedly

CAMILLO PELLIZZI

LETTER CXXII

(From the Italian)

FORTE DEI MARMI (LUCCA)
VILLA PELLIZZI

16.VIII.(1922)

ILLUSTRE AMICO,

I had your letter on returning from a journey and have delayed a few days to reply in order to have some phrases explained to me by my friend Pellizzi, in whose villa by the sea I now am and where I shall remain for at least a month. If you were to reply to my "Postilla" it could be nothing but an honour and a pleasure to me and to the Review; it would also be very interesting to the readers that the discussion should be continued, if for no other

¹ Sig. Pellizzi, now Professor of Italian, was then Lecturer in University College, London.

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reason than that the central point of difference between our two idealisms should be seen in every light. In my view it consists in my having called *naturalism* on your part that to which our school opposes what we call spiritualism. To say that "reality is the whole" is not to decide the question seeing that this dictum can be accepted by every philosopher. What we want to know is *what* is the principle of all reality. Now, if I have rightly understood, you conceive that principle as a *nature*, not merely physical, but also ideal and spiritual, which nevertheless remains always *nature*, something that is presupposed in the creative act of self-consciousness. This creative act therefore has no longer any sense, seeing that what is *made* is already given independently of its *making*. Even knowledge is either nothing or it is a creative act: reality is not *by* that reduced to nothing but comes as a result in the very reality of the dialectic inherent in the act. In a word the principle of every reality is for us the self-conscious act. But the adjective human, which you add to it, could not be accepted by some of us without the greatest reserve. It is a matter with us of an act which is *divine* not less than human, seeing that man and the subject of which we speak is transcendental, universal and absolute, one which realises itself, indeed, in the most individual act of the self, but does not thereby lose its universality and absoluteness, seeing that the individuality of the self is for us the very individuality, in its purity, of the act. It is not at all a matter of *particular* individuals, or of men objectively and empirically thought of as we think of such and such other beings that move on the surface of the earth.

I have tried (departing rather in letter than in spirit from my masters) to understand that self in the concreteness of *history* as collective experience. In other words, while Gentile for example insists on the fact that every reality is such in the act by which it is real and is that determinate reality, I have insisted on the historical and social significance of the act, which in being perfectly individual does not thereby exclude multiplicity but involves and resolves it in itself. Of course (and this ought never to be forgotten)

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for me also history and society cannot be understood as phenomena which occur on the surface of the earth, but in the only way consistent with the pure concept of spiritual act. Our spiritualism consists altogether in the affirmation of self-consciousness as absolute principle. It has nothing to do with the spirit as already existing reality beside or together with a nature different from it: this coexistence or union would make spirit *nature* instead of absolute self-conscious act.

Lastly you should remember that although there are not wanting many points of agreement between Croce and Gentile there is nevertheless a gulf between their respective philosophical positions. The doctrine of the act is Gentilian; the philosophy of Croce really inclines (as you have noted in your book) to a species of "humanism". The contrast between Croce and Gentile is the starting point of the reflections in my small book, which therefore become clear to anyone who has this contrast clearly before him.

I am very grateful to you, dear Signore, for the interest which you take in my observations. La prego di credermi con ossequio e profonda stima

Suo dev.

ARMANDO CARLINI

LETTER CXXIII

24 PEMBRIDGE CRESCENT, W.11

12—XI—'22

DEAR DR. BOSANQUET,

. . . . I shall be always delighted if you will put me any question or suggest to me any criticism on Gentile or Carlini; of course, I think it is only fair from me to warn you that my way of thinking is nowadays no longer "orthodox" as compared with Gentile's or Carlini's ideas. Still, as England has certainly influenced me, it may be that my way of looking at certain problems will appear more manageable to English scholars.

Mussolini has begun beautifully; of course the work he has to do is enormous, and it will take time. Gentile is certainly inter-

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rupting his studies,¹ but not his thoughts; in his life, he always managed to carry on some practical activity besides his studying. I do not need to say that his assumption to the Ministry by Mussolini has been one of the greatest joys of my life.

Yours very sincerely

CAMILLO PELLIZZI

(b) "Naturalism and the Philosophy of the Whole."

Absolute idealism had been accused of many things, but seldom by any responsible thinker, of Naturalism or of reviving the idea of a thing-in-itself. No wonder that Bosanquet was stirred to write a second article devoted to exposing what he thought so gross a misunderstanding. This appeared in the March number of the *Giornale* 1923, under the above title.

To Carlini's accusation of contradicting himself in holding that the objective world is a construction of thought and at the same time something independent of it he replies, in terms long familiar to his English readers, that it is one thing to "construct in thought," another to "create in reality." In construction we affirm elements which we do not owe in any sense to our will; and, if it be asked to what then do we owe them, when sensible perception is absent? logic is ready with the reply that we owe them to the demands of the whole of experience, which is under the necessity of organizing and completing itself and can only be organized and completed in this way. These elements we *find*, we do not *produce*, just as we do not produce a new planet in interpreting the movements of those which we see. This is not to fall back on a thing-in-itself outside of all experience. The external world is a distinguishable form of experience, and has its own characteristic reality, in contrast to the thing-in-itself, which has no place in the context of experience, but would be something transcending, not only the world of sensible experience, but also the whole world

¹ By the acceptance of the post of Minister of Education in Mussolini's Cabinet.

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of constructive thought. A complement to sense knowledge accepted in the above way is neither a thing-in-itself nor something produced by our knowledge, any more than the inside of a stone or the other side of the moon. To say that something new is produced by the process of knowledge is to destroy knowledge. And what is true of knowledge is true of art and poetry. We read the poem, and in reading construct it. Each of us, it is true, in reading it adds something to it, or perhaps takes something from it; but to say with Gentile that we have made it, just as much as the poet has made it, is sheer and misleading exaggeration.

Nature thus understood as living and concrete has nothing to do with Naturalism or Paganism. The conception of the spiritual *body* of the church came directly or indirectly to St. Paul from Plato (*Rep.* 462 and 589 E), that of the beauty of nature (*φύσιος χάρις*) while appearing in Greek poetry of the third century B.C. reaches its full splendour in the parable of the Kingdom of Heaven and of "the lilies of the field."¹ Every concrete experience from that of the enjoyment of nature to religion has its own value, as revealing in its own degree the spirit of the whole. And the standard of their value again goes back to Plato (*Rep.* 585 D) as the extent to which they are filled with reality and are really satisfying—again also taken up in the sayings at the well in Samaria.²

He does not reply directly to Carlini's comparison of his Absolute to Bruno's Abyss, but he had already in effect done so in the article of the previous year already quoted: "Compare Benedetto Croce with Jakob Böhme and ask yourself if a reasonable man can sit down with either. Certainly compared with these the concluding Remarks of *Ethical Studies* embody in my judgment a view as much deeper than the one as it is saner than the other."³

In a "Postilla" in the same number Carlini wisely confines himself to the attempt to state the precise point of separation

¹ Cp. what he says on the greater depth of our sense of unity with nature as compared with that of the Greeks, p. 208 above.

² Cp. *What Religion Is*, c. iv. ³ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 60.

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between their respective views. He finds it in their different interpretations of what is meant by knowing. For himself knowing is the total act of self-consciousness—an act which he takes as itself a point of departure without presupposing any other reality. For Bosanquet there is another reality presupposed in the act of knowing, called by him the Whole, Nature, Spirit. It is to find this that the act goes out, in a pre-Kantian manner, as to something which produces what we know. Carlini admits the need of this going out, but he attributes it to an "exigency" which is implicit in the self-conscious act itself—a part of its own dialectic. Hence, to bridge the gulf between this point of view and a more modern and more truly Kantian one, Bosanquet has to have recourse to a conception which we find also in French idealists, namely the *analogy* between the creative act of the world and that of our own experience, and to the attempt to find an ideal coincidence between the whole of logico-empirical knowledge, as a process, and the real whole, instead of finding this whole as something given in the reality of the process itself. The difference is between *presupposing* and *including* and this makes an impassible gulf between the two points of view. The analogy that Bosanquet appeals to remains either a rhetorical figure or a naturalistic idea. Not perceiving this, Bosanquet thinks that we can still speak of the aesthetic qualities of natural objects as we can of their weight and colour, and that we can find the origin of the conception of spirituality (i.e. self-consciousness, moral personality, subjectivity) in Greek philosophy, and the dominant characteristics of Christianity instead of in the denial of naturalism. In this denial we in Italy are not denying nature and natural beauty. We are denying the attempt to find the reason for the existence of nature, or for our attribution of value to it, outside of the life of self-consciousness as *we* know it in ourselves.

Bosanquet did not live to see his second article or Carlini's reply to it in print. In a note at the end of the same number of the *Giornale* in which they both appeared is the announcement

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of his death, to which the editor adds: "We are particularly grieved, seeing that we lose in him a warm friend of our philosophical movement. In England he was ranked with justice amongst the most living and fertile writers in philosophy, to the problems of which even at an advanced age he devoted a youthful activity."

EPILOGUE

It is no business of an editor to go beyond the written words of his texts. But it may be legitimate by way of epilogue to this Part to try to interpret what is likely to be suggested to the reader who has followed the discussion so far as the words carry us. What gives particular interest and importance to it is the exceptional clearness with which the controversy between the two main forms of professedly idealistic doctrine, at the present time before the world, comes to a point at which an understanding between them might almost be said to have been in sight. For myself I cannot help feeling, as Bosanquet himself and some of his Italian friends obviously did, that the points of these "mighty opposites", though "incensed" enough, were not so "fell" as either side seemed to think; and that they were kept opposites in great degree partly by the different associations that stock phrases such as activity, novelty, freedom itself, have in Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries, partly by the different histories that lie at the back of the two forms of doctrine as they have developed in these countries respectively—the one for generations free from the incubus of Catholic tradition and from the danger of confusing forms of experience transcending sense and discursive thought, as we have them in science, with a mystic transcendence of all experience; the other still threatened with the revival of mediaeval mysticism as the one alternative to naturalism. In view of that history it might, for example, be seen to be as irrelevant to confuse the absolutist's rejection of subjectivism in all its forms with naturalism as to confuse the neo-idealist's rejection of historic religion with any desire to deny that the world, in its essence as a system of infinite spiritual values, has a character that remains constant in the welter of men's endeavours to actualize them in the finite lives of individuals and nations.

Following on this insight, might come a perception of the equal irrelevance of accusing the absolutist of making the transition from

the finite to the infinite by the help of any flimsy analogy,¹ and of accusing the neo-idealist of conceiving of spiritual activity as in any way creating or adding to the realm of ends, instead of as an extension of it over a wider field of temporal life. To Bosanquet certainly the existence of the Absolute was no weak inference from finite experience but an actual part of its content. He was prepared to say that "we have the Absolute throughout" and even that "we experience it better than we experience anything else."² Neo-idealists, on the other hand, like Carlini and Vivante seem to be prepared, as we see from their letters, to insist that novelty belongs to spiritual activity only in so far as man raises himself above the level of a being appearing with others like him "upon the surface of the earth," and makes his life a revelation of a world of values which differentiates him from them as truly creative, but which otherwise is eternal in the heavens.

Yet when all is said that can be said in favour of such approximations, and that naturally rises in one's mind on reading this interchange of ideas in high places, I believe we shall still be conscious of a difference of emphasis, that may easily enough pass into a difference of principle between the two points of view, if the understanding which Bosanquet sought to bring about is not carried further. To the supporters of the one the apparently uncompromising emphasis on the ultimateness of time and progress, even of self-consciousness as we know it in human life, is apt to be as repellent as the uncompromising emphasis on their relativity to the idea of the timeless, the perfect, and the supra-personal is to the other. That this conflict is apt also to express itself in a difference of theory as to the ultimacy of the ethical and political in contrast to the religious point of view—perhaps therewith as to the ends of national education is only too obvious in the present state of Europe—witness Gentile's apparent acceptance of Mussolini's theory of the absoluteness of the State in his denial of the existence of any collective will beyond it.³ But to say this is only

¹ See p. 302 above.

² *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 27.

³ *Reform of Education*, Eng. tr., p. 13.

Epilogue

to say that philosophy, as understood by both schools, has still a work to do in the continuance of the effort to reconcile the truths for which they respectively stand with one another, which, as Bosanquet profoundly felt, is of far more than merely theoretic interest at the present time.

OBITER SCRIPTA

1. To his niece, R. B., in Oxford:

"To enjoy time without wasting it is the highest art in life perhaps."

2. To the same:

"Educated women with leisure and real culture are not yet too common. One feels that each of them may be a really precious possession to the country."

3. To the same, apropos of an arrangement with a publisher about a book:

"It is so very difficult to fix the exact lines of justice in these delicate matters that I am convinced the only satisfactory solution is when each party is willing to do more than the other party demands."

4. To the same, apropos of the Home Rule vote on January 28, 1910:

"If you meet Unionists who object to the Nationalist vote being important in the H. of C. I hope you will tell them they are Separatists and Little Englanders. It is strictly true; they will neither organize the U.K. on a reasonable system of devolution, nor treat it bona fide as a political unity."

5. To the same on the election of the same year, in which he took a part.

"On the whole my opinion of the democracy was raised."

6. To the same on his brother, Admiral Bosanquet:

"Uncle Day sent me a S. Australian paper the other day which reported one of his speeches about the future of a colonial navy, and the essential qualities of seamanship being the same as they always have been, and about justice being an essential qualification of officers. He really does say very fine things."

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7. Apropos of his experience of an anaesthetic:

"My friends said I was over-excited—literally 'intoxicated' I suppose. Is it not odd that toxic = poisonous should mean belonging to a bow and arrow because of the early habit of poisoning arrows and should then have come down to the special current meaning of intoxication?"

8. On an article in *The Times* on the May weather 1912, in which the Latin lyric [identified with the aid of Professor Alexander as the *Pervigilium Veneris* of the 2nd century A.D.] with the refrain

"Cras amet qui numquam amavit,
Quique amavit cras amet"

was quoted:

"It is one of those beautiful things that scholars never told one about when one was being educated, because (I suppose) it was A.D. and not B.C."

9. To Mrs. R. C. B. on his *Social and International Ideals*:

"It contains the essence of my faith,"

and of the War:

"I believe we shall have a better world for it."

10. To R. C. B., Xmas, 1918:

"It was very pleasant reading what you told me about my recent book (*Social and International Ideals*) and the old *Philos. of the State*. I always rather longed for appreciation from my family; but our lines were not quite the same, and but for your Father and Mother's splendid sense of family unity and personal affection, I should have been a lonely being, at least till my marriage."

And:

"I hope public things are coming straight. I think it important to be confident: after all, all depends on credit, doesn't it? and credit is confidence, I suppose."

11. To the same, July 1919:

"I think you are right in what you fear for the permanence of retrospective pride in the war. And the young people who took no

part—won't they regard Haig and the veterans as gods? I am perhaps most anxious about the economic policy. I feel certain that hostile tariffs are the main cause of war, and I fear there are many evil interests in England lying in wait to exploit any necessary economic precautions. . . . These barriers to human intercourse are loathsome to me."

12. To the same at the time of the Railway Strike:

"I am afraid you are separated from us by a storm centre; but I suppose you are in reach of the necessities of life at Rock. What a queer background for Peace Day! It seems to me really all very natural; I almost had a fancy to write something on the text, "Then it is all true," i.e. all we were taught about material things being unreliable and only spiritual things real. Hegel says we hear such a lot about this from the pulpit, but when it seems to be coming true——!"

13. To the same, January 1921:

"The economists till lately have seemed to me a singularly unenterprising and uninformative race. They have not really risen to their mission. Even now the Labour Party's literature seems to me better than the Oxford tracts. But I don't mean to say that you are not right about new problems arising."

14. To his niece, E. P. B., August 1920:

"I wonder what you think of Ireland; I still think our Government might have gone further. Six conditions sounds such a lot; and if it is to be a treaty I think it must be between independent Powers. I believe more courage would have paid better."

15. To Mrs. R. C. B., February 1921:

"I wonder if you know the Four Lectures on the English Revolution by my old teacher in philosophy, T. H. Green. I was much pleased that some historian at Oxford thought them worth reprinting in a separate volume some years ago, though not of course up to date in research and all that, I always think they have the quintessence of the Nonconformist movement in them."

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16. To R. C. B., October 28, 1918, in reference to a town-planning scheme for a regional survey of the whole Mersey area after the war:

"It seems to me an overwhelming problem to determine where the people (are) to live before they can settle the question of going there. Did I ever tell you that hearing Jowett's Political Economy lecture as a raw undergraduate I could hardly understand what he meant by saying that one day the State would have to determine where houses might be built? I take it the word regional came partly from Patrick Geddes and partly from an American lecturer, Stanton Coit, who tried to establish Neighbourhood Guilds in London."

17. To the Rev. F. E. Plater, January 1902, on Christian Charity and Greek and Roman Liberality:

"Christian Charity represents a falling away from the purposiveness of the Greek Ideal. When you get the best of the Christian spirit, e.g. in Francis of Assisi (or in the apostolic days), that is the best you can have. But in the ecclesiastical and theological fabric the virtue in question tended to get separated literally from its purpose and stiffened into a routine, which of course really apostolic men would just smash up, and then it would stiffen again."

18. Letter to *The Times*, September 20, 1920, on Neighbourly Kindness:

"Neighbourly kindness—inventive and creative, at the hands of those whose neighbourly sentiment has fortified itself by a wide practice and experience—is the general function of free social reciprocity in difficulty and emergency, without which no decent society can possibly exist. As all the Lord's people were to be prophets, so all the members of the community are to be educated and experienced one way and another in the art of living together. Then emergencies and accidents, failures and distress, will be things which love and experience will, so to speak, take in their stride, as to a great extent they do to-day in a strong and united family."

19. To R. C. B.:

"I try hard not to be a Pharisee (vicarious after all), but I can't help thinking sometimes how simple all social problems would be if the spirit that has ruled at Rock had ruled over the English town

Obiter Scripta

and country. . . . I have always been furious at the way people talk of and portray the country labourer as 'Hodge,' from my recollection of our people."

20. To the same, apropos of Cornford's *From Religion to Philosophy*:

"I am not quite sure how far they think that they have explained things away when they have traced their history; to me they seem just to be coming to meet the modern theory from the other end."

21. To Mrs. R. C. B., March 11, 1920:

"It was very good of you to tell me about Mr. Braithwaite's account of the phrase 'Friends in the Truth' as an extension of the word Friends as originally used. Then I may take it that the original use was—what I always thought so beautiful and natural—simply 'Friends,' i.e. of each other, and perhaps (it strikes me as I write) with an implication of their attitude to the world."

22. To the same, September 22, 1922, on moving to Golder's Green:

"We shall be nearer friends, freer in our own minds and close to the far side of Hampstead Heath, the quiet side. There is a Friends' Meeting house close to, where we may find a congenial atmosphere perhaps."

23. To the same, February 13, 1921 (of his grand-nephews and nieces):

"What a pleasure it is to us to make friends with these dear creatures, who accept us so frankly and heartily and don't seem the least strange."

24. To the same, January 29, 1913, on Alice-in-Wonderland Dodgson:

"I remember the man; sat next to him once when dining with Holford; a pale, prim, white chokered parson; and with absolute gravity kept me in fits of laughter the whole of dinner."

25. To his niece, F. B., April 6, 1919, on Viscount Grey:

"You will have heard from home or seen in the papers about the progress of Viscount Grey's blindness. It occurred to me that the words of Milton's sonnet on his blindness, the one that begins 'Cyriac——' applied very truly to Edward Grey, and I mentioned

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it to Lord Haldane, who was here yesterday. He is going to mention it to Edward Grey, and I hope it may cheer him if he has not had it pointed out to him already. You remember the words:

‘to have lost them overplied
In Liberty’s defence, my noble task,
Of which all Europe talks from side to side.
This thought may lead me through the world’s vain mask,
Content, though blind, had I no better guide.’”

26. To R. C. B., November 23, 1920, apropos of their silver wedding:

“We really can’t think of anything we are in want of, unless you could give us a few more years to work.”

IN MEMORIAM

"... THE public loss to philosophy is very great, proportionate to the great work he did, of which it is better to think than of the ending of it. For my own part, I always looked upon him as a leader, and I never read him without learning from him. And I owe him a debt of gratitude for constant kindness, and for encouragement in my work, however much I diverged from him—encouragement given in public as well as in private."

S. ALEXANDER

"... I have the sense that one of the best friends I ever had is gone from me. He understood everything."

HALDANE

"Every memory I have of him during more than fifty years is one of pleasure and admiration, and some of them are of pride in his approval of things I had written. I have not the least doubt that recognition of his wonderfully many-sided work will continue, long after our time, to increase."

A. C. BRADLEY

"Perhaps few persons can appreciate better than I do both the amount and the quality of the work done by your husband in philosophy. His was indeed a strenuous life, and to think of how much more he might yet have accomplished is indeed saddening. And, with regard to the high original quality of his work, no one who can judge will be for a moment in doubt. His place in the history of philosophy is, I am certain, secure."

F. H. BRADLEY

"There have been many vicissitudes in the philosophical field contrary more or less to Idealism since Green went silent. Your husband has indeed been the doughty protagonist not merely in the preservation of fundamental principle, but in that yet more difficult task of eliciting wisdom from modes of thought more alien to his own, and fostering amicable and workable relations throughout the entire field of speculative thought. His last published volume, *Contemporary Philosophy*, is to my

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thinking nothing less than imperial in its illustration of such a temper. His influence must surely remain abiding, the very finest fruit of our English School of Philosophy."

F. OSMASTON

"... I have throughout my life learned so much from him, and though we differed on some points I have always looked to him for guidance on the fundamentals of philosophy. And it was always such a pleasure to meet him, for he was the very soul of courtesy."

A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON

"In view of the differences between our outlooks and the controversies thereby entailed on your husband and myself, I am somewhat concerned lest any words of mine may strike you just now as discordant. But in truth, as I had occasion to say in writing to F. H. Bradley but a few weeks ago, there is nothing that has for long exercised my mind more than the desire to work my way from my standpoint to that which he and your husband shared. I have never seen my way to begin where they did—with the Absolute; but I have never doubted that that is the goal for us all. What my old teacher Lotze felt in regard to Hegel has been pretty much my feeling about them. . . ."

JAMES WARD

"... Bosanquet's death is a great loss—a big man gone. Of recent years I have been more and more appreciating his size. Also his broad outlook and his single-minded devotion to truth have made him an inspiring figure. He is one of the outstanding men who have collectively made the epoch of thought of the last forty years. I am sure that some of the main principles for which he contended will be found embodied in the slow philosophic reconstruction of the future."

A. N. WHITEHEAD

"Reverente omaggio caro grande maestro con commosso ricordo."

Telegram from L. VIVANTE

APPENDIX

CARLINI's review of *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* appeared in the September number of the *Giornale Critico*, 1922, and may be said to be the official reply of the School to the challenge to it contained in Bosanquet's book, written by one who, in virtue of his own recently published study,¹ was exceptionally well fitted to undertake it. After a well-informed statement of the rise of neo-realism in England and America and the bifurcation of it which followed, the writer goes on to notice that the idealism against which it was directed is quite a different thing from the Italian form of the doctrine. With the latter neo-realism stands in no direct relation. The "extremes," in fact, are not extremes of the same thing and they do not "meet." The interest of the book therefore consists not in this soi-disant "meeting," but in the way in which the author faces each of the supposed opposites with his own philosophy, which, instead of being a "robuster" form of idealism than the Italian, is in reality a much anglicized form of eclecticism combining features borrowed from the two supposed opposites. Carlini agrees with the censure he passes on neo-realism for its preoccupation with the problem of sense-perception, and its confusion of transcendence of the immediacy of sense (which is demanded by idealism), with transcendence of the reality we meet with in experience (which is rejected by it). On the other hand, he accuses him of having altogether failed in his interpretation of Italian idealism not only to realize the difference between Croce and Gentile,² but to appreciate the fact that they both rest for the vindication of their doctrines, not on abstract conceptions, but on the witness of a living experience that escapes the conceptual nets which Bosanquet spreads for it. Even in giving them credit for their historical method he fails to see that the onward march of spirit, as they conceive it, is not *a* reality but *the one* reality and is not therefore to be confused, as he confuses it, with any empirically discoverable "progress" of man, as a natural species, towards betterment.

These errors culminate in his interpretation of what they mean by thought and self-consciousness. If the "pure act" of thought be taken as something merely immediate and finite, relative to something else of which it is at once a revelation and a limitation, the doctrine would be as fallacious as the counter doctrine of neo-realism. But this is not what is

¹ *La filosofia contemporanea* (1922).

² See what Carlini says on this in his letter, p. 299 above.

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meant. The act is "an Absolute" and therefore amenable neither to the author's censure of "narrowness," "humanism," "subjectivity," nor to correction from the point of view of the jumble (*guazzabuglio*) of materialistic and Bergsonian ideas that we have in Alexander's evolutionary realism. The source of his error is that he fails to take account of the real requirements (*esigenze*) of the situation, to confront which he has nothing but his own grandiose and wholly dogmatic metaphysical edifice. Carlini is willing to admit that there may still be some treasures of reflection discoverable in it, and that neo-idealism may find questions raised by it that may be usefully reconsidered, e.g. that to which Bosanquet has called attention in his little book, *What Religion Is*, of the basis of religion as other than a mystical transcendence of experience. It may well be that for the fuller justification of religious experience there is a point of view from which an argument may be found less open to the objections of "humanism," "historicism," and "mentalism" which he brings against our idealism. But these and similar objections lose all force when they come from within a structure which, owing to the weakness of its foundations and the ruin of so many of its main walls, is incapable of offering a secure refuge to thought which concerns itself with the great problems of spiritual life. In its too rigid insistence on immanentism, idealism may still be showing too much of the imprint it has received from the positivism which Bosanquet finds so objectionable in contemporary philosophy. Meantime it may certainly be claimed for it that it has proved a salutary bath, freeing us, among other things, of the presuppositions of a reality anterior to "the act in which and by which it is posited." The article ends with the suggestion that a similar bath of rigorous positivism might with advantage be recommended to Bosanquet.

Bosanquet must have seen this review, but we must suppose only after his second article had left his hands, seeing that the latter contains no allusion to it. We are therefore left to conjecture what his reply would have been. To the claim put forward at the end on behalf of Italian idealism as a liberator from the weight of tradition he would have been ready to agree;¹ but I cannot help thinking that the metaphor of the bath would have suggested to his mind the homely warning as to the danger of these wholesale evacuations. What he certainly regarded as of supreme importance in philosophy was the fate at the hands of

¹ See what he says on this head in his *Quarterly Review* article on Croce's *Philosophy*, pp. 196-7 above. • •

Appendix

theorists of the living content of experience, and particularly, in these latter years, that of religion, the foundations of which seemed to him to be threatened by the return to Kant or, at any rate, to Fichte which Italian idealism seemed to be proclaiming. From the point of view of those who, like him, sought to follow the march of thought along the line of the great idealistic tradition, especially in its advance upon Kant, there seemed something strange in a philosophy, which claimed to found itself on history and to find its vindication not in abstract ideas but in the living experience of the race, being so ready to turn its back upon a line of thought which since the days of Socrates has sought to preserve intact the finer essence of that experience. That Carlini himself is not wholly happy about the religious implications of the teaching of the school seems clear from his admission, towards the end of his article, of the possibility of a positivist taint still adhering to it. If the cure for the errors of its opponents is a reimmersion in a rigorous positivism, perhaps the cure for its own exaggerations may be a similar reimmersion in a rigorous transcendentalism—not in the popular sense of a separation of the world of ideas from the world of things, but in the sense of the essential interpenetration of the two worlds. Neo-idealism seems to admit such an interpenetration in the world of human creations, while refusing to admit it elsewhere. What has always seemed obvious to the older idealism is that nature in the wide sense of the word (*Natura sive Deus*) as the all-inclusive whole, if it cannot be said to be *pre-existent* to spiritual experience in some form, must be admitted to be *super-existent* to that form of it which we know in ourselves, and cannot be immediately translated into terms of finite experience or interpreted without remainder as a creation of it. To call the thought which is the essence of this experience “an Absolute” does not help us until by further analysis we have set out the nature of the element of absoluteness presupposed in its work—in other words, the claim upon it of a standard of truth indifferently describable as objective or absolute. Does Italian idealism really intend, in asserting the creativity of thought in ourselves to deny what I have called the super-existence of this and the other ideal values?

I have already suggested that in the recognition of such a form of being, as the condition of the creativity neo-idealism claims for the human spirit (as we seem to find it in some at least of its representative thinkers), it may be possible to find a ground of reconciliation between these two divergent schools of idealistic thought. But I confess that I am not very hopeful of effective advance towards so happy a consummation through controversy conducted at long range in books and articles that almost by their nature contain appeals to a gallery that

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delights in epithets. It is for this reason that I believe in the greater effectiveness of the kind of friendly correspondence of which the first section of the last Part of this volume is so admirable an illustration than of the public controversy of the second. Philosophy as we know it began in the time of Socrates with discussions among friends concerned only to listen to the still small voice of reason as they sought "to follow the argument whithersoever it might lead." Distance and preoccupation with the multiform business of life in these days make such discussion the rare privilege of a few. But the post-office remains, and if the publication of these letters shows the resources that still lie to our hand of reaching through it a greater measure of agreement on the chief issues of philosophy and life, it will have accomplished what was perhaps the most important part of its object.

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